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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates law and analyses its representations in popular culture. Law is a 
powerful institution within western society with a regulatory role that is supported by a 
range of complementary discourses that accord with society's dominant cultural values. 
This thesis proposes that while such institutional hegemony is never stable as there is 
always an expectation of challenge or resistance, law is currently experiencing a series 
of challenges on numerous fronts. Legal commentators themselves acknowledge that 
law mm faces a ·crisis of confidence' that may affect its status and impact on its power 
to control and regulate. Media arc cultural phenomena that can point to changes 
occurring in society, and this thesis, in examining law's representations in popular 
culture, seeks to determine whether challenges, as oppositional discourses, are present 
and available to media audiences. Law is generally regarded as 'o,er-represented' in 
popular culture, and television in particular, has developed a special relationship with 
the stories of la" based on a shared preference for ideological closure. This thesis uses 
textual analyses to examine to what extent the challenges to law are allocated textual 
space within the texts of popular culture, as oppositional discourses and alternative 
versions ofreality. 
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CHAPTER I 
I. KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTIONS 
I. I Introduction 
This thesis investigates law and analyses its representations in popular culture Media 
texts from both television and film will be examined to determine to what extent law's 
representations in popular culture, serve to reinforce or interrogate law's role in 
society. 
Law's institutional role is that of a powerful agenda setter and regulatory agent. 
Indeed Thornton ( 1991, p. 11) ranks law as society's "central mechanism for 
transmitting and legitimating societal values." Law's regulatory role in society is 
supported by a range of complementary discourses which. for the most part, accord 
with dominant cultural values. This hegemonic control is. however. never stable. its 
"'victories' are never final" (Fiske, 1987, p. 41) as alternative discourses are constantly 
competing for their own particular 'truths' to be recognised and accepted. As a 
consequence, there is always an expectation that law's hegemony will be subject to 
challenge and resistance. 
Indeed what is presently confronting law could be likened to a blitzkrieg on numerous 
fronts. That the law is under attack is openly acknowledged by those within the 
profession. The Sackvi!le Report, "Access to Justice" (I 994, p. 3) set up by the 
Minister for Justice, Honourable Michael Lavarch, was asked specifically to address 
the "'crisis of confidence' in the institutions fundamental to the rule of law .... [as] 
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public cynicism had extended to the very institutions at the heart of the justice system-
the legal profession and the judiciary." 
The challenges which confront law, and which are responsible for this 'crisis of 
confidence', come from a variety of sources: 
• The first emanates from a general critical theory of institutions which, amongst 
other things. highlights tee ideological significance of the institutional 
knowledge/power nexus; 
• the second challenge has its origins in law's fallibility; the celebrated 'miscarriage 
of justice' cases. where law's relationship to science and increasing reliance on it. 
provokes scrutiny of both the legal and scientific processes; 
• the third evolves out of the application of feminist theory to law which draws 
attention to law's masculine paradigm and gender bias. 
Each of these challenges to law presents an oppositional discourse which is. in tum. 
taken up and re-presented by another challenger to law's authority, the media. 
The media is an important contributor to law's 'crisis of confidence' through its own 
discourse, and through its discursive support of other critical discourses. This is 
confirmed by Cassidy's (1993) inquiries into the role of the print media. 1 Cassidy's 
research indicates that the press performs several functions. sometimes reflecting, and 
at other times directing, public opinion. Either way its role is influential: "(T)he 
public is being forced, by the sheer volume of critical 'stories' they read, to confront 
the existence of continuing, often fundamental problems influencing the way law is 
dispensed in Australia" (Cassidy, 1993, p. 14). 
In the press's treatment of law, Cassidy discerned a substantial shift in attitude which 
\\as observable and quantifiable over time. The once "uncritical, often reverential 
treatment" accorded law. has been replaced by "considerable dissatisfaction with 
many performative aspects of law-gi,ing" (pp. 12-13) The question that arises from 
these findings is, whether the same degree of attitudinal change is detectable in law 
programmes on television° In other words is television also involved in critiquing 
law. and if so. how is this reflected in its representati,.m in popular cultural texts0 This 
query lies at the heart of this thesis' project. 
It is clear that a great deal of what the public kno\\s and understands about social 
institutions such as law. medicine. education and so forth. comes from popular 
culture, particularly from television. Cassidy ( 1993. p. 12) acknowledges that with 
the "law industry" this area remains under-researched: "Television, which has a 
significantly wider audience than any segment of the print media. is an important, but 
largely unknown force in shaping Australian attitudes towards the law industry." 
Rather than use Cassidy's longitudinal model to measure attitudinal change, this 
thesis will examine individual texts to determine whether 'challenges' to law are 
present. What will be deemed significant in this process, will be the presence of 
alternative discourses and the degree of narrative space each is permitted within the 
text. In media terms, the texts will be analysed to ic!-!ntify how each oppositional 
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discourse is positioned within the context of the dominant discourse. and in relation to 
a preferred reading position (see Fiske, 1987). 
Despite evidence of law's 'bad press' (Cassidy, 1993), there is an expectation, based on 
law's historic position in society. that most representations of law on television and 
film "ill serve to validate and reinforce law's traditional role as regulator. 
Oppositional discour,es which encourage interrogation and scrutiny of law, may be 
allocated some narrative space. but these will probably be limited. This is in line with 
Cassidy's (1991 b) and Rowe's ( 1988) observations. that law's fallibility is usually 
represented as an individualised flaw "hich seldom generalises to a critique of the 
institution as a whole. Cassidy's (1991 b, p. 88) ,·iew is that "cultural agencies such as 
television and film" are actually closely inrnlved in law's "reification." 
Notwithstanding these assertions. this thesis proposes that a potential site for 
challenging ht:gemonies does exist within a range of cross genre texts now emerging 
from the United States. These texts are typically 'boundary stretching· in both their 
form and content and characteristically exhibit more open ended narratives and 
progressive storylines. Recent examples of this type of text include. 1'."PYD 13lue. 
Chicago Hope, Northern Exposure and Picket Fences. These cross genre texts 
attempt to balance their dual appeal of soap and drama. so as to fulfil expectations 
which attach to each genre. This textual balancing act, which is the text's promise to 
deliver according to established expectations, is the genre's "contract" with its 
audiences (Hartley cited in Fiske, 1987, p. 114). The polysemic potential intrinsic to 
these new cross genre texts, points to genre itself as an important, even determining 
factor in meaning making. It may be the case that genre actually dictates to a 
significant extent, the progressiveness or otherwise of a text. This thesis, in exploring 
this notion, will consider aspects of genre to determine whether there is a correlation 
between textual polysemy and genre type. The expectation is that such a correlation 
will be found. 
Before considering law texts individually, acknowled~ement needs to be made of 
law's long term association with television and film. The significance of this is, that 
as a narrative subject within the field of popular culture. law is considered to be "over-
represented" (Hartley & Fiske, cited in Chase. 1986. p. 551 ). Similarly the ongoing 
relationship between law and television is described by Karpin (I 995, pp. 4-6) as 
"special", because, in Karpin's viev.. when "TV is reporting law it is doing law." 
Law's narratives possess obvious media appeal: both favour ideological closure. 
Law's practice is premised on conflict which just "happens to mesh nicely with the 
perceived structural needs of drama" (Rosenberg, 1989, p. 1625). Furthermore. the 
need to hand down a judgement is intrinsic to law or as Cassidy (1991a, p. 66) puts it: 
"The law must be 'found' in all legal contests" just as traditional drama needs a 
resolution. There is thus a degree of synchronicity between the discourses of law and 
media which may counteract or inhibit institutional interrogation. 
Another element which may influence law's representations may be its association 
with, and some would say dependence on, science. Science and the media, and 
particularly television which "is the principle bearer of the meaning of science" 
(Gardner & Young, 1981, p. 171), appear to collude in a 'positivist' enterprise to 
portray science as infallible. Through a range of discursive strategies science confers 
I 
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power on associated discourses. The discourses of law and science intersect 
decisively in areas where scientific or forensic evidence is involved. Frequently 
within popular culture these instances of scientific 'certainty' are used 1,, reinforce and 
endorse law's authority. i\s several of the nominated elements may be involved in 
hem law is ulumately constructed and presented in popular culture, each will be 
examined within the thesis. 
Thesis Outline 
! laving identified the first challenge as one linked to new understandings about 
institutional power. the thesis will commence with an critical overview of institution,. 
An investigative approach derived from Foucault and poststructuralism. together with 
some feminist insights. will provide the framework. The same analytic methods will 
subsequently be applied to law. as the specific institution under review. From this 
overview of the topic. a more detailed examination of both law and science. and law 
and feminism will he continued in subsequent chapters. 
i\ similar methodological approach focusing on science as an institution. will be 
pursued in chapter two. Science's relationship to law is an important factor in 
Foucault's explanation of how law continues to assert and maintain its power. 
Aspects of this affiliation will be examined in this chapter. The basis for science's 
privileged position will be investigated to ascertain how it retains its particular status 
in society. Science's media presentations represent just one aspect of its discursive 
efforts in this regard. The constraint on science's media discourse points to one of the 
underlying contentions of this thesis, that institutions like science, are rarely critiqued 
in their media representations. When a challenge to science's 'infallible' status does 
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occur, it often emanates from a feminist subjectivity. A text which nominates itself as 
offering a feminist perspective, will be critically evaluated to identify how it critiques 
scientific discourse. 
Having substantiated science's hierarchical superiority over law, chapter three will 
c~ammc the lm,/seicnce nexus as illustrative of the second challenge to law's 
authorit). Science's association vvith law works discursively to validate lavv's judicial 
role. This is particularly apparent m the area of forensic science where science's 
claims to 'mfallibility' allm, it to take precedence O\er law. One of the questions that 
arises from this (m1s)alignment is \\hether the hierarchical discrepancy between lavv 
and science, which favours science, affects judicial outcomes. Appropriate media 
representations \\ill be examined to mvestigate ho\\ science's discursive strategies 
impact in the area. An assessment "111 abo be made to determine \\hether this 
intersecting site is represented as problematic \\ithin popular culture. 
Law has been interrogated most direct!) 111 recent ,ears from various feminist 
perspectives. Feminism l,as excavated and exposed la\\ as a masculine paradigm 
which masquerades as gender neutral and value-free. As a result of feminist 
endeavours legal reforms have been initiated. In chapter four, in rcvie" ing these 
reform efforts, the feminist challenge to law will be examined. A textual analysis of 
two texts from popular culture, focusing on 'women's issues' in a legal frame\\ork, 
will be pursued in chapter five. The analysis will seek to determine if feminists' 
concerns have impacted on legal issues in television's mainstream programming. 
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In conclusion in chapter six, the range of textual analyses already undertaken will 
form the basis for an assessment of law's representations in popular culture. lbe task 
will be to identify whether any of the previously identified 'challenges' to law's 
hegemony, are evidenced in the texts examined. lbe presence within these 
mainstream texts of oppositional discourses, which allow or encourage interrogatim, 
with consequent destabilisation of law's dominant discourse, will indicate that 
tdc, ision, like the press. is engaged in a critique of law. 
1.2 Institutional Theo11·: An Overview 
La" can be defined and examined from numerous perspectives but in this thesis it 
will be considered primarily from an institutional viewpoint. Accordingly this chapter 
will begin by examining law using investigative insights derived from institutional 
theory. In this theory. institutions share a range of defining characteristics, such as an 
hierarchical structure, exclusive membership and a distinctive language. Institutional 
theory pruposes that these seemingly 'normal' indicators of institutional membership 
are ideologically loaded and far from neutral in their effects. 
Within this chapter some general observations concerning institutions will be 
examined. These insights will be applied to law as a specific discipline. with 
emphasis placed on law's particularities as a discipline relative to its general 
characteristics as an institution. Through this process the discursive strategies which 
assist law in maintaining its hegemonic hold on society will become apparent. 
Any interrogation of institutions presents the problem of incorporation. This aspect 
will be addressed and counteracted by employing a range of methodologies which 
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include Foucault's insights in respect of law and science and relevant feminist 
analyses. Both perspectives are useful in offering critical standpoints external to the 
institution. This approach is designed to reveal a number of the institutional 
characteristics which are particular and intrinsic to law One of the most significant of 
these, in terms of validating law's 'truth', is science. For this reason, law's relationship 
to science, manifest in a range of "'scientific' discourses" (Foucault, 1991. p. 23). will 
be specifically targeted for further investigation. 
Background to Institutional Power 
As one of society's many institutions. like education, medicine and science. law 
presents itself as another unic;ue and discrete discipline. All institutions base their 
claim to status on the exclusivity of their particular knowledge culture. This strategy 
enables each one to exert considerable covert power over those within the discipline 
and overt power on those outside. Their pronouncements also carry weight which 
extend beyond the confines of the institution. because such advice is offered by 
persons designated by the institution as 'experts'. 
Law's overt power is clearly visible in cultural practices which regulate society t. ,m 
birth to death. For instance, there is a requirement in our society to register both these 
events and failure to comply results in sanctions and penalties. Less visible are the 
covert practices implicit in each institutions' formation and continuation. It is the 
contention of this thesis that the contrived 'naturalness' of institutions deflects 
attention away from their institutional role as regulators, agenda setters and self-
maintaining bases of power. As an example of how innocuously the;• can be 
regarded, Kress's ( I 989) description is instructive: 
Each has its own view of the world, which in many things reaches beyond 
the immediate concerns of either law or medicine or education. Each has 
its specific practices, its classificatory systems of relevant categories 
(illnesses, treatments, prescriptions, for instance) and all the linguistic 
technology that goes with these. (p. 110) 
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This can be contrasted with Bannet's (1989) more critical perspective which is based 
on Foucauldian principles: 
(V)arious disciplines imposed their norms ... delimited the truth that could 
be said ... regulated and controlled the methods by which these truths could 
be determined and transmitted, and ... excluded as error all knowledge 
which did not conform to their paradigm. (p. 10 l) 
For the purposes of investigating institutions this latter description provides a more 
useful model from which to draw comparisons. Bannet ( 1989) eludes to the intrinsic 
features in the construction of institutions which explains their naturalness and 
acceptance as the 'commonsense' view within society. Quite plainly it is considerably 
more difficult to critique or argue against something that is denoted 'natural'. 'normal' 
or 'real'. A great deal of the power of institutions lies in their very naturalness, as does 
the problem of critiquing them. 
The problem is one with historical origins and relates to the rise of scientism in 
Western society. Scientific concepts of rationalism and objectivity became the 
'perfect' standards against which each institution's knowledge claims were measured 
and tested. Institutions commonly 'borrowed' from scientific methodology in devising 
strategies to validate their own credentials. This in turn certified them as the correct 
and proper bearers of certain kinds of knowledge. Science is seen as being able to 
confer this power on others because, "'truth' is seen as the product of science or 
scientific 'methods"' (McHoul & Gra~e, 1993, p. 58). An example of this is the 
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'expert' who is credentialled (given status), on account of his/her expertise based on 
possessing a certain set of specific 'scientific' criteria which vary according to the 
knowledge culture. 
From the perspective of science (rationality), the establishment of such an arbitrary set 
of rules ensures objectivity; dissent, as a consequence, appears irrational. 
Furthermore the epithet 'expert', neatly dissociates the message from the messenger, 
and promotes what Cassidy (199\a, p. 64) describes as author "invisibility." This 
process permits the subjective delivering the message, ( offering the advice), to be 
successfully concealed behind an objective facade. Fiske (1987) draws attention to 
this same phenomenon at work, in the field of cultural studies: 
(W)e must never be content with asking and revealing what view of the 
world is being presented, but must recognise that someone's view of the 
world is implicitly or explicitly, obviously or subtly, inscribed within it. 
Revealing the "who" within the "what" is possibly the most important task 
of criticism.(p. 42) 
The phenomenon of author invisibility is replicated in the seeming disregard and lack 
of acknowledgment by the institutions, of their own social constructiveness. The task 
of interrogating institutions which appear as 'givens' in our society, quite clearly 
presents a formidable challenge. Such an undertaking is necessary though, before an 
assessment can be made about the role their construction plays in the maintenance of 
their position in society. In assessing how law maintains its own privileged position, 
features alluded to earlier, (like the role of the 'expert', the exclusivity of language, the 
screen of scientism and the constructed 'naturalness'), will all be examined to identify 
how each operates to validate and reinforce law's status as an institution. 
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1.3 Examining Institutional Structures: The methodology 
In critiquing institutions and their practices, some critics have adopted a Marxist 
political economy model with the associated premise that all power differentials 
within society are the result of existing class differences. Though such methodology 
could provide some insights, this thesis after extensive literary searches, argues that 
work drawing on both poststructuralist and feminist perspectives will offer more 
useful and relevant perspectives. Feminists in particular have reservations with the 
Marxist approach which in its. "privileging [ ofJ the labour/capital distinction" and 
treating "gender as secondary to class relations" (McNay, 1992, p. 24), tends toward 
marginalising or excluding women altogether. This thesis will, as a consequence, be 
informed by recent work in the area of law and legal studies (Cassidy, 1991; Graycar 
& Morgan, 1990; Smart, 1991), criminology and sociology (Hunt, 1992; Smart, 1991; 
Sumner, 1990) and feminism. 
The work of these researchers has been selected on the basis that they take account of. 
and thus more accurately reflect, ideas of power structures more relevant to 
contemporary society. In particular both Smart (1991) and Cassidy (1991) have 
usefully appropriated the work of Foucault and offer, through their analyses and 
discussions, various points of entry which relate quite specifically to legal discourse. 
The thesis will be further informed by Foucauldian work on specific instances where 
the role and structure of institutions is being investigated and where their power to 
command or control is under scrutiny. 
13 
The feminist perspective will be employed to reorientate, the 'natural' bias which 
flows from observations and conclusions based on patriarchal structures (Frug, 1992; 
Graycar & Morgan, 1990; McNay, 1992; Naffine, 1992; Smart, 1991). Kuhn (1982, 
p. 73) describes this corrective, as the process of "making visible the invisible." It 
entails the recognition, and taking account of. the personal perspectives of women 
whose life experience is one of subordination under patriarchy. Recent reviews 
instigated by the law itself into gender issues within its own discipline, clearly suggest 
a realisation that the present system is not equitable. (Senate Standing Committee's 
Report on "Gender Bias and the Judiciary." May. 1994). 
One problem which presents itself. in identifying a satisfactory critique for 
institutions. concerns the difficulty of developing a methodology or a set of 
investigative measures which are not already part of. or incorporated into. the self-
same knowledge culture. The problem according to Smart (1991. p. 5) involves 
"challenging a form of power without accepting its o"n terms of reference and hence 
losing the battle before its begun." An example of how this problem manifests itself 
would be in a criticism of science which would be deemed invalid or lacking in merit 
because it ignored or took no account of 'scientific methodology'. Similarly a 
'commonsense' view on a legal matter would have no weight or validity because it 
failed to use or refer to the accepted judicial process; the so called 'legal method'. 
As foreshadowed earlier, Foucault's work which concentrated particularly on the rise 
and development of the 'new' disciplinary society, with new "systems of knowledge" 
(McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 58), including the 'psy' professions (Smart. 1991). has 
provided the basis for a useful critique for investigating other knowledge systems. 
14 
Bannet (1989, p. IOI) in reviewing Foucault's theory of institutions and their 
knowledge cultures, identified the defining features as ones that, "imposed their 
norms .... delimited the truth .... regulated and controlled .... [how) truths could be 
determined and transmitted, and .... excluded ... all knowledge which did not 
conform to their paradigm." The logic of their acceptance is thus plainly assured 
because as Harland (1987, p. 103) observes, as each knowledge culture constructs its 
discourse it "furnishes the very criteria by which its results are judged successful." 
Knowing a Knowledge Culture 
Various studies now conceptualise knowledge as a construct that is subjective. 
variable and institutionalised rather than a serendipitous uncovering or discovering of 
infom1ation (Cassidy 1991; Smart, 1991). From this perspective, institutions 
construct their own knowledge cultures according to cultural biases that vary over 
time. The notion that the knowledge espoused and expounded by institutions is in 
some way objective, neutral or autonomous. is a fallacy. that remains largely 
unacknowledged by the institutions themselves. 
The constructionist view of institutions is supported by the consistent appearance of 
certain distinctive characteristics, or "techniques" in Foucault's terminology (1991, p. 
23 ), which could properly be regarded as intrinsic to their form and structure. One 
such distinguishing feature is an hierarchical form which, as a 'given', presents an 
effective structure that resists scrutiny and simple interrogation. Institutions, in fact. 
work to ensure the privilege of their discourses through various discursive strategies. 
For example they customarily authorise only certain persons, (representatives from 
within the discipline, the so called 'experts'), to speak on behalf of the institution. 
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While this principle is obviously demonstrated in institutions like law and medicine, it 
is in legal representation that the ultimate act of someone speaking for or on behalf of 
some,,11e else. is most clearly apparent. 
As a discursive strategy this operates at more than one level. Quite clearly the expert 
role. serves to enhance the credibility and 'truth' status of the established discipline. 
At the same time. at a more subtle level. the process of devaluing or discounting the 
claims of those from outside the institution is occurring. These "alternative accounts 
of social reality" (Smart. 1991, p. 4). representative as they are of the subjective world 
of comment. opinion and experience, are accorded little in the way of status or 
validity. Cassidy's (199la) views are pertinent on this point: 
(T)he image of expertise and of being an appropriately credentialled bearer 
of knowledge operating in the context of an established discipline, or of a 
"government" or "industry" are asserted to distinguish legitimate views 
from mere opinion.[emphasis added.] For example, academically and 
vocationally lawyers represent the law (that is the apparatus called the legal 
system). Similarly, historians represent history. scientists. science and so 
on.(p. 63) 
Feminists have quite rightly drawn attention to the way such b:nary oppositions 
operate to exclude and devalue the 'other', which characteristically include society's 
so-called 'minority groups', comprising women, Blacks, children, ethnics and 
homosexuals. 
In identifying the chare:teristics of knowledge cultures, Foucault has provided a 
schema or paradigm with which all knowledge cultures can be scrutinised and 
interrogated. Indeed, despite criticism of Foucault's "gender blindness" (Sunmer, 
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1990), social researchers have applied his precepts to a vast range of research areas. 
Feminists (Bartky, 1988; Sawicki, 1991 ), have been the most creative in their 
application of his work, incorporating the principles into areas ranging from 
reproductive technology to defining women's bodies. 
Foucauldian against Foucault: Law and Power 
At this point it is necessary to justify the application of Foucault's concepts to law 
since he himself attempted to exclude law as a relevant area of power, based on its 
diminishing role in a society developing new disciplinary regimes. Foucault's 
rationale. for what he saw as the gradual marginalisation of law, was its association 
with the 'ancient regime' (the monarch) and its traditional regulatory role within that 
system. With the replacement of the monarch. Foucault foreshadowed that law's role 
as a regulatory body, would gradually be, "supplanted by discipline and government 
as the key embodiments of modernity". (Hunt, 1992, p. 1 ). 
Foucault's predictions in this area appear not to be supported by current evidence. 
Researchers in this field, such as Cassidy (1991 )and Hunt ( 1992), in observing the 
place of law and its role in society, have noted that as a regulatory body, law still 
retains considerable force and power with an undiminished capacity to command and 
regulate. Indeed Smart ( 1991, p. 8) forcefully argues that law has increased its reach 
by incrementally extending its influence through a process of incorporation that 
includes "the growing legalization of everyday life from the moment of conception . 
through to the legal definition of death." 
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The core of the problem, as Foucault perceived it, was that law represented the 'old' 
concept of power, one that was wholly imposed, repressive and negative. Such a 
concept of power was at variance with what he had identified as the multifarious and 
diffuse sites of power so typical of the twentieth century disciplinary society. 
For the same reason Foucault also rejected as 'inadequate' the Marxist nexus between 
power and class: "(T)he idea of power as a commodity which some people, or a class 
of people, may 'own' (usually because they command wealth or economic resources) 
is inadequate to an understanding of contemporary society" (Smart, 1991, p. 7). 
Foucault's redefinition of power, as 'new forms of power' diffused through society via 
multifarious sites. is appealing in that it offers a rationale for why power is so readily 
accepted by those it is designed to control: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
tenns: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts1, it 'masks', it 
'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains 
ofobjects and rituals of truth. (Foucault, 1991, p. 194) 
This concept of power, as something positive and pervasive, and its apparent ready 
acceptance by those it affects, has parallels with Gramsci's notion of hegemony 
whereby dominance is achieved and maintained as an ongoing struggle for consensus. 
Foucault characterises this power balance as unstable, likening it to "a perpetual 
battle" (Foucault, p. 26). 
This same scenario of a constantly moving equilibrium is observed by Fiske within 
the field of cultural studies. In this context he describes it as a juggling process, 
"whereby the subordinate are led to consent to the system that subordinates them" 
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(Fiske, 1987, p. 40). Gramsci's theory has special application in cultural studies 
where the notion of negotiation between reader and text is used to explain meaning 
making in the context of analysing texts. 
Following on directly from Foucault's identification of the rise of the disciplinary 
society. is the need to explain how control, once established, is maintained despite the 
absence of a central unifying body to oversee the process. Foucault (I 991, p. 304) 
posits that such control is created through a process of "normalisation." This notion of 
'norms', internalised by discipline and maintained by surveillance. is something 
Foucault observed to be characteristic of the new disciplinary society. Smart ( 1991. p. 
8) refers to this process as "the discourse of normalization" and postulates that two 
discourses of power. law and the new disciplines. actually operate in parallel. In this 
way. Smart cogently argues against Foucault's position that law's influence has waned 
or been superseded. 
This facet of Foucault's work. which revolves around societal regulation and control. 
has its resonances in the field of media studies too. Foucault ( 199 I. p. 217) noted. as 
a consequence of administrative and governmental data collection. the development 
of "surveillance" of designated groups within society. Populations became objectified 
as targets for study. This phenomenon of compiling population statistics and data, as 
knowledge for power, arose during the beginning of the eighteenth century with the 
advent of scientific rationalism. Though its purpose may well have been benign or 
even humane, others contend it was always for political control of the population, 
(Foucault, 1991, pp. 195-199), with an end result designed to control via 
categorisation and a process of normalisation. The internalisation of culturally 
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specific but seemingly 'natural' concepts, like what is considered 'normal', has lead in 
Foucault's view, to the development of the most powerful controlling mechanism of 
all: self-regulation and self-surveillance. 
Extrapolating from these concepts to consider law's regulatory role in society, points 
to the relevance of Foucault's ideas to this thesis. Consider, for example, the 
culturally constructed meaning of phrases such as 'a law abiding citizen'. From the 
Foucauldian perspective it signifies someone who has successfully internalised 
society's norms and who unconsciously observes the rules of self-regulation. This is 
certainly not what this expression means when it used in general parlance, where the 
connotation is of an exemplary. high-minded, responsible member of society. The 
inference is decidedly positive. Revealed in this example are competing discourses 
whose frames of reference and claims to assent are different and unequal. The 
positive interpretation is supported by a range of societal and mstitutional discourses 
which invariably coincide with dominant cultural values. 
This example is illustrative of how the Foucauldian approach to critiquing institutions 
and their knowledge cultures, can offer a perspective that avoids incorporation and 
promotes space for oppositional, 'other' viewpoints. As such it provides a useful 
paradigm for more general application. This thesis will apply these insights to the 
selected institutional processes and structures of law, and to some extent science, so 
that the constructed nature of each particular knowledge culture will be exposed. 
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l.4 Examining Law: "Its corpus of knowledge, its techniques, its scientific 
discourses'' 
Both science and law share the high status which society naturally accords to 
institutions of quality and privilege. Foucault would suggest that their relationship is 
even more immanent with science intrinsically linked to law's construction as 
society's regulator. Science's intrusion into the criminal justice system represents, 
according to Foucault (1991, p. 23), "a whole new system of truth .... (a) corpus of 
knowledge, techniques. 'scientific' discourses ... formed and ... entangled with the 
practice of the power to punish." 
This definition clearly fixes and differentiates four constituent elements of law the 
institution: law's "corpus of knowledge" or its separate know ledge culture: its 
"techniques", or the specific validating measures it employs; its "scientific 
discourses", or its validating affiliation with science; and its "p0wer to punish" which 
is the manifestation of the power it derives from a combination of the first three 
elements. Some aspects of law's knowledge culture, the so called "corpus of 
knowledge", have already been examined but the discursive strategies which operate 
to constitute law are also detectable in its "techniques" and "scientific discourses." 
A specific example of a law "technique" which is evoked to establish its credibility, 
and which is central to its power to regulate, is the so called 'legal method'. Cousins 
(1988, pp. 131-132), in comparing historical investigation to the practice of law, 
comments on law's particular methodology: its "jealously guarded order of procedure" 
which includes its "definite rules of evidence .... due legal process .... [and its] legally 
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defined class of events." For events to have legal status though. they must fall into 
already established legal classifications. 
For feminist scholars ( Graycar & Morgan. 1990; Smart. 1991; Thornton. 1991 ) law's 
arbitrarily constructed categories form part of a systemic structural problem. which 
entrenches inequity and inevitably discriminates against those for whom the law "as 
not originally designed or intended to serve. In the words of Graycar and Morgan 
(1990). 
Legal practitioners hme al"a)s known that people's Ji,es did not readily fit 
into legal categories For \\Omen. these artificial classifications are 
especially problematic since \\omen have played no part in defining those 
categories. (p. 3) 
Legal categories \\ith their emphasis on the \\orlds of \\Ork. business. \\ork-related 
injuries and criminality. reflect masculine perspectives. Finley (cited in Cira)car & 
Morgan. 1990. p. 3) makes the point that applying "male frames of reference" to the 
concerns of women. can lead to their non-recognition as issues or to their being 
regarded as "doubly deviant." Criminality of any kind fits within this latter categof). 
This represents just one area where law's "gendered partiality" (Ciraycar & Morgan. 
1990) is exposed. 
This tendency toward fixing specific gender characteristics. or "polarising gender" 
(Smart. 1992, p. 36). again relates back to the scientific discourses of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, when women's bodies became the focal point for medical 
study and intervention, based on biological difference. The gender differences, once 
articulated and formulated under the auspices of a scientific discipline. became 
22 
naturalised, and the resulting discourses further reinforced these 'natural' differences 
as the ideal. ln this historical context Foucault's notions of control and surveillance 
are especially relevant. According to Smart's ( 1992) research, it is during this period, 
particularly the nineteenth century, that law turned its attention to women in particular 
This century marks both the pinnacle of law's exclusion of women from 
civil society ( e.g. the denial of the legal personality of married women) 
and the moment when written law began to inscribe in finer and finer detail 
the legal disabilities of Woman. (Put another way, we can say that gender 
became increasingly fixed in terms of its attributes and in terms of being 
increasingly polarised).(Smart. 1992. p. 37) 
ln examining this point more fully. Smart ( 1992) tracks specific instances where 
legislation became a measure for controlling women's reproductive capacity. In the 
wake of these regulatory 'gendering strategies'. concepts of 'motherhood' developed. 
and with them. ideas of the 'good' and 'bad' mother (Smart. 1992. pp. 37-40). These 
historically constructed characterisations quite clearly influence perceptions and 
judgements today, and. in respect of judgements made on this basis. the '"'' is 
similarly affected. 
One of the most celebrated legal cases. where the issue of the 'good' versus 'bad' 
mother was observed to be central to the guilt or innocence of the accused. was the 
Chamberlain case. Howe (1989)(cited in Graycar & Morgan, 1990. p. 262). in 
assessing the media's role in demonising Lindy Chamberlain, argues that she [Lindy]. 
was strongly portrayed as an "unnatural mother" because she was viewed as a 
"counter-stereotypical woman who refused to play her assigned gender role." In 
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supporting this view, Howe quotes journalist Goldsworthy, (cited in Graycar & 
Morgan), who agrees that it was: 
(P)ublic attitudes to motherhood and to female sexuality which informed 
and to a great degree shaped the course of Lindy Chamberlain's trial- a trial 
by jury, media and by the collective unconscious of an entire nation.(p.264) 
Educating Lawyers: Gender and Partiality 
Considering other situations where law's gendered partiality is in evidence, both 
Thornton (1991 ). and Graycar and Morgan (1990). have offered as an example, the 
way that legal epistemology is transmitted within law schools. Legal knowledge is 
constructed according to arbitrary categories and "fragmented" into specific areas of 
knowledge, which in lurn are, "supported by the textbooks and the law school courses 
which replicate and r~inforce those divisions" (Graycar & Morgan, p. 3). The 
divisions quite clearly reflect law's preoccupation with patriarchal and capitalist 
concerns, giving priority to subjects which. "privilege property and profits in 
accordance with the capitalist imperative: property and land law. contracts, torts. 
company law. equity and so on" (Thornton. 1991, p. 11 ). Seen as less important and 
less relevant to the 'real' (masculine) world, are options such as family and welfare 
law, environmental law, discrimination and consumer law; areas which 
characteristically affect the least powerti.Il groups in society, many of whom are 
women. 
Thornton goes on to argue that these options with their "human-centredness" and 
"peripheral status" are perceived as less valuable than core course components and 
avoided by career orientated students. Such examples exemplify how areas of 
concern outside those valued by the institution are marginalised, even though 
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paradoxically, it may appear otherwise because they are offered as options on the 
curriculum. The control exercised by the institution is subtle but as Thornton (1991) 
notes, the results accurately reflect the culture in which law operates: 
This hierarchisation of subjects within the curriculum reflects the ordering 
of the legal profe,,sional market which, in turn, reflects the dominant values 
of our society .... [It] also reflects the way in which the activities of the 
modern state are structured and conceived along patriarchal gender lines. 
(p. 12) 
To change law's culture would involve educational reform. In her call for changes to 
"what goes on at law school" as a way of eradicating gender bias within the 
profession, O'Donovan, a visiting law professor from the United Kingdom, asserts 
that the established knowledge base has to be altered and expanded. This can be 
initiated, "by opening up legal conversations to women's experience and to women's 
knowledge" (1993, August 25). The Australian, p. 33. 
In pursuing still further this idea of law's strict adherence to categorisation. this thesis 
contends that the basis for maintaining such arbitrary boundaries is bound up in an 
artificial divide or "dualism" known as the "public/private dichotomy" (Thornton. 
199 l, p. 12). This distinction is a construction of great importance to law as it defines 
areas where intervention is considered valid and appropriate or alternatively. 
inappropriate and therefore extra-judicial. In defining these zones Smith ( l 974) ( cited 
in Graycar & Morgan, 1990) observes how the divide relates to gender: 
(T)he public sphere is that sphere where 'history' is made. But the public 
sphere is the sphere of male activity. Domestic activity becomes relegated 
to the private sphere and is mediated to the public sphere by the men who 
move between both. Women have a place only in the private sphere. 
(p.31) 
Popular, Public and Private 
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In an essay relating to lawyers' images in popular culture, another legal academic, also 
comments on law's arbitrary divides. Fraser (1990, p. 3) observes that his legal 
colleagues are totally indifferent to any attempt "to smash the ideological barriers 
called the public/private distinction and the difference between law and (popular) 
culture." Fraser further confirms that law is orientated toward the male-oriented, 
corporate world of the public sphere. away from the private domain of women's 
interests and family matters. According to Naffine ( 1992, p. 69), the legal system has 
succeeded in constructing the family unit as a private zone of "non-intervention" 
(Graycar & Morgan. I 990. p. 30) based on the doctrine of classical liberalism and the 
pressures of the industrial revolution. This notional unit. the family. is constructed on 
the capitalist model of the head of the family. the male. working outside the home 
(public) while the woman remains within the home (private) in a reproductive and 
supportive role. 
For feminists the isolating and quarantining of the private sphere is problematic. 
because it is within this sphere that 'domestic' issues. of a violent and/or sexual nature 
often occur. According to Thornton (I 991. p. 13) the issue of domestic violence 
receives scant attention "because it is largely perceived as a private sphere 
phenomenon which cannot easily be subsumed within one of the subject 
compartments." The law's reluctance to intervene in the family relates quite 
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specifically to a privacy proposition in common law, encapsulated in the aphorism 
that 'every man's house is his castle'. As Graycar and Morgan (1990) point out, this 
assumption can be used to advantage, by those seeking redress for infringements of 
civil liberties, such as in homosexual law reform: "But it may also conceal a power 
struggle within the family .. .. (l)t also masks physical abuse and other manifestations 
of power and inequality within the family" (p. 33). It is these inequalities which 
particularly concern feminists. 
In respect of domestic violence and recent changes to the law which give effect to the 
issuing of special restraining orders, Scutt (cited in Graycar & Morgan, 1990, p. 304) 
makes the point that violent acts within the home, are already covered under existing 
criminal law: "(T)he problem lies not in the inadequacy of existing law, but in the 
failure by police and other authorities to enforce the law." In Britain, Naffine ( 1992, p. 
17) notes that the same lack of will by "law-enforcers" prevented similar reforms 
being effective in the 1970s. 
In respect of an area defined as marital rape, where the assumption. reinforced by law. 
was that the wife was the property of the husband. both Queensland and the UK. 
continue to maintain this as an exemption under criminal law (Graycar & Morgan. 
1990, p. 117). The legal immunity conferred under this exemption is justified under 
the principle of 'privacy'. Conversely in the USA feminists sought and obtained 
abortion rights legislation under a privacy provision. According to Barlett and 
Kennedy ( 1991) this initiative has been problematic in its implementation, as it is 
seen to impact negatively on "poor women": 
Grounding this right in privacy rather than antidiscrimination doctrine ... 
pem1itted the Supreme Court to limit access to abortion by poor women 
and ... reinforced the ideology that dominance and abuse within the 
"private" family are beyond the law's authority.(p. 3) 
Beyond the Private: Law and Exclusion 
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Despite what seems to be law's reluctance to extend its reach into certain areas 
deemed 'private', Smart lists numerous examples where legislation has continued to 
be drafted in response to the developing human sciences. Areas involving marriage, 
divorce and children as well as medical conditions have all become, despite Foucault's 
predictions to the contrary, the subject of various forms of legislation. Smart (1991, 
p. 17) observes in respect of such areas that "law retains its 'old' power, namely the 
ability to extend rights. whilst exercising new contrivances of power in the form of 
surveillance and modes of discipline." This comment is supported by recent cases in 
the USA. where distinctions between maternal and foetal rights have led to charges 
being laid against women on the basis of their "conduct during pregnancy" (Karpin, 
1995, p. 62). Such conduct may involve cultural factors too since, as Karpin notes, it 
is significant that where the defendant's race was recorded, "approximately 70% [of 
these cases] involve women of colour" (p. 62). 
Another area of concern to feminists relates to the presumption of unive1sality which 
is implied in the common laws legal paradigm, the hypothetical 'reasonable man' 
against whom all are judged. The notion that some objective, "neutral abstraction" 
(Thornton, 1991, p. 13) exists as a legal ideal can become a construct designed to 
obscure law's partiality. Quite obviously law is constituted as a masculine discipline 
and that is not only because the majority of its representatives, especially the 
_J 
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judiciary, are male. The discourses surrounding law are those associated with 
objectivity, rationality, power and aggression, concepts that are also closely identified 
with notions of masculinity. One example that Thornton (I 991, p. 13) draws attention 
to, is law's "combative style of cross-examination." She describes this approach as 
"alienating" for women stuuents who seek a "more personalised and relevant 
approach which takes cognisance of women's experiences" (p. 13). This same 
methodology and style works to constrain how legal arguments are presented by 
giving precedence to so-called reasoned debate and excluding demands that may 
appear "ambiguous and contradictory" (Bartlett & Kennedy, 1991, p. 3). Women's 
claims ot1en fall outside the law's fixed and designated legal categories and, as a 
consequence. their demands are less likely to succeed. 
These exan1ples of law·s exclusionary techniques find further reinforcement in law's 
own legal processes. Cousins ( 1987) contends that the method of legal argument is 
simply a set of rules which excludes and includes particular kinds of information. 
according to well defined principles. In other words it is a social construct not a 
infallible precept. The truth that is arrived at, is a particular kind of truth, "a strictly 
legal truth" just as history, using similar processes, claims to accurately present the 
past (Cousins, pp. 133-135). In observing how the two disciplines coincide Cousins 
says of the legal process: 
There are definite rules of evidence concerning admissibility. Hearsay may 
be discounted; clearly motivated witnesses may be impugned .... It might 
appear that the legal process attempts to establish what really happened in 
the past, but 'really' is used in a specialised sense. 'Really' is what is 
relevant to the law, what is definable by law, what may be argued in terms 
of law and evidence. (pp.132-133) 
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Similarly in reviewingjudges' pronouncements, Cassidy (1991, p. 64) determined that 
it was an institutional process that "operated to entrench the context and the discourse, 
such as the 'law' and the judges utterances, as being the same thing." The process is 
aided too by 'author invisibility', which entails detaching the object (the words) from 
the subject (the speaker), and permitting the utterances to circulate as neutral, value-
free narratives. Additionally the role of the 'expert' and the status of the knowledge 
culture itself, lend support to the notion that such pronouncements are objective. 
The whole process is validated by an exclusivity of language, a "legitimating rhetoric" 
(Cassidy, 1991, p. 89) which distinguishes and empowers those within the discipline 
and excludes those outside. In the Law Reform Commission of Victoria's Report, 
(1987), "Plain English and the La"" (p. 11) linguists identified and formally 
categorised "legalese" as a separate. "identifiably different dialect or class of 
language." This report (p. 9) also noted significantly. that "legal language remains 
largely unintelligible to most members of the community." Exclusivity of language 
works as a powerful tool to identify and separate members of the institution from 
other, non-members. The knowledge/power nexus creates its own reality or 'truth·. 
which operates to disenfranchise and disempower those outside the institution. 
'Unique methodology': Law. Science and Other Stories 
Another of law's defining characteristics which institutionalises power differences. is 
the principle of precedent. This procedure forms the basis for much law making but 
when scrutinised for its "unique methodology", is observed to be merely "a 
chronology of interpretations where the hierarchical location of the interpreter 
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[ emphasis added] governs the "rightness" (authoritativeness) of the interpretation" 
(Cassidy. p. 67). Indeed Cassidy likens such pronouncements to the narrative 
construction of storytelling, with judges acting as, "the author(s) of episodes in a soap 
opera of dominant myths" (p. 67). 
Closely related to law's unique process of judging, is law's distinctive appeal process. 
This system permits a legal procedure using the accepted judicial method to arrive at a 
(presumed) correct decision which is then subsequently overturned by a higher court. 
Such obvious Judgement error' could properly be construed as a fault in the system. 
This anomaly is (re)constructed by the institution however. as absolute proof that the 
system "orks, and works well (Smart, 1991, p. IO). 
Law's obvious fallibility. exemplified in such maxims as "the law's an ass", raises the 
question of how it. and similar institutions. are able to retain their inviolate positions' 
The answer, as has been demonstrated, lies in the power that each institution has to 
naturalise its position, and practices within society. Each achieves this mainly. by 
adopting and promoting various discursive strategies which arc in accord with 
society's dominant cultural values. The resulting institutional structures and 
pronouncements remain resistant to interrogation because each institution sets its own 
standards and limits those authorised to speak on its behalf. Harland (1988, p. 103) 
aptly illustrates this process when he observes that each institution, "furnishes the very 
criteria by which its results are judged successful." 
In the case of law's particular knowledge culture, it is seen to be supported by specific 
"techniques" and "scientific discourses" (Foucault, 1991, p. 23). These coalesce to 
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entrench law as the institution with authority to speak and act on legal matters. The 
discourses which bolster law's claims to power and status simultaneously act to 
discount and disqualify other knowledges and experiences. Law's discourse, as has 
been shown, also manages to accommodate a degree of 'fallibility' through 
incorporating and subsuming it into an accepted procedure known as its appeal 
process. Smart (1991) notes that both science and law utilise similar strategies, in 
order to achieve their end, which is to exercise power: 
Law's claim to truth is not manifested so much in its practice ... but rather 
in the ideal of law. In this sense it does not matter that practitioners may 
fall short of the ideal. If we take the analogy of science, the claim to 
scientificity is a claim to exercise power, it does not matter that 
experiments do not work or that medicine cannot find a cure for all ills .... 
we accord so much status to scientific work that its truth outweighs other 
truths, indeed it denies the possibility of others. (p. 11) 
While it is clear that science and law share similar institutional characteristics, Smart 
alludes here to science's unique quality: that special 'truth status' which aligns it 
perfectly with western notions of rationality and progress. Smart ( 1991, p. 9) 
maintains that law does not need to call itself a science because "(l)aw has its own 
method", and certainly law offers its 'legal method' as one of its legitimating 
attributes. At the same time it is important to realise that the philosophical base 
underpinning both the legal process and science is the same; both are grounded in and 
proceed from positivism: 
Postivists are committed to the scientific method. To the positivist, what 
matters, scientifically, is what we are able to observe .... Transposed to the 
legal context, a positivist outlook interprets law as a collection of rules 
which can be authenticated as valid law by the application of certain 
formulaic tests. (Naffine, 1992, pp. 34-35.) 
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It seems clear then, that much of the power that law has accumulated, rests on its 
status as an objective, neutral, value-free discipline; in other words its claims to be 
'something like science'. 
Another aspect of the relationship between science and law that warrants attention, 
stems from Foucault's observations of science's role within the legal context.Foucault 
(l 991, p. 19) proposes that "(a)nother truth" (science), has infiltrated law and through 
this expedient, now profoundly influences the judicial process. Judgements that were 
previously based on precise knowables, such as, "(k)nowledge of the offence, 
knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law" (Foucault, 1991, p. 19), are now 
overwhelmed by matters extraneous to law with the result that: "a whole set of 
assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgements concerning the criminal have 
become lodged in the framework of penal judgment" (Foucault, p. 19). In other 
words legal discourse, and most particularly judicial outcomes, are being affected, and 
perhaps even 'infected', by the discourse of science. 
It is apparent from this preliminary investigation that the relationship between law and 
science is important. Two distinct aspects suggest themselves as areas requiring 
special attention. The first involves law's claim to be 'something like science' which 
necessitates a testir:g of that claim and an exploration of its significance. One of the 
questions that arises is how valid is this claim? and what effect does such a claim 
have on law's position and role in society? 
The second concern involves science's role as the bearer of 'truth', able to reinforce 
and validate other discourses. In circumstances where the discourses of law and 
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science coincide, the task will be to determine whether such an obvious hierarchical 
disparity affects judicial outcomes. These queries will be the subject of subsequent 
chapters. Before examining the science/law intersection, the first challenge to law, its 
institutional characteristics, will be investigated. A textual analysis of an episode of 
Law of the Land will be examined to ascertain how law is currently being presented to 
its Australian audience. 
1.5 ATextual Analysis of Law's Institutional Features in an episode of"Law of the 
Land" 
The series Law of the Land is an example of a cross genre text which combines 
aspects of action/drama and soap. Set within an Australian country town, much of the 
action of the original series centres around the courtroom and focuses on legal 
decisions made by a 'new' magistrate from the city. The drama content of the first 
series concentrated to some extent, on depicting how the law operates within a 
'typical' rurnl community. 
The dichotomy between city and country is a recurring motif throughout the series, 
and is actualised with the arrival in town of the new city magistrate. The dual 
resonances are reflected in the series title. The expression "the law of the land" points 
to a methodological approach (legal method), which revolves around how things are 
'commonly' done. Things operate the way they do because of a 'created' precedent or 
an historical antecedent. The meaning of the expression in this context is analogous 
to 'the rule of law' and encompasses a whole continent or country. 
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The title's other meaning refers to the land itself, the country, as a natural entity 
distinct from the 'other', the city as 'alien' place. This reference to, and emphasis on, 
the land as something unique, is strenuously reinforced within the text. The narrative 
suggests that things, even something as universal as the law, operate differently in the 
country. This point is made early in the first episode, broadcast on Channel 9 on 
20/4/93, when Chalmers, the retired judge. offers advice to the new magistrate: 
"It's not like the city where you can climb down from the bench and vanish into your 
life. Here you have to live face to face with your failures, as well as your successes. 
everytime you walk down the street" 
(Magistrate): "And should that make a difference?" 
(Chalmers): "On your decisions - no. It just makes the tough ones tougher" 
This dichotomy between 'law' and 'land' is overtly signalled in the opening and closing 
sequences of each episode through a split screen effect. Featured on one side is an 
a,most static interior shot, representing the law, while the other side has a tracking 
aerial shot of the exterior, denoting the country. The juxtaposition of these 
contrasting images, one a desk with law paraphernalia on it. and the other, rolling 
shots of an everchanging countryside, is further enhanced by the use of different 
lighting effects. The static interior image, which moves gradually to include familiar 
farm items, such as a lace tablecloth, scones, an old phone, shed, boots and cartridges 
for a gun, is dark and sombre. By contrast the tracking shots of the countryside are 
brightly lit, enhancing predominantly primary colours of yellow and ueen. 
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These two pictorial representations, with their contrasting colours, content and 
movement, convey something of the breadth of the issues to be dealt with, but do not 
clearly prioritise 'land' over 'law'. A guide to the relative narrative importance of one 
over the other. is gained via the theme music. Its lively, uptempo rhythm, recalls 
previous TV series such as Bonanza or A Big Country, and positions the viewer to 
regard the text as of a similar country. 'western' generic type. This contextualisation 
suggests there might be significant compromises in law's narrative po\\er. 
From the start the countryside, 'the land' in the series title. is constructed as an 
important element in this text. The framing of the opening and closing sequences 
suggests this reading. and this is underscored b) the deliberate omission of any 
individuals as identifiable characters in these segments. Customarily. the visual 
'introduction' of characters within the opening credit sequences. act as genre indicators 
for viewers. This lack of screen time allocated for specific character identification in 
the opening segment is significant as it points to a democratisation of storylines 
within the narrative. Such a tendency is a feature of soap/drea1as where screen time 
tends to be shared more equitably between characters. This narrative form allows 
several story lines to run simultaneously which in turn. offers multiple points of ,·ie". 
This polysemic tendency is apparent to some extent within Law of the Land, although 
the commitment to naturalism prevents the use of narrative devices. such as interior 
monologues or flashbacks, which are commonly used in soaps to advance plot. 
develop character and explain motivation. 
Also signalled as an important element in the text, is a distinctively Australian 
subjectivity. In the narrative there is a strong and recurrent theme, drawn from a 
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persistent Australian myth of ambivalence, verging on antagonism, that exists 
between rural and city life. References reinforcing this attitude are both explicit, in 
dialogue between c1 iracters, and implicit. through the actions of 'city' characters, such 
as the new magistrate, whose actions are shown to be out of kilter or inappropriate in 
a small tov.11 setting. Outsiders are considered to need some form of 're-education' 
into the special ways of co,mtry life. 
The clear dichotomy between corrupt, impersonal cityscape and its counterpart. good, 
clean-living count!} (t)air. is at the same time swiftly undermined by plot 
considerations. As an example of this. the first episode includes instances of racial 
problems involving drunkenness. the theft of the magistrate's vehicle by the 
policeman's son. a bank holdup caused by fam1 repossession and rural recession. a 
murder mystery and errant teenagers in conflict with their parents. This level of 
unlawful acti, ity though improbabl, high in 'real' terms. in no way disturbs the 
pervasi,e underlying premise on which this series is based: that small tov.11, country 
life is solid. stable and secure. 
All of these incidents appear as disruptions to the presumed equilibrium of count!}· 
life. and they form the basis of narrative action in the text. Significantly all require 
legal intervention for their resolution. The following analysis of one of the incidents. 
will be used to give some indication of how law is regarded generally within the 
series. 
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Laying down the law 
The storyline relating to the bankrupt farmer and the banker commences in the first 
episode, broadcast on 20/4/93. Its emphasis on violence probably owes as much to 
commercial considerations, attracting an audience to the series, as it does to concerns 
about the plausibility of the plot. The high point of the action involves Harry Miles, 
the farmer. driving into town armed with a shotgun and taking Ray Richmond, the 
bank manager, hostage. Before Harry goes into the bank, the camera lingers on him 
deliberately loading two cartridges into the gun barrel, indicating that he 'means 
business'. The music at this juncture underlines the seriousness of the situation with a 
heavily melodramatic insistence which continues throughout the siege scene. Harry's 
resorting to violence has been precipitated, and given motivation in terms of the 
narrative. by the bank erecting a mortgagee-auction sign on his property. 
Harry is presented sympathetically, as a man at the end of his tether; someone who 
has no redress available to him, except an act of violence. The preferred reading 
aligns the viewer with Harry, who, as representative of the archetypal 'Ausssie battler'. 
is positioned oppositionally to the bank, an institution whose callous indifference and 
insensitivity to the rural situation clearly marks it as a symbol of city life. This reading 
is strengthened by extra textual knowledge of 'hard times' in the country circulating 
widely at that period. Issues such as the rural recession, farm repossessions and bank 
foreclosures form the social matrix in which this text is located and comprehended. 
The hostage scene, where Harry enters the manager's office with the gun and 
confronts him with the words "You bastard', fades to a commercial break to resume 
some time later with police sirens going and the townsfolk assembled outside the 
I 
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bank. During this break some action takes place in the manager's office resulting in a 
window being broken. The exact cause of this breakage is never definitely 
established although there is a clear inference .'i.at Harry shot at the manager, missed 
him and broke the window. The confusion and ambiguity that surrounds this incident 
is quite deliberately maintained as it provides an acceptable 'out' for Harry, in terms of 
audience acceptance of the legal outcome, when the matter subsequently comes to 
court. Quite clearly the missing narrative pieces could have been revealed using 
'flashback' which is a device commonly accepted even in the realist mode. But the 
opportunity to reveal the extent of Harry's culpability is not taken, because the 
audience is deliberately positioned to accept that the law's decision. an acquittal, is 
correct. based as it is, on the evidence tendered in court. The viewer, like the court. is 
never privy to all the evidence and this omission is quite deliberately engineered. The 
ambiguity of Harry's situation, vis-a-vis the audience, has to be maintained to preser\'e 
the image of the law as an infallible institution. 
Any residual ambivalence surrounding the correctness of the verdict. is \'irtually 
obliterated by a plot deviation which has the bank manager revealed as a 'bad' 
character who, according to Chalmers. has "played hard and .fast 1ri1h hanking 
regulations." Ray, the bank manager, in his suit, tie and dark glasses is constructed as 
the antithesis of the honest, hard-working farming folk of the community. In his 
i~itial callous disregard for Harry, and subsequent vindictive desire for revenge 
against him through the courts, Ray represents the worst aspects of city life. His 
capitulation in court where he retracts his evidence about Harry firing the gun: "I 
jumped to the conclusion that he shot the window", is a result of his being informed, 
during a court adjournment, that his own reputation and truthfulness will be 
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scrutinised on the witness stand. In replying to the magistrate's query as to whether he 
discussed his evidence with anyone during the break, Ray responds in the negative. 
Although this answer is technically correct, it conceals a real 'truth'; that the 
information given to him caused him to 'reconsider'. perhaps even conceal, what he 
really believed happened. But then Ray is a character whose honesty is questionable 
so perhaps this plot twist. which leads to Harry's acquittal, is of little substance in 
critiquing the law. 
This san1e problematic ambi\'alence is apparent though. in other sequences 
surrounding the trial. The \'iewer is positioned toward accepting the proposition. that 
'good' characters on the basis of their 'good' intentions are justified in whate\'er the) 
do. A clear example of this is Hamilton Chalmers' imol\'ement in the bank siege and 
his role as a witness at the trial. Chalmers. the fom1er judge and town elder 
statesman. bravely confronts Harry at the bank otlice during the siege and e,·entuall) 
convinces him to release the cowering bank manager. While Harry holds forth about 
the effect of the recession on the small farrner and the bank's crippling interest rates. 
Chalmers. the voice of reason. calmly states the obviou,· "Your wasting your time 
talking to Ray- he's not one of' us .. fle's not worth 1mstmg a bullet on." Again the 
city/country binary opposition, the 'them' and 'us'. is overtly activated to incorporate 
viewers into the 'us' position. even though the majority of vie,..ers are likely to be city 
based. 
With the manager released unharmed. Chalmers emerges from the bank holding the 
gun. In handing the gun over to Clive, the policeman, he deliberately breaks the 
gunbarrel to show no bullets are in the breach while comment'.ig that because it is not 
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loaded. the charges will be substantially reduced: "It's a lot of fuss over nothing, 
Clive " The next scene is of Chalmers in his car, removing two bullets from his 
coatpocket and placing them in his briefcase. There is a closeup on the bullets, fading 
to a commercial break. 
Constructing the case 
This act by Chalmers. himself a lawyer and former judge, raises several issues 
relevant to the lav.. Firstly. it is clearly an act of compassion done to protect another. 
perhaps v.eaker person. The element of class difference. involving the patriarchal 
figure. is obvious here and indeed referred to specifically by Harry during the siege. 
"hen he quite right!) observes that the bank would not be kicking Chalmers off his 
propeny. The other aspect it raises is the right of someone like Chalmers. who has 
been intimately involved in the la\\, to take it upon themselves to interfere with 
evidence and possibly alter the course of a legal outcome. When the policeman. who 
is suspicious about the unloaded gun. challenges Chalmers to empt) out his pockets. 
Chalmers, without a trace of irony. invokes the law in his defence: "You'd need 
reasonable cause to search me Sergeant .. and you know howfond I am of hunting." 
The audience is positioned to ,iew Chalmer's blatantly illegal act of removing the 
bullets as meritorious. Chalmers is constructed as brave, honourable and obviously 
smaner than the policeman. who. in any case. shows signs of being a non-admirable 
character. a 'bent copper'. In the ensuring coun scene. Chalmers, who is called as a 
witness for the prosecution, chooses his words meticulously and cleverly avoids 
implicating himself. Nevertheless when the young police prosecutor Marc Rossetti, 
attempts to reopen the subject of the loaded gun with him, Chalmers protects himself 
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from scrutiny, and possibly from having to lie, by reference again to a legal 
technicality: "/ don't think the rules of evidence allow you to re-examine your own 
witness Mr Rossetti." 
With this fine point oflaw, and Chalmer's final statement, which confirms to the court 
that, "Harry had not unloaded the gun in [his J presence", the scene has been set for 
what in objective terms, can only be described as a possible miscarriage of justice. 
The text's preferred reading, on the other hand, ensures that the scenario fits 
comfortably with viewer expectations of how 'good' characters can expect to get 
justice from the law. The fact that the 'right' result, Harry. the good, honest, hard-
working chap is acquitted, is achieved through a process of deception, 'blackmail', 
legal manipulation and half truths. is not commented on, or scrutinised in the text. 
The magistrate, in his sentencing auJress. makes it clear that he can only make a 
judgement on what is presented to the court. In other words the law is not at fault, if 
'wrong' or incomplete facts are presented. The subtext here reiterates Cousin's ( 1987. 
p. 133) observation, that law is not interested in the truth per se, but in a certain kind 
of truth, "a strictly legal truth." The law we must assume would not have been able to 
arrive at this 'correct' (compassionate) decision, if all the facts had been presented. 
And this may well have been the case. An attempted murder charge (loaded gun) as 
distinct from an assault charge (unloaded gun), would certainly have warranted more 
than a two year good behaviour penalty. With this neat conclusion, the viewer is not 
encouraged to scrutinise or speculate as to whether the law has the capacity to take 
into account human factors which may provoke violent acts. The resolution that is 
offered, refuses to acknowledge the possibility of a structural problem with law. 
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Instead, as both the plot's perspective and audiences' expectations coalesce without 
disjuncture, any overt or implied criticism of law itself is avoided. 
Reconstructing the case 
Some other pertinent legal issues are also aired in the trial which reveal the artifice 
and constructed nature of law as an institution. One instance concerns the packaging 
of facts in conformity with law's strict rules of evidence as a way of defining what is 
'admissible' in a court of law. Another is the way that certain acts or events, 
irrespective of their individual context, need to be fitted into pre-ordained categories 
designated by set legal principles. To move from one category to another, for 
example from attempted murder to assault, has important ramifications in terms of 
how seriously the act is viewed and what sentencing rules apply. 
In respect of the latter circumstance. shortly before the trial begins. Harry's solicitor. 
Kate Chalmers. tries to negotiate dov.n the charges with the prosecutor Marc Rossetti. 
There is no suggestion that this is anything but right and proper on her part. portrayed 
as a normal procedure not an attempt to pervert the course of justice. Even the 
policeman overhearing the 'offer' suggests that Marc should take the deal. What Kate 
proposes to Mark is that her cEent will plead guilty to lesser charges if "you [Mark} 
nod your head to simple assault and resisting arrest and drop all the others." Mark's 
counter offer is a plea of guilty to all charges and,"/ won't press.for the maximum." 
Kate r~jects this offer, as jail is the inevitable outcome of that scenario. 
Such blatant negotiating and juggling between legal categories exposes the arbitrary 
constructiveness of procedures which form the basis of the legal process. Again there 
I 
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is no suggestion in the script, that a grossly altered, emasculated case, concocted 
behind the scenes by respective lawyers, would in any way effect or alter the 
administration of justice. The viewer is not positioned toward admiration of Marc for 
his refusal to deal. Indeed Mark is portrayed as a loser who is not clever enough to 
recognise a good deal when it is offered, and, in the cut and thrust of legal combat, he 
is seen to be no match for the former judge, Chalmers. 
The other aspect. which involves formulating and honing events so that the facts 
represent 'valid evidence' in a legal context. is also clearly presented in the trial 
sequence. A situation which demonstrates this issue, occurs in a corridor discussion 
between Kate, the solicitor. and her client Harry. during an adjournment. The 
important element under discussion is the 'accepted' legal strategy of excluding and 
omitting facts. or persons, that are obviously relevant to a case and who can and 
should speak to the truth of the situation. 
Kate begins by asserting quite forcefully that she hasn't asked Harry if the gun was 
loaded because "/ don't care " Harry replies that all will be revealed when he takes the 
stand to which Kate responds that she will not be putting him on the stand. Harry's 
anger at this, revolves less about truth-telling and more about 'gettir,g his day in court' 
and having the opportunity to explain his actions so that he does not "appear like a 
deranged bloody idiot." For Kate's legal purposes of course the illusion of 
derangement, whether real or not, is an important element because "It goes to 
mitigating circumstances." 
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This scenario is so much at variance with the oft-quoted legal maxim which forms 
the basis of the witness oath, 'the whole truth and nothing but the truth', that it could 
be presented as a critique of the legal process. It is not. Kate is a bright and caring, 
young lawyer using all her skills to get her client off while Harry's refusal to 
acknowledge her efforts, even after the event, serve to mark him as foolish and as an 
ingrate as well. His concerns about a defence which portrays him as "out of his tree" 
are seen as unreasonable if prison is the alternative. Clearly the text is positioning 
viewers toward seeing Harry as someone who may indeed be mentally unstable. For 
doesn't he realise that it is 'logical', 'perfectly proper' and indeed, sanctioned by law 
itself. to use the system to your own advantage? A lawyer who did otherwise would 
be derelict in her duty to her client. But what does this presumption say about law9 
Summing up the case: Outcomes 
The narratives of Law of the Land foreground topical social issues which include 
references to rural environmental matters. Aboriginal racial concerns and the 
problems of rural youth. Their inclusion suggests the possibility of progressiveness. 
With gender representation too, the casting of women in strong, lead roles, as 
solicitor, farmer and farmer's wife, indicates a recognition of the necessity to provide 
spaces for women within the text. These positive trends are not reiterated however, in 
the text's representations of law. 
In this series the institution of law operates as the moral centre piece to arbitrate and 
resolve the narrative disruptions. It is projected as the only proper, 'objective' 
regulatory body equipped to do the task. The unquestioning acceptance of law in this 
role is proof of its powers of 'incorporation.' Smart (1991, p. 5) notes, that 
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challenging any institutional power is problematic because it involves "accepting its 
own terms of reference and hence losing the battle before its begun." Tangential to the 
numerous plot Jines, which are a feature of the soap genre, are instances where the 
law, in the form of the new 'city' magistrate, is seen to be seriously compromised, 
though this fact is not commented on by the text. Justice does prevail in the ~nd 
through a narrative closure which conflates the issues into ones of minimal 
importance resolved as matters of a personal nature. 
Basing the series on the premise that law's 'method' is inevitably correct, automatically 
ensures that flaws and faults are assigned elsewhere. Utilising a different perspective 
the instances examined, could have been used to critique law. For example why was 
Justice' for Harry dependent on Chalmer's illegal removal of the bullets as evidence; 
in other words human intervention" How is it that 'legal method' and knowledge of 
that method, can be 'lawfully' used to conceal unlawful acts9 as when Chalmer's 
intimate knowledge of law's rules protected him from physical and verbal 
examination. This instance actually exemplifies Naffine's ( 1992. p. 76) contention 
that Jaw is designed for, and best serves a particular 'legal subject': "Consistently, the 
identity suggested is of an autonomous, self-interested. competitive man of property 
operating in a hostile and competitive society of like-minded people." For others, 
those less able to benefit or take advantage of law, they must be slotted or squeezed 
into one of law's designated categories. 
In the case of Harry, whose version of events is never told, is this not an instance of 
law's 'truth' actually being at odds with what actually happened? Could Justice' not 
have been done if all the facts, including Harry's testimony, been submitted? On this 
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point Smart's ( 1991, p. 11) observations are relevant: "The problem for lawyers is that 
the litigant may bring in issues which are not, in legal terms, pertinent to the case, or 
s/he might inadvertently say something that has legal significance unknown to 
her/him." 
All these examples demonstrate a reluctance on the part of the text to confront and 
challenge law, and this may in part be related to genre expectations. This version of 
the soap/drama, which prioritises character above social or political elements (Fiske, 
1987, p. 149), assures viewers that the characters presented as the main protagonists, 
the male magistrate and the female solicitor, will inevitably act and conduct 
themselves in an ethical manner. Thus outcomes based on legal judgements will not 
be compromised. Narrative resolutions, based on the personal attributes of the 
characters, deflect serious scrutiny away from the universality and reality of the 
problems raised. Problematic issues which do arise, such as conflicts of interest, 
interpersonal relationships with colleagues whose clients will appear in the court for 
judgement, and the obvious difficulty of dealing impartially with people known 
personally in a small town situation, are all presented as real scenarios in the narrative. 
The characters too, articulate an awareness of the difficulties these situations 
represent. But for the most part, dilemmas are resolved by way of an appeal to 
personal integrity and sound moral fibre. In this way law's systemic faults are 
individualised with the result that the law itself remains sacrosanct and impervious to 
challenge. This outcome is in keeping with Rowe's (1988, p. 37) assessment of 
another law series, LA LAW: "Our heroes may be flawed, but the law is not." 
47 
While the televisual account of law in Law of the Land ignores the contradictions that 
ar~ inherently a part of law, the institution, a recent example from fictional literature 
offers an interesting comparison. Novelist and lawyer, Nicholas Hasluck, writes 
about law from within the instill•'ion. In an excerpt from a recent novel, A Grain of 
Truth (1993), Hasluck's lawyer character, openly acknowledges the "great irony" of 
law: namely that law, in practice, is inherently contradictory. 
'And the rules of evidence can be used to keep, the jury in the dark, 'Jane 
chipped in, speaking almost bitterly. 'That's the great irony about the law. 
The public sees a widely respected advocate in action, mouthing noble 
sentiments, and believes he stands for morality and justice: the traditional 
values of society. But actually most of his techniques are aimed at 
subverting rational argument - constantly interrupting, confusing witnesses 
with nit-picking questions, blocking the presentation of crucial facts, 
shaping the truth to suit his client's case. Deep down. the professional 
advocate has to be something of an anarchist.' (Hasluck, 1994, p.218) 
This passage actually critiques aspects of law which are ignored in Law of the Land. 
Under particular scrutiny is the legitimacy of law's claim to 'construct a case'. As 
this excerpt demonstrates. this procedure is more accurately described in Foucauldian 
terms, as "shaping the truth.". 
Although Law of the Land is a contemporary text, in its espousal and replication of 
law's own view of itself, it firmly reinforces a dominant cultural position. The text's 
lack of progressiveness in its representations of law, points to a definite 'lag time' 
between the film and television representations of law, and the 'critical' literary work 
of scholars in the same field. Kuhn ( 1990, p. 5) notes a similar disparity between the 
visual and literary representations within the genre of science fiction. 
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Both the television and literary examples cited, offer a contrasting discourse on law 
yet both are contemporary texts, sourced from Australian culture. In proposing that 
institutional hegemonies such as law, can be challenged through the contemporary 
cross genre fonn, it seems a distinction needs to be made too, between those texts 
originating in the United States of America and the equivalent Australian text. It is 
the contention of this thesis that the emerging cross genre texts from the United States 
give semiotic proof, that there is a major cultural gap between their representation of 
contemporary social issues, compared with Australian narratives covering similar 
topics. This theory will be tested when textual analysis of one of these texts in 
undertaken in a later chapter. 
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CHAPTER2 
2. SCIENCE AND TELEVISION 
Some of the power that law has accumulated rests on its claims to be 'something like' 
science. In investigating this claim. this chapter takes a structuralist approach using 
binary oppositions as a starting point· 
SCIENCE 
• lays claim to 'absolute truth' based 
on verifiability and replicability 
which is based on the so called 
'scientific method'. 
• is concerned with events in the 
future 
• has good predicability claims 
inherent in its methodology 
• makes claims to universality 
• by its nature favours the new and 
novel 
(Mykitiuk, 1993, p. 69) 
LAW 
• has truth claims based on 
investigation of 'facts' b) the so 
called 'legal method' 
• is concerned v. ith events in the past 
• has poor predicabilit) claims 
• has claims based on specifics and 
circumstances 
• has the rule of precedent which 
favours analogy from past cases 
with assimilation of the ne" into the 
old. 
This structuralist perspective reveals some obvious, though perhaps not major. areas 
of discrepancy between the two disciplines. The science/law nexus and the issues it 
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raises about the hierarchy of discourses, will be the subject of the next chapter, but 
initially, it is necessary to investigate science or 'put science under the microscope'. 
The review of science's discourse will be done through science's representations on 
television because these illustrate science's role and position in society and indicate 
hm, closely science's representations in popular culture relate to science, the 
institution. As with law. television texts examined in this thesis provide a site to chart 
the relationship between the llbtitutinn and any emergent or alternative discourses. 
Researchers. Gardner and Young ( l 98 l ). who conducted seminal research in this 
area. contend that science's comentional representations inevitably tend to replicate 
and lend support to the positi, ist scientific discourse. Such projections invariably 
promote dominant ideology: "The current ideology of science on TV is a material 
force in reinforcing current priorities and practices in society" (Gardner & Young. 
l 981. p. l 7 l ). The nature of the reiationship between science's representations in 
popular culture and its institutional face, provides a useful model with which to 
compare law. The comparison cannot be exact of course. because law does not 
possess the 'special' attributes which makes science unique amongst knowledge 
cultures. The questions that arise are: What is it that sets science apart from other 
disciplines? What are its 'special' characteristics which make it the paradigm, ,ost 
which others are measured and judged'' 
2.1 Examining Science 
Science's claims to "privileged status" (Lievrouw, 1990, p. 2) are based on a range of 
defined characteristics which accord perfectly with western industrialised society's 
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notions of rationality and progress. It is no coincidence that these characteristics tally 
with what makes good economic sense. A recognition of the close historical links 
between science and the capitalist imperative, goes some way to explaining how 
science has been able to maintain its unassailable position as the icon of knowledge 
cultures. Sci~nce's rise to pre-eminence as a discipline, coincided with the rise of the 
industrial society and the decline of traditional social structures such as religion and 
the monarchy. 
Science's objectivity and validity are ·guaranteed' by an appeal to its so called 
'scientific method' but there is at the same time. an underlying economic rationale 
which bears on the overall representation of science. It needs to be acknowledged that 
it is in science's own interests to ensure that it is represented (for example on 
television). as an error-free font of knowledge: "The maintenance of science's 
privileged status among ... [other] competing 'knowledge cultures' helps scientists 
ensure the continued economic and social support of science" (Lievrouw. 1990, p. 2). 
So in order to preserve its own economic viability. science has a need to project itself 
( or be projected) as something essential to society's future. When comprehended 
from this perspective it should come as no surprise to learn. that the researchers 
examining media representations of science, (Dornan. 1990; Gardner & Young, 1981; 
Hornig, 1990; Silverstone, 1985), all comment on its almost unrelenting discourse of 
positivism. Such observations are particularly directed at television's representations 
of science, and this is significant, because television remains the major disseminator 
and populariser of science in western society (Barnes, 1989; Gardner and Young, 
1981). 
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The substance of the claim by these researchers is that television, by constructing 
media images reinforcing a view of science that is invariably progressive, infallible 
and value-free, colludes in science's positivist project. In presenting such 
constructions, the programmes replicate the Foucauldian "discourse of science", with 
its much "vaulted objectivity of 'scientific' method", which includes its practice, 
("'experimental' approach"), its language ("way of speaking"), all working together to 
support the whole (the institution) (Harland, 1987, p. 103). 
As was suggested previously, one of the results of ignoring and disqualifying 
alternative positions. is the de-limiting of meaning. Hornig ( 1990) observed just this 
tendency in the American television documentary science series NOVA: 
In the role of television, then, the sacredness of science becomes 
transformed into the special character of scientists, they become the high 
priests who negotiate for us between their mysterious world and our more 
mundane one. The scientist of NOVA is defined as a special- it is 
tempting to say "superhuman"- person rather than as a human being 
performing specialised activities .... The NOV A scientist generally appears 
in a suit and tie if not a laboratory coat against a background that identifies 
his role for the viewer. Scientists appear before blackboards covered with 
equations and in offices lined with books and littered with notes.(p. 17) 
In this extract Hornig identifies some of the devices and techniques which routinely 
accompany science presentations and help to define it as a 'sacred' knowledge system. 
She signals the notion of a mystery that needs solving, the invincible scientist on a 
specially assigned mission against an enemy, (often identified as time itself, hence the 
oft used phrase 'the race against time'), and the latent potency of scientific 
accoutrements which clearly underpin the credentials of the expert. Such a scenario, 
coupled with other production devices, patently carry "ideological implications" 
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(Hornig, p. 21) and in terms of audiences' readings, strongly signal a preferred reading 
toward an uncritical acceptance of science's project. 
The scientific discourse is at base a positivist discourse of continuous 
experimentation. It is a 'perfect'. fail-safe, mechanism which incorporates 'failure' into 
its very methodology but avoids naming it as such. Underpinning the scientific 
method and integral to it. is the notion of 'falsifiability', which has as a requirement 
the necessity to endlessly attempt to disprove a given hypothesis (Popper. I 974. pp. 
36-37). It is for this reason that, "experiments [that] do not work ... [and] medicine 
[ that J cannot find a cure" ( Smart. 1991. p. 11 ) are able to be representec m science as 
merely 'work in progress.' They are not perceived nor presented as failures of the 
discipline itself. Law's appeal process can not offer quite this degree of absolute 
certainty though it does accommodate what could be regarded as a system's failure. 
2.2 Science on Television 
Even with the systemic 'bias' which guarantees science its special status. its 
representations in popular culture are observed to be tightly constrained and uniformly 
formulaic (Bell & Boehringer, 1989; Gardner & Young, 1981; Silverstone. 1985 ). 
Control is particularly enforced in respect of showing science as a process. The 
exposition of the scientific approach as 'ad hoc' and 'fluid', would clearly provide 
opportunities to observe gaps in the prevailing hermeneutic discourse which could in 
tum "threaten the privileged status of scientific conclusions" (Hornig, 1990, p. 12). It 
is for this reason that science programmes on television tend to adhere to a definite 
fact/fiction divide with high status accruing to the high modality, factual mode. 
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Within this mode, strenuous efforts are made to distinguish between the public world 
of work and the private world of the scientist. 
This artificial divide which separates the public from the private has resonances with 
la\\ 's "public/private dichotomy" which was cited by Thornton (1991, p. 12) as being 
highly problematic. Science. in adhering to such arbitrary divisions. attempts to 
quarantine 'objective' science away from the 'subjective' contaminant. thereby 
arniding the possibility of disruption to a well established discourse. This strategy is 
rigorously enforced, according to Pinch and Collins' research (1984 ), because 
"revealing the private character of scientific activity ... can have a deconstructing or 
delcgitimizing effect on the resultant science" ( Hornig. 1990. p. 12 ). 
These characteristics of science programmes on television. are observable across 
national borders. Gardner and Young's ( 1981 ) research on UK science programmes, 
has been replicated by Bell and Boehringer ( 1989) in Australia. which further 
confirms Silverstone's (1985) work on the BBC's science series. Horizon. Similar 
research in the USA by Lievrouw ( 1990), Doman ( 1990) and Hornig ( 1990). all note 
a uniformity of presentation which is characteristic of science on television. On the 
basis of this work, researchers are in general agreement that a whole array of 
discursive practices operate to construct science's positivist discourse for popular 
culture. As Gardner and Young's (p. 174) observations conclude, "a firmly-
established, highly-regarded set of conventions [exist] ... which are expository. 
narrative and fundamentally celebratory, purveying culture to an audience of passive 
consumers who regard a spectacle." 
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As well as exposing the institutionalised practices underlying science presentation, 
Gardner and Young (1981, p. 174) ,:raw attention to a representational pattern which 
divorces science from its social environment, de-contextualising it as though its 
impact is naturally "neutral." Such deliberate segmenting or fragmenting denies a 
contextual setting. and parallels feminist concerns over the proponents of one of the 
ne\\ sciences. reproductive technology. These concerns similarly centre around 
\\Omen being perceived as an "assembly of parts" rather than as "a person as a whole" 
(Klein. 1989. p. 287). 
The exan1ple of reproductive technology is also useful in demonstrating how science. 
quarantined from a social context and from critical enquiry. is able to pursue unique 
forn1s of research unhindered by either moral or legal constraints. This particular area 
of science has quickly consolidated itself and legitimised its position by developing a 
discourse which is supported by its O\\ n special language. Phrases such as 'altruistic 
surrogacy'. 'surrogate mother', 'harvesting eggs' and 'selective termination' are no\\ as 
commonplace as are the descriptions of the multiple births of quads and quins. as 
·multiple multiples'. Such terminology is not neutral ·scientific' language but 
language loaded with persuasive intent which operates to conceal substantial ethical 
dilemmas. 
Science televiaion programmes dealing with this issue have, for the most part. 
eulogised its scientific possibilities and failed to critically analyse, or even apprehend. 
any consequent social impact. Instead reproductive technology's association with the 
origins of life itself represents the ultimate in the · gee whiz' science experience. 
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Typically this kind of science is presented in a style, Doman (I 990, p. 63) describes as 
the, "Eureka approach to science reporting" where routinely, there is the inclusion of 
an historic 'breakthrough' or a mystery solved. 
Other media. particularly radio and print (Barnes, 1989, p. 27), offer some opportunity 
for debate on scientific issues. With television, it is within the area of the social 
sciences that alternative discourses for critiquing the new science of reproductive 
technology have developed. The debate surrounding this, and other issues of 
particular concern to women. has emerged out of a more general critique of scientific 
epistemology begun by feminists. Bleier (I 988, p. 62) argues that feminism offers an 
important theoretical framework, which can "disrupt" and "subvert" and even provoke 
"open conflict at key points of greatest interest." Bleier's metaphor for science. 
comparing the "lab coat" to the "klansman", is a powerful one. and echoes Naffine's 
(I 992, p. 100) assertion that fundamentally law. like science. is male. 
It is the lab coat, literally and symbolically, that wraps the scientist in the 
robe of innocence ... and gives him, like the klansman, a face of authority 
that his audience can't challenge. From that sheeted figure comes a 
powerful, mysterious. impenetrable, coercive. anonymous male voice. 
How do we counter that voice? (Bleier, 1988, p. 62) 
In countering science's male voice, feminists have developed a series of strategies to 
interrogate science's methodology. The motivation for this stems from feminists who 
early-on indentified science, and particularly the medical "power-knowledge" area of 
science, as forming "key sources of patriarchal control over women" (McNeil & 
Franklin, 1993, p. 134). 
I 
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2.3 Textual Analysis of a Progressive Science Text 
An alternate (feminist) view on reproductive technology was presented in a two part 
documentary series Making Babies. shown on SBS in 1994, as a co-production of the 
National Film Board of Canada and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The 
first part of this one hour documentary called, On the 8th Day -Perfecting Mother 
Natur~ set about establishing a societal context for reviewing this new science. 
At the programme's outset, the documentary-style camera work and snippets of 
verbatim conversation. starkly expose the close. symbiotic relationship linking the 
science of reproductive technology with the technological industry. With 
accompanying film footuge from the '7th World Congress on IVF and Assisted 
Procreation'. the female narrator makes the announcement that "over 3000 doctors 
and salesmen gather in Paris to pitch the latest in reproductire technology." Science 
and industry in this context are art;-11Iy yet accurately described as '1,artners in the 
reproduction of life " During this sequence the camera pans to shots of the 
Conference 'marketplace'. Salespeople are heard extolling the virtues of freezing-
canisters for human embryos, computers are on hand to analyse sperm mobility, 
everywhere 'state of the art' technology is shown being co-opted and utilised in this 
endeavour. As the voice-over continues with the statement that, "what was science 
fiction some three years ago is reality now", the camera moves to a close-up of a 
exhibition poster featuring a child's face, half of which has negroid characteristics, 
while the other half is albino. 
These verbal and visual discourses combine to position the conTEXTualised viewer 
(as distinct from participants viewing the poster in the context of the Conference), to 
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regard this mutant vision as the antithesis of what progress or improving on nature 
means. For surely this would be every parent's worst nightmare, to be presented with 
a child so abnormal, so grossly disfigured.2 In concluding the scenes at the Congress a 
salesman in his booth laughingly admits to camera, "We're the biggest manufacturer 
uf hahies in the world" This jocular remark reinforces yet again the 'unnatural' liaison 
being forged between technology and commerce. The reading offered to the viewer 
from this sequence is one of complete disjuncture, not the least because this is clearly 
a case of men doin!l \>.omen's business and science replacing the natural. 
These are compounded when the invasive nature of the actual JVF procedures is 
graphically illustrated in another sequence, in "hich parallels are dra\>.n between 
human and animal reproduction techniques. The scene opens with the gross 
visualisation of a farm worker inserting his plastic coated arm into the vagina of the 
cow to flush out fertilised eggs for transfer to less valuable animals. The setting. 
which includes the cow's steel holding-pen on a bare, cement floor. a !lushing 
machine with a hose and nozzle insert and a farmhand in blue work-overalls routinely 
going about his job, all contribute to feelings of distaste and revulsion about such a 
grotesque and invasive procedure. In commenting on this scene the narrator says 
quite simply, "All of these techniques are used on women " The visual discourse is 
reinforced by direct to-camera comments from a variety of opponents of reproductive 
technology including feminist, and articulate anti-IVF campaigner, Gena Correa, 
together with a series of women who have unsuccessfully tried ]VF and several male 
doctors who are opposed to reproductive technology for different reasons. 
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In contrast to science's usual 'objective' stance, when strenuous efforts are made to 
separate science from its context, "(s)cience is one thing, context another" (Gardner & 
Young, 1981, p. 174), those who are involved in this process become an integral part 
of its discourse. There is no attempt made to disguise the purpose of the programme. 
It is clearly designed to provoke a reaction against reproductive technology based on, 
its low success rate (I 0%), its experimental nature, its technologically-driven, rather 
than human-centred ethos, and the deleterious effects it has on women, both 
physically and psychologically. 
What is presented, is definitely not an impartial, unbiased, apolitical text. Nor 
according to conventional TV science is it a 'scientific' text although various facts are 
presented in a documentary fonn which is supported by visual evidence. The 
per~pective offered is a feminist one. Its clear purpose is to critique and discredit this 
particular science. It achieves this by employing a range of discursive strategies 
which finnly link the research area of reproductive technology with the masculine 
culture of science. According to McNeil and Franklin (1991, pp.129-146), the 
feminist critique of science has been especially productive in exposing this link 
between science and the discourse of masculinity. 
This text's uncompromising fonn and content establishes it as one which fits neatly 
within Hartley's (1992) category of "propaganda". Hartley's plea in support of 
"propaganda", echoes Foucault's position in sanctioning anarchic voices of resistance, 
where there is a clear intention to destabilise dominant discourses and interrogate 
institutions. In the context of reproductive technology, Philp's (I 985, p. 17) summary 
of Foucault's position is pertinent: "His [Foucault's] support is lent to those who resist 
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the subjugating effects of power: those, like some feminists, who refuse to surrender 
their bodies to the established pr~ctices of medicine." 
2.4 The politics of reading texts 
In discussing the meaning making potential of propaganda, Hartley (1992, p. 53) 
contends that, "propaganda is more honest than news ... because its fonn invites a 
different politics ofreading."3 This reference to "a different politics ofreading" (p. 53) 
suggests that the onus for meaning making lies mainly with the social subject rather 
than the text. In assessing the significance of texts, such a statement, which implies 
significant reader power, should not be taken to preclude the idea that mainstream 
texts do not exert significant hegemonic power. The tendency of these texts is toward 
preserving the status quo while radical texts attempt to provoke change. These two 
textual extremes, the mainstream. popular text and the radical one. do not represent, 
nor have access to. equal power bases. The first has all the weight of cultural and 
institutional authority which means it has as its disposal all "the power of certain 
discourses ... to command assent" (Hartley, 1992, p. 52). The radical text or the 
voice of the "lunatic fringe" (p. 62), is infrequently aired or heard because it lacks 
access to any "organized power or institutional clout .... Thus the forces of truth are 
unequally balanced" (Hartley, 1992, p. 62). 
At the same time Fiske (I 987, p. 46) observes that radical texts which eschew 
anticipated cultural demands for entertainment and pleasure, run the risk of alienating 
viewers. 
(T)he conventions of[the] culture industry ... have to be taken into account 
in a theory of popular meanings within a mass culture. 
Social change in industrial democracies rarely occurs through revolution 
which is the sociopolitical equivalent of the radical text. (fiske, 1987, p. 
47) 
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Fiske's concern here is with popular culture's role in promoting social change. Power 
permeates through culture as discourse, and the popular, mass cultural mediums, such 
as television. film, radio and press. are the major purveyors and disseminators of 
culture. According to Allen (1992), television's impact is especially influential 
because it is so pervasive. It ranks, along with oral storytelling, as the "most prolific 
and important narrative medium in the world today" (Allen. 1992. p. 26). Television 
texts thus represent, one of the most significant sites for social change but instigating 
change requires of the text. that it balance both the demands of pleasure. and 
challenge. in the form of meaning making, for the viewer. 
In relating these issues concerning the politics of reading, to science in its popularised 
television form, it is clear that science utilises the institutional power that its status 
affords it to co-opt and influence a wider culture. Such endeavours are part of 
science's attempt to preserve an institutional edifice that is elite, non-contentious. and 
incontestably systematic. It manifests on television as a reliance on a format which 
favours the uninterrupted 'talking head', an avoidance of overt confrontation between 
'experts', and a masking of the reality of science as a process ·vhich is subject to 
uncertainties and vagaries (Gardner & Young, 1981 ). The resulting rigidity of form is 
symptomatic of a perceived need to control. limit and close down the excess of 
meaning which television inevitably generates (Fiske, 1987, p. 58). 
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Gardner and Young ( 1981, p. 179) make the point that the "rigid system of closure" 
required of science programmes, contrasts markedly with other Jess 'elite' genre types, 
which, in both content and form, assume a much greater degree of reader 
sophistication. Many of television's fictional representations, for example, are highly 
complex in narrative and visual style (Gardner & Young, p. 179). The same degree of 
latitude or 'slippage' is rarely observable in science, in either its typical discourse or in 
its popular cultural manifestations (Bell & Boehringer. 1989: Gardner & Young, 
1981). 
In addition to feminist texts some degree of relaxation in narrative form has recently 
become evident in one area of science. An increasing number of texts favouring 
open-ended formats are appearing, but these are almost exclusively reserved for 
programmes dealing with environmental issues. In such examples different 
perspectives are canvassed and often left partially unresolved. indicating that perhaps 
this area represents a different type of science, one that is more human-centred and 
perhaps more variable over time. The ABC's Quantum series has featured exan1ples 
of environmentally contentious issues where meanings are opened up rather than 
closed down, but statistically such programmes remain the exception rather than the 
rule. 
The other major popular culture area where the most interesting and challenging 
scientific debates are observable, is in science fiction. Commentators have drav.n 
attention to the genre's subversive potential (Kuhn, 1990) and to a characteristic 
narrative flexibility which allows critique, though not always solutions, of problems 
relevant to western industrialised society. Common themes which recur are those 
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associated with environmental degradation (Logan's Run), dehumanisation and 
mechanisation (Metropolis, Brazil), scientific experimentation (The Fly, Flatliners), 
societal breakdown (Robocop) and isolation and alienation (Blade Runner) (Kuhn, 
1990, pp. 15-18). 
This may seem like a curious phenomenon. to propose that science and related 
societal problems are interrogated more directly and vigorously in fictional 
representations rather than the much lauded factual ones. Nevertheless researchers 
(Fiske. 1987; Hartley. 1992) premise that as a communication vehicle. fiction's 
particular form. and its tendency toward excess (especially prevalent in its television 
manifestations). breaks do\>.n the constraints controlling meaning and opens up 
textual spaces for readers. Fiske ( 1987) suggests an economic rationale for this; 
namely that the polysemy associated with popular texts relates to the!T need. as 
products within the consumer economy. to have universal appeal. 
While there is clear evidence of science being interrogated in science fiction. its 
presence in fiction per se. does not guarantee scrutiny of science and its processes 
Indeed it is quite usual for science to be projected reverentially with its status used to 
authenticate the dominant discourses of other institutions. This is certainly the case in 
many fictional texts where law and science intersect. The police series Phoenix is one 
such example and for this very reason represents an ideal subject which will be 
reviewed later in this thesis. Particular aspects of law do attempt to align themselves 
quite closely with the scientific paradigm. One such area is criminology, (the study of 
crime and criminal behaviour) which is based on the science model of caust"leffect 
with its notions of inevitability and predictability. Continuing social disruption, 
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articulated as the 'law and order' problem, indicates that there has been little success in 
this area, either in predicting or controlling crime. The problem according to s0me 
feminists (Smart, 1990, p. 73 ), is that criminology is over-reliant on science: "The 
problem is that science is held to have the answer if only it is scientific enough." 
Another area where the law and science intersect decisively, is in the realm of forensic 
science. Significantly for this thesis. such representations form the basis for many 
fictional accounts on television including the previously mentioned police series, 
Phoenix. As a general rule fictionalised forensic examples are characterised by an 
adherence to a positivist scientific line. At base lies the notion that \\hen enough facts 
are obtained by the specialist (scientist), the 'truth' becomes clear and the answer 
becomes ine, itable. The ABC series Phoenix exemplifies this model and it will be 
considered as an example of th1: la\\/~cience nexus. The intert,,:ining of these l\\O 
discourses provides the site for interrogating ho\l, the second challenge to la\\ is 
represented within popular culture. 
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CHAPTER3 
3. THE LAW ACCORDING TO SCIENCE 
In the preceding chapters institutions and their constructed knowledge cultures have 
been examined. It has been suggested that particular institutions attempt to emulate or 
align themselves with science as a way of increasing their status. Affiliation with 
science represents an attractive proposition as it offers status, ready acceptance and 
little procedural scrutiny. Law justifies its own power to regulate and control on the 
basis of its objecti, ity. neutrality and being value-free: characteristics it claims derive 
from scientific principles. Closer inspection. by way of institutional theory. reveals an 
'objective' facade rather than substance. 
Commenting on this screen of scientilicity. Nafline ( 1992. p. 44) agrees that "the legal 
idea of objectivity functions as a smokescreen to conceal the actual sucial content of 
law and the place of value in legal processes." The main challenge to law's 'objective 
smokescreen' has come from feminists. such as Nanine, who have argued against the 
possibility of there ever being a totally objective position from which to speak. 
Feminists argue instead. that there are "partial understandings ... which owe their 
existence to the particular, concrete experiences of the apprehender" (Nafline. 1992. 
p. 45). The re-inscribing of this issue. is illustrative of just one aspect of feminism's 
challenge to law. 
3.1 The 'strange scientifico-juridical complex' 
The challenge to law investigated in this chapter will centre on what Foucault (1991. 
p.19) describes as the "strange scientifico-juridical complex." This is the situation 
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where "(a)nother truth [science) has penetrated the truth that was required by the legal 
machinery." Foucault's concern here, is with science's intrusion or 'penetration' oflaw 
and the degree of influence it assumes over judicial decisions. For Foucault (p. 19), 
science's role is problematic chiefly because it complicates and diffuses the legal 
process: "Judges have gradually ... taken to judging something other than crimes, 
namely, the 'soul' of the criminal." But, perhaps law's relationship with science, which 
has increasingly become a reliance Q!! science, raises other issues which are even 
more fundamental 9 For instance, when the legal and scientific discourses intersect, 
do~s the hierarchy of discourses which gives natural precedence to science, impact on 
the legal process" Could justice be a casualty in such circumstances? 
The two discourses intersect most decisively where forensic or scientific evidence is 
involved. It is in this area that law's fallibility becomes most obvious and where the 
challenge to law's authority begins Miscarriages of justice are the public 
manifestation of the legal system's failure and. although not all 'miscarriage cases' 
emanate from scientific evidence, many do, and some of these are celebrated cases 
which have been widely publicised.' Wilson's (I 991. p. 4) analysis of ten Australian 
miscarriage of justice cases, cites 'expert evidence' as a major problem in six of the 
cases examined. Bourke (1993, p. 124) agrees that "the unreliability of scientific 
evidence unjustly affects many criminal trials". though curiously, as she reports. 
"lawyers are generally unaware of the existence of the problem" (p. 127). This 
contrasts markedly with the public's perception of such occurrences. Higgins (1994, 
p. 137), in assessing the residual effects of the Chamberlain case for example, reports 
that it "had a negative impact upon the community's faith in the jury system and the 
reliability of forensic evidence." 
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This assessment stands in direct contrast to the legal fraternity's view of the case, 
where "the notoriety of Chamberlain has only served to distinguish it from other 
cases, so that it is now commonly thought of as an aberration, a 'one-off legal 
mistake" (Bourke. 1993, p. 127). Bourke (p. 124) is one of few within the legal 
profession who regards the case "as indicative of a more extensive problem" 
involving scientific or forensic evidence. Another is feminist lawyer, Roxanne 
Mykitiuk ( 1994 ). who cites specific instances where science is used by law, both as 
support and then in opposition, depending on which legal outcome is desired: 
One of the things I have found fascinating about these cases is the 
construction and use of scientific evidence to support particular outcomes. 
That is to uncover the socially and legally constructed standard or norm 
which masquerades behind the application of scientific 
evidence .... (C)ommonly in jurisprudence, scientific knowledge is regarded 
as an objective basis upon which to reach particular and determinative legal 
outcomes. However, we find the scientific explanation or understanding 
used in one case directly contradicted by its usage in another case. (p. 94) 
These contradictions in law have been actively taken up by the media and re-
presented in both fact and fiction genres. While there is general agreement that "no 
obvious blueprint for successfully challenging miscarriages of justice" exists. the 
media's contribution lo the debate is seen as "important". if at times "unpredictable" 
(Zdenkowski, 1991. p. viii). 
This so called "unpredictability" is more apparent than real though. as journalism has 
its own set of standard discourses. The illusion actually stems from the media's role 
which allows it, either to support a critique of the system. or support the status quo, 
which means in effect to "regurgitate the conventional wisdom about appeal systems 
I 
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... that the accused has had his or her day in court, and so on" (Zdenkowski, p. viii). 
Whichever is the case, as this thesis proposed at the outset, the media's role is a 
discursive one. which permits it to challenge, or support law and its regulatory 
!unction. 
Popular culture's fictional accounts of the law/science nexus. which include the 
law/cop/mystery genres. may show evidence of this challenge to law. Confirmation 
of such a challenge would be in the deconstruction of science's 'natural' hierarchical 
superiority. along with a repudiation of its discursive power to validate other 
discourses. The task will be to determine through textual analysis, how science's 
representations influence legal discourse. Does the discourse of science with its 
attendant claims of logic. objectivity and infallibility. tend for example, to overwhelm 
or inhibit the legal discourse to such an extent that justice is a casualty? The 
proposition v.ill be examined using tv.o texts where. within a legal context. science's 
role in law is a significant factor. 
3.2 Fiction/Law/Science: A forensic sample - Phoenix 
Fictionalised forensic examples. as a general rule. are characterised by an adherence 
to the positivis: scientific line. They are underwritten by the notion that when enough 
facts are obtained by the specialist (scientist). the answer/ the truth becomes clear and 
inevitable. The ABC series Phoenix exemplifies this model. In this cop series. 
science is treated reverentially with tacit affirmation of its infallible status. By 
association it invests credibility on the institution it supports; the judicial system. 
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Phoenix. as part of the cop genre series, advertises itself as reflecting the 'real' world. 
It is heavily naturalistic in narrative d~•ail, setting and dialogue. Its concerns centre 
on the serious masculine business of public life as dangerous, competitive and 
unpredictable. The forensic team. a husband and wife combination, Ian and Carol 
Cochrane, appear at various times throughout the series. They assist the police in 
collecting evidence at crime sites. provide hypotheses based on the evidence and 
submit the evidence to various testing procedures. When shown in the work 
environment. the pair are usually portrayed in white lab coats surrounded by 
scientific apparatus. 
The characterisation of the senior scientist. Ian Cochrane. draws heavily on the 
stereotype of the 'crazy scientist' but any deliberate peculiarities. for example odd 
socks. remain at the insignificant le\'el to ensure that his scientific judgement remains 
sacroscant. Carol Cochrane on the other hand. is portrayed as something of a 
feminist. A working mother. she stands somewhat apart from the overtly masculine 
culture of crude jokes. sexual innuendo. pubs and excessive drinking which 
characterise the police team. Her character also re\'eals evidence of intellectual 
superiority with wit and repartee being her standard response in most situations. In 
illustrating the role the forensic element plays in Phoenix. a typical scene from the 
second series, shown on ABC on 27/5/93. has been selected for analysis. 
The extract involves the scientist, Ian Cochrane. testing the shoes of two detectives. to 
ascertain whether they were responsible for a young girl's precipitous leap from an 
upstairs window during an arrest. The young girl has been left paralysed and the odds 
are stacked against the detectives being able to prove their innocence. In a previous 
70 
episode via omniscient positioning, the viewer has been privy to the 'truth' of the 
situation and knows the detectives are innocent. In this scene, as the detectives hand 
their shoes over to Ian Cochrane for testing, he remarks that if they are not the right 
ones it will go in his report. The purpose of this seemingly unprovoked comment 
becomes apparent in the exchange which follows. It aims to establish scientific 
objectivity. 
(Ian) "Jock suggested I take extra care in case I'm biased toward you. I mean what 
does he think I am ... "7 
(Carol- humorous aside) "Human"? 
([an) "// you were my own mother. God help you, I'd do exactly the same as I always 
do" 
(Carol-smile and laugh) "With care/iii incompelence" 
([an-good humouredly) "Will you sh111 up" 
Th~ focus of this extract is clearly to pre-empt concerns of bias against the scientist 
Ian Cochrane. It is framed as a personal issue but at stake is the more general one of 
science's credibility. Such a pre-emptive tactic, represents in media terms, a classic 
strategy of containment. By overtly raising the issue of bias. the episode 
acknowledges and at the same time counters, possible viewer concern about Ian's 
'objectivity' in the face of a known friendship between himself and the detectives. 
Left unresolved the issue might lead to a more general query about science itself and 
undermine science's validating role in the series. Within the verbal discourse, Ian 
Cochrane explicitly denies subjective involvement: "I'd do lhe same if you were my 
mother", implying that it is science's own methodology which guarantees his 
I 
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impartiality. This denial of subjectivity is fundamentally regressive for, as Bleier 
(1986, p. 63) observes, "scientists cannot simply hang their subjectivities up on the 
hook outside the laboratory door." This narrative also signals that the truth will out, in 
that the results of the tests will vindicate the detectives, because science has been 
constructed as the method of deriving truth from the facts and experimental 
procedure. In this instance science provides the answer via a process Jan Cochrane 
calls "analysing the fi,otprint choreography". 
The actuality of this extraordinary procedure is demonstrated later in the episode 
when a map with various footprints and a transparency, are used to explain the 
process to the detectives. Cochrane obtained the results by, in his words, "staring 
through a polylight and squaring it with an electrostatic lifier." These 'dance' maps, 
"ith their dots and crosses, provide conclusive proof that neither detective was 
involved in the girl's jump from the window. 
In this short scene the verbal and visual discourses coalesce to produce an 
unambiguous pro-science discourse. Visually the images of the laboratory, the white 
coats, scientific paraphernalia and glasses for Ian Cochrane. merge with a script heavy 
with scientificity, to produce what is clearly the dominant discourse. The 
synchronisation of the image, 'the dance map', with the verbal explanation given by 
the scientist, "makes it appear as if the images 'speak for themselves"' (Brunsdon & 
Morley, 1978, p. 62), and require no further interpretation. The discourse is given 
additional weight by the process of inscribing the viewer into the film space (p. 64 ). 
Seeing the dance map through the eyes of the scientist, Ian Cochrane, in a close-up 
displaying the graphics and detectives names, vouches for the truth and validity of the 
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material. This combmation of processes reinforces science's image as an infallible, 
objective and value-free knowledge system. The scene's closure, which is signalled 
by a shift of focus to a wide shot includes a reinforcing verbal summation, "this 
means you're in the clear." The explanatory comment is offered by the female 
scientist. Carol Cochrane, indicating perhaps that the feminine is required to decode 
the language of men's science, for the general audience. 
This sequence's positive and incontrovertible outcome stands in marked contrast to 
what happens in the rest of the narrative, where things are seen to go horribly wrong 
for the police team. Drug busts fail. information goes astray, informers get killed. and 
factional rivalry within the team eventually undermines the success of the operation. 
Within this maelstrom, science remains intact and inviolate and by association gives 
credence to the judicial institution it supports. The discourse of science being 
propounded here. is a wholly traditional one which refuses to acknowledge either the 
possibility of scientific error or of ambiguity. 
On Bourke's (1993. pp. 124-125) evidence. la" perpetuates this discourse v.hen it 
fails to recognise, "the existence of unreliable scientific test evidence:[and] its extent 
across a whole range of scientific tests." The associated tendency of!awyers to regard 
failures of the judicial system. based on forensic evidence, as mere "aberration(s)" 
(Bourke. p. 127) has also been criticised. Wilson's (1991, p. 4) study of Australian 
examples where miscarriages of justice had occurred, identified "expert evidence" as 
a major problem in over half of the cases examined. In the Chamberlain case alone. 
Wilson lists six separate problem areas, three of these concerned the 'evidence', with 
queries about its "partial", "circumstantial" and/or "inconclusive" nature. Wilson's 
73 
examples, seem to suggest a less than perfect 'fit' or accommodation, between the 
intersecting discourses of science and law. 
How far do these aberrant legal outcomes result from the hierarchy of discourses 
which gives natural precedence to science? Could it be the case, that the discourse of 
science with its claims to logic, objectivity and infallibility, tends to overwhelm or 
inhibit the legal discourse; and is justice a casualty as a result? 
3.3 Science Rules: O.K? 
Some support for this claim can be found in the special provisions allowed expert 
witnesses in respect of giving testimony. Normal rules of evidence exclude hearsay, 
but this provision is waived for expert witnesses called to testify on the basis of their 
possessing special knowledge. A further exemption applies too with regard to 
offering opinions. A relaxation of the normal procedural requirement, which permits 
witnesses to report only on observed facts, allows experts to extrapolate. hypothesise. 
infer and make suggestions based on opinion rather than actual observation of an 
event. In respect of the social sciences. Konopka (1980, p. 132) asserts that under 
normal circumstances "most of the sources of information from which a social 
scientist derives an opinion would be inadmissible as evidence." He includes all data 
derived from census and survey results in this category. 
Also regarded as problematic is the traditional attitude of deference to, and regard for. 
the role of the expert. Science's privileged position in Western society guarantees its 
members high credibility in respect of matters relating to rationality, objectivity and 
value-free judgements. All characteristics which are highly valued and sought after 
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by the law in its administration of justice. Expert pronouncements are afforded 
special status through what Cassidy (l 991, p. 64) terms "author invisibility", which 
gives subjective opinions the appearance of objective statements of fact. Bourke 
( 1993. p. 126) notes in her study that an "aura of scientific certainty causes lawyers 
and jurors to operate under a shroud of assumed omnipotence of science." Aitken 
(1994. p. 244) supports this view advising that "(p)art of the danger of expert 
evidence lies in the misleading objective appearance of the expert witness." Post 
(l 980, p. 174) similar!; comments on the "opaque" nature of evidence which is 
unwittingly caught up in the social prestige of the expert. 
Within this system. science also constructs its own hierarchy which certifies experts 
according to a set of criteria determined by the institution. This hierarchy of expertise 
operates to discount other less credentialled opinions and/or to disqualify non-
scientific discourses. Samuels ( 1994. p. 151) notes how the illusory process works: 
"(F)orensic experts, with a string of qualifications after their name. can be seen by the 
jury as infallible and omnipotent, when they may not be." In the Chamberlain trial. 
where specialist forensic scientists were an integral part of both the prosecution and 
defence cases, special emphasis was placed on academic and other qualifications as a 
way of establishing a clear superiority in the scientific hierarchy. For example 
Professor Cameron, whose evidence of a bloodstained handprint on the jumpsuit led 
to the re-opening of the case, is regarded as, "one of the leading forensic experts in the 
world" (Johnson, 1984, p. 95). In court, his pre-eminence in the forensic field is 
evidenced by a list of his previous accomplishments: "So long was his curriculum 
vitae that Sturgess handed a typed copy to Galvin, rather than read it all out" (Bryson. 
1989, p. 306). 
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In the retrospective decision that finally cleared the Chamberlains, Justice Morling, 
using legal determinants, concluded that it was the Crown's eminent forensic 
scientists who had made errors of judgement in their expert evidence (Young, 1989, 
p. 272). Young's review of the findings of the Morling Inquiry, also points to some 
fundamental flaws in science's revered 'objective' methodology: 
Bias appears to have been a factor influencing the direction of the errors .... 
Prejudice apparently blurred the vision of scientific objectivity. Too many 
forensic experts simply failed to practise a basic principle of modem 
science: to subject all opinions to tests that are designed, if possible, to 
invalidate them. (Young, 1989, p. 272) 
By contrast. the forensic work of the defence's less well credentialled scientists was 
totally vindicated: "Incredibly the Morling inquiry was a triumph for these minor 
scientists over those with vastly superior reputations (emphases added] in the forensic 
field" (Youn:-, p. 273). These examples are illustrative of how the discourse of 
science, in addition to having special status within the legal system, also maintains its 
own hierarchy of expertise which can affect a judicial outcome. 
The adversarial system is also seen as problematic in respect of forensic evidence. 
Any real notion of impartiality on the part of the expert is destroyed. according to 
Hogg (l 99 l p. I 93 ), by an adversarial process which incorporates the so-called 
independent expert witness into "the partisan outlook of one or other of the 
adversaries. 1' 
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3.4 Institutional Interrogations: The case of Evil Angels 
In setting out the various contentious points surrounding the science/law nexus it is 
clear that these sites of contestation offer ample opportunity for law to be interrogated 
via science. A film text such as Evil Angels is useful in how it interrogates many of 
these sites and exposes in the process, the nature and variety of discourses which 
support both law and science. These range from a critique of science's sexist 
discourse, to an expose of the institutionalised practices which empower the expert 
and discount alternative discourses through exclusion of the non-expert. 
Based on Bryson's (1985) novel Evil Angels, the film adopts a similar pro-
Chamberlain position and approaches the forensic evidence from that partisan 
viewpoint. The film's ideological stance. positions it oppositionally to both law and 
science's discourses of certainty. Part of the enterprise to re-position alternative 
discourses, requires the erosion of credibility of the forensic evidence. In the opening 
scene the ideological position is enunciated by juxtaposing the pro-Chamberlain 
discourse against a number of conflicting anti-Chamberlain elements, the significance 
of which, becomes apparent later in the text. 
The film opens in Mt Isa prior to baby Azaria's disappearance, and within two 
minutes, in five separate scenes, attention focuses on matters vital to the ultimate 
determination of innocence or guilt. Aspects of the family, the religious community 
and some crucial hints about character, such as Michael's obsession for photography 
and Lindy's unconventionality, are all framed positively. This series of images work 
pre-emptively to counter the myriad extra textual myths associated with the 
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Chamberlain's much publicised court cases. This same counteracting strategy occurs 
frequently throughout the film. For instance, the film uses groups of 'ordinary' people 
commenting on the case, as a disruptive narrative device. Presented as 'public 
opinion' are people at a dinner party, at a bowling club, on a pub verandah. packing 
sandwiches and walking dogs: all ot1er 'opinion snapshots' on the Chamberlains and 
display in the process. varying degrees of ignorance. intolerance. prejudice and 
bigotry. These ill-informed and illogical opinions ha,e no narrative v.eight and are 
easil) discounted though. as we spectators. through the "position of spectatorial 
privilege" (Fiske. 1987. p. 25). arc pm") to the 'truth' of the situation: we have 'seen' 
the dingo enter the tent and leave" ith something in its mouth. 
It is imp1Jrtant to recognise thb ~tratcg; at \\Ork in the text hccausc the same 
discrediting process is used to erode the credibilit) of the forensic e, idcncc. In its 
systematic undermining of the Im, 'science ncxu.'.'). F\ ii :\nucls rcpre~enb a rare 
media/legal instance of discursi\ c d1screditmg. 
3.4.1 Representation of forensic e,·idencc in fa·il A11ge/s 
The representation of forensic e, idcnce occurs primaril) in the trial sequence "ith a 
variety of discrediting strategies being utilised. The first forensic scientist presented is 
biologist. Joy Kuhl. whose evidence of blood in the car. and particularly her assertion 
that foetal blood was present. v.as vital to the Crm,n's case: "The fact that Kuhl's 
evidence dominated the proceedings in the second inquest. the trial. both appeals. and 
the inquiry demonstrated the fundamental importance of her testimnry" (Young. 
1989. p. 182). 
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Kuhl is cast as a slightly frumpish, self-satisfied woman who bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the accused. Lindy Chamberlain. Lindy acknowledges the 
,isual ambiguity. "the outfit. the polkadot dreu. practically the same as mine, not lo 
mention the hairdo" After hearing Kuhl's testimony, Lindy is seen to react to her 
(Kuhl) personally. "f/ul!ering her eye., at the jury". and adds rather crudely; "/ reckon 
.,he's got somethmg going \rith that copper too " 
1.inJ; 's role as the \ ictim. gin~s her \ ituperati\ e comments narrative motivation and 
positions her character in a preferred posil!on. fl) contrast Kuhl's demeanour and 
language. suggest a subJecti\c. personal investment m her C\ idencc \Vhich se\ere!; 
detracts from her objecti,e standing as a scientist. For example under questioning she 
says of the tests she carrit~d out: "The huckle gan: IJJ.._£!.. ,·e,}'. ,·e,T strong poslll\'e 
reactums to hlood'' and. "the .\pray pallern wult:r the dash ga,·e me a ,·ery strong 
positii'e reaction to foetal haemoglohm "Both the visual and \erhal discourses here 
\\Ork to position the spectator as obseners to Kuhl's partiality in her close physical 
attachment to here, idence. SubjectiYity as opposed to object1,·ity is constructed in 
her actual holding of the camera bag as she gives her c, idcnce. 
Under cross-examination Kuhl's credibility is further \\eakened \\hen she admits. 
with ob,ious discomfort. that the actual test-plates used in the experiments have been 
destroyed. ;\ combination of sound effects. an audible gasp in the courtroom. and 
camera \\ork. a closeup of the jury showing surprised faces. frames the scene to 
Kuhl's disadvantage In her subsequent appearance in a hotel beer-garden in the 
company of the prosecuting police, the film clinches Kuhl's lack of credibility as a 
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scientist/witness. In this scene Kuhl's speech reveals a personal antipathy tow•rd 
Lindy based on the most irrational of reasons, emotion coupled with claims of black 
magic and sorcery; "She just stared into my hack I could.feel it. She just stares you 
knoll'. She's a witch you know'" Although such a suggestion in this context is seen as 
quite bizarre, the script here overtly draws attention to an extra textual discourse 
circulating at the time: "The spectre of Lindy as witch was rarely articulated, yet the 
notion percolated just beneath. constantly informing the imagery which pervaded the 
discussion" ( Johnson. 1984. p. 91 ). 
In this segment involving Kuhl, scientific credibility is undermined by activating a 
sexist rhetoric which postulates that the discourse of woman as scientist is antithetical 
(Haraway. 1989. p. 281 ). Both the verbal and visual discourses systematically corrupt 
the 'aura of the expert'. culminating in Kuhl's absurdly anti-scientific reference to 
Lindy as a "witch." Indeed the composite portrayal of both women in this sequence 
could be categorised as sexist, as it reinforces stereotypical notions of women's 
behaviour. Displayed are instances of gossip. pctt, jealousies. and judgements based 
on superficialities and irrationality. With Lindy such strategics may work to 
humanise and round out her character but with Kuhl they arc clearly designed to 
discredit her as a person with an, scientific credibility. 
A combined attack on Kuhl, via her gender and psychological make-up, counteracts 
her potential as a scientific witness. A similar technique undermines another 
important expert witness. Professor Cameron, but significantly, it is not done on the 
basis of his gender. Cameron is shown to have a character defect, a personal and 
professional arrogance, which makes him vulnerable as an expert witness. In his 
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appearances another technique for discrediting the forensic evidence is employed and 
it involves setting up obvious discrepancies between the visual and verbal discourses. 
The initial framing of Cameron as the traditional expert is conveyed by technical and 
representational codes including casting, dress codes and speech patterns. (fiske, 
1987. p. 5). Camera shots from below construct Cameron's aquiline profile as 
arrogant and supercilious while his cultivated and deliberate speech patterns activate a 
discourse of superiority based on class with colonialist overtones. Cameron's 
theatricality's, his staging for effect, with his suggestion of human involvement: 
"711ere rs evidence to suggest an incisal ,1·ow1J around the neck. in other word\ g_ 
cw throat'". is accentuated by a deliberate closeup of his face which characteristically 
reveals emotion. whereas 'true' objecti,ity \\Ould necessitate a mid-shot. 
The actual discrepancy between verbal and visual discourses occurs "hen Prof 
Cameron attempts to demonstrate , ia "11/tl'll l"iolet photogl'llph/' the presence of a 
handprint on the jumpsuit. The visual discourse records a murky. indistinct. 
ambiguous image which is at variance with Cameron's confident assertion of "the 
impression of the hand of a small adult." In such a hierarchy of discourses the visual 
tends to take precedence and the cut away shot to a female journalist adds ,·erbal 
support with the comment, "If that's a hand I'm a l"irgin " The spectator is here 
positioned to favour the commonsense view over the expert scientific opinion. 
whereas in the Phoenix example. the perfectly coinciding visual images draw the 
spectator into an easy acceptance of science's 'truth'. 
The framing of the final sequence has the verbal discourse take precedence. as 
Cameron's credentials as an expert are quc;-ied through Lindy's comments on his 
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faulty evidence in the celebrated "Confait case." During the cross examination both 
verbal and visual discourses combine to discredit Cameron. This reaches a high point 
in the concluding scene, purporting to be television news footage, when in a grainy 
media shot with voice-over, the verbal discourse indicates that Cameron's evidence 
has been "completely discredited "The high modality and truth status of news, invests 
this scene with credibility and signals that Professor Cameron's fall from grace is 
complete. This sequence interestingly frames the media's 'truth' above that of the 
scientific expert. 
3.4.2 Excluded knowledges 
While it is the hierarchical nature of institutions such as science. which gives experts 
their status and credibility. the same system operates to disempower. through 
exclusion, those whose skills and knowledge are outside the paradigm. Mclloul and 
Grace (1993, pp. 15-16) refer to these as '"naive' knov.ledgcs. because they are 
located low down' on most official hierarchies of ideas (Foucault, l 980a: 82). 
Certainly they arc ranked 'beneath' science." A clear illustration of this process occurs 
when the text comments on the exclusion from the trial of the real 'experts'. the 
Aboriginal trackers. According to Young (1989. p. 256). "(t)he blacktrackers had no 
doubt that the tracks proved a dingo had seized Azaria from the Chan1berlain's tent". 
but the authorities continued to regard this information as 'unreliable'. Bourke ( 1993. 
p. 190) also nominates this as a "classic example of the aura of science" at work. 
"(N)otwithstanding significant eye-witness evidence, Aboriginal tracker evidence, a 
recent history of dingo attacks. and the prior concerns of the ranger. the scientific 
evidence still prevailed." [emphasis added]. 
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In the film, a sequence involving talk-back radio, is used to demonstrate how 
Aboriginal cultural superiority in this sphere, is not acknowledged, validated nor 
respected. When a female radio announcer queries on-air, why none of the trackers 
has been called to give evidence, an aggressive male caller offers the standard racist 
response: "look lady, you can't believe those bludgers. They're always drunk. You 
know that!" In addition to its obvious racist implications, this short sequence 
graphically illustrates the unequal struggle different discourses have to command 
assent. On display are the methods customarily employed to discredit and inhibit 
non-credentialled discourses on the basis of their Jack of a 'scientificity'. Graycar and 
Morgan (1990) in summarising Howe's ( I 989) view on the media's role in the 
Chamberlain case, conclude that: 
(T)he scientific evidence completely displaced the eyewitness accounts and 
in particular, the evidence of an Aboriginal tracker . I !owe suggests that 
the media's failure to report the evidence of blacktrackers \\as also 
'profoundly racist'.(p. 265) 
Higgins (I 994, p. 140) in her recent review of the press coverage of the case, noted 
the same hierarchy in operation. and concluded that it "valorised the evidence of 
(forensic) science over eye witness accounts and the evidence of black trackers." 
Another technique used by the film to disrupt science's credibility occurs \\hen 
science is represented as a highly specialised and complex discourse. The resulting 
level of incomprehensibility relates to what Cassidy (1991 a, p. 63) refers to as the 
exclusivity or "closed shop" which characterises each discipline. In several instances 
science's 'foreign' language is targeted for ridicule because of its elitism and lack of 
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relevancy. For example, a witness who is an expert on blood, is shown droning on 
incessantly about "anti-serums", ·'anti-haemoglobins", "anti-bodies", "alpha" and 
··beta molecular chains" while a camera shot of the jury indicates puzzled non-
comprehension. Bourke (1993, p. 141) confirn1s the accuracy of this representation: 
"Professor Boettcher ... spoke of having seen many jurors' and lawyers' eyes 'glaze 
over' when confronted with scientific evidence in court." To reinforce this point. and 
raise the more general problem of a jury's ability to deal with highly technical 
evidence, a scene including Jaw students discussing the Chamberlain case. is 
presented. One puts the commons~nse view of the problem: "Jj highly regarded 
experts can't agree, how are the jury suppo\·ed tu make u conclusion?" On offer here. 
is an alternative competing discourse about ju!) competency in specialised areas. The 
proposition being advanced. is that some legal cases are just too specialised and too 
complex for the average person to comprehend and make a judgement on. 
The media too has difficulty breaking down and re-packaging. the mass of scientific 
material offered as evidence. The scientific tern1inolog1 is constructed as 
problematic. with journalists grappling to understand and explain specialist tenns 
such as 'ouchterlony', 'orthentology' and 'electrophoresis'. While such instances could 
be read as a critique of journalistic practices. in the context in which they are 
employed in this film, the discursive processes tend toward encouraging an 
interrogation of science. Both the verbal and visual discourses construct science as 
something abstruse and irrelevant. For instance during the presentation of scientific 
evidence. a shot of the media room shows bored journalists yawning openly as one 
asks rhetorically: "Jesus, how many more days of'this?" Another scene in a newspaper 
office has the editor telling another journalist: "l ii ;;,, ,· mu ten bucks if' you can get 
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hap10g/ohin into a headline!" while another reports on "!he a/mos/ incomprehensible 
fi,rensic evidence." This discourse of science being 'too difficult', and something 
antithetical to commonsense. extends to the jury room where members argue about 
the evidence. "Can we son oul !he blood 1hingfirs1 before we go any fur/her?" says 
one. The response from another jury member reinforces the visual and verbal points 
made earlier. "Forge/ !he h/ood. none ofus 11ndersland1· anylhing aboul lha/ 1" 
The media's inability to critically engage with and comment on the scientific aspects 
of the case. may appear an innocuous omission but as Wilson (1991, p. 10) obsen·es 
both "media pressure" and "media stereotype/prejudice" are involved in many 
miscarriage of justice cases, including the Chamberlain case. Pugliese's (1991. pp. 
72-73) print-media textual analysis of the Tim Anderson/Hilton Bombing case. argues 
that the media draw from a range of "rhetorical and narrative strategies" in 
constructing a "discourse of journalism", and in cases of this type. they customarily 
resort to "the rhetoric of criminality." It seems likely that a media that is unable to 
evaluate and make distinctions between the significance and value of scientific 
evidence presented. will favour the standard journalistic discourse: "We're supposed 
to be reporting the prosecution case. right''". is how one journalist perceived his role. 
in Evil Angels (Bryson. 1985. p. 40 I). 
As has been noted earlier. the coupling of law's adversarial system with expert 
evidence. often results in outcomes which are far from just. According to Hogg 
(1991. p. 192). the reas<::>n for t..c anomaly lies within the system itself: "The 
adversarial process tends to encourage the suppression of evidence favourable to the 
accused and the shoring up (if not manufacture) of evidence suggestive of guilt." 
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Hogg further contends that the offering of "expert, scientific evidence" in no way 
assists in arriving at the 'truth' because this type of evidence is only given to secure a 
conviction. In fact the system itself encourages the so-called "independent expert", to 
become incorporated into "the partisan outlook of one or other of the adversaries" 
(llogg.1991.p. 193). 
The film acknowledges the problem of partisan evidence by nominating the Crown's 
t\\o expert witnesses. Joy Kuhl and Professor Cameron. and allowing them extra 
screen time. Their objectivity as witnesses, is seen to be compromised because of 
their close alignment and sympathy with the prosecution case. By contrast. none of 
the de fence's expert witnesses are nominated individuall). which tends to guarantee 
their scientific impartiality. This affords them no advantage m the hierarchy of 
discourses however. as the lack of nomination signifies their narrative impotence. In 
narrative terms this is consistent with the lack of impact their e, 1dcnce had on the 
eventual verdict and fulfils the film's narrati,·e logic and audience expectations. m 
respect of the rationale required to secure a guilty verdict. 
Evil Angels. as the fictionalised account of the Chamberlain case, succeeds in 
exposing the nature .. 1d variety of science's discourses within the legal process. In so 
doing, it invites interrogation of a particular encounter between law and science \\here 
justice is seen to be a casua: According to research by both Bourke (1993). and 
Wilson ( 1991 ), cases with similar outcomes are not uncommon. Some see a remedy 
1n making science more reliable (Bourke, 1993). while others demand more 
account:1\,: 1 and scrutiny of science, as in the USA Supreme Court. 1993, Daubert 
-1·,• ,Richardson, 1994). The problem also fundamentally concerns the way 
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knowledge cultures and institutions are constructed and naturalised in society via a 
process which valorises and credentials science above other '"naive' knowledges" 
(McHoul and Grace, 1993, p. 15). Bourke (1993, pp. 126-127) explicitly 
acknowledges this. as a problem confronting law: ''Twentieth century dependence on 
science and technology . has crea·.eJ an aura of scientific certainty which pervades 
the whole of society, and no less Im,yers." 
3.5 Outcomes 
Popular culture's contribution to this debate, based on an analysis of Phoenix, 
indicates that science does indeed act as an infallible adjunct to law, aiding and 
abetting the validation of its discourse. Despite evidence of substantial problems in 
the forensic and scientific field (Aitken. 1994. Bourke. 1993; Sanrnels, 1994: Wilson. 
1991 ). science continues to be represented in the legal context. as the epitome of 
objectivity. rationalit, and infallibility. Bourke suggests that a rcvirn of science's role 
must begin by acknowledging that discipline's subjccti, ity: 
Just as law incorporates policy and value laden decisions. so too does 
science .... The basis of the education should be to develop an appreciation 
that. at its best. scientific 'proof is a default option': at its \\Orsi. science 
provides answers that are 'simple. neat. easy - and \Hong'. ( 1993. p. 193) 
Ultimately representations such as Phoenix are regressive as they constrain rather than 
provoke meaning. Craven (I 994, p. I 0) could well be referring to this text when he 
comments that: "Once again. the text of popular culture seems primarily to amplify 
rather than challenge existing 'common senses' about national and social relations." 
Certainly a challenge to law does not originate from this source. 
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Texts such as Evil Angels by contrast, in acknowledging the contentious nature of the 
law/science nexus, allow space for alternative interpretive accounts to form and 
circulate. In offering "oppositional discourses" (Fiske, I 987, p. 47), such texts 
suggest possibilities for change. Fiske's view is that social change occurs not 
"through revolution" but: 
as a result of a constant tension between those with social power, and 
subordinate groups trying to gain more power so as to shift social values 
towards their own interests. The textual equivalent of this is the 
progressive text. [emphasis added) where the discourses of social change 
are articulated in relationship with the metadiscourse of the dominant 
ideology. (p. 47) 
Clearly such a mainstream text as fail Angels, \\ith its progrcssi,c potential. 
represents a \\indow of opportunity through \\hich change may begin to occur within 
the contested area between science and law. Certain!, in its critical appraisal of the 
lav.iscience nexus the text sanctions a challenge to law's authorit). 
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CHAPTER4 
4. LAW AND FEMINISM 
4.1 What Difference does (Gender) Difference Make? 
rl1is chapter examines Jaw from a feminist perspective. This facilitates a review of 
J,m as an institution. and pennits the testing of the validity of its claims to "rationality. 
neutrality and objectivit)" (Graycar. 1990. p. vii). Feminist analyses began to impact 
on J,m in the J 970s. resultinis in what Cira,car (p. vii) describes as "an exciting arra, 
of nt:\\ \\Orl-..s infonned and inspired hy the insights of feminism." For the institution 
of la"' it represents a further challenge to its authority. 
The "insights of feminism" prmide a particular ,·antagc-point from "hicl1 l,m's 
hidden discursive strategies may he located and examined. It also suggests possible 
recuperative measures or legal reforms. the intent of \\hich. is to insert \\omen into 
the legal frame. Several of the reforms \\hich hm e resulted from feminist initiati, cs. 
will be reviewed in the light of recent feminist concerns that "legal refonn has 
achieved Jess for \\Omen than fcmi111sts had expected" (Bartlett & Kennedy. 1991. p. 
2) 
An analysis of relevant television texts will be undertaken to gauge the extent of 
feminism's impact on Jaw within the context of popular culture. With the knowledge 
that media discourse itself has be~n influenced by feminist concerns. reterred to by 
Tasker ( I 991. p. 86) as "(t)eminism's rediscovery of the popular. this 'looking again"'. 
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there is an expectation that some texts will recognise and acknowledge gender as a 
culturally significant issue. 
Within the same text;, using a similar analytic process, law's representation as an 
institution v.ill be similarly examined. Several researchers (Cassidy, 1991 b; Rov.e. 
1988) haw observed that the inadequacies of individuals involved in administering 
the la" (lawyers). seldom generalise to a critique of law the institution: 
Despite the often unsavoury image of lawyers as money-grubbing 
mercenaries which is conveyed by the rn,·ss media. the vision of the system 
of'the Im, which they operate is markedly different. (Cassidy. 1991b. pp. 
87-88) 
This observation is in line v.ith Sman's ( 1991, p. 11) contention. which relates to both 
the institutions of law and science. that. "practitioners may fall short of the ideal" 
without that in any way reflecting adversely on the institution itself This tendency to 
attach fallibility finnly to the individual as a way of deflecting and limiting a more 
generalised critique of the institution may be observable in the popular cultural texts 
selected. If this is the case it \\ ill fit with the overall contention of this thesis that the 
'ideal of law'. manifest as la\\ the institution. 1s seldom challenged either in its social 
context or in its fictional representation. 
4.2 Law from a Feminist Perspective 
Law. like science, masquerades as a gender free discourse. Even at a superficial level 
law asserts this with its signifying iconography of a blindfolded woman. who with 
sword and scales dispenses justice supposedly without fear or favour (Naffine. 1992, 
p. 48). The irony of this signifier is obvious to feminists. Noted criminal barrister 
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and television writer. Helena Kennedy, signals it semiotically in the title of her 
confronting BBC drama series on the law, Blind Justice. 
Another irony emanating from this figure is an empirical one. It is a fact that very fe\\ 
\\omen actually dispense justice in the sense that very fe\\ women ever gain judicial 
appointment or attain its equivaknt status v.ithin the la"'. This incongruity is noted m 
a Repon bv the Senate Stand mg Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affa1rs (May 
1994) on Gender Bias and the Judiciary: 
Membership of the judiciar, in Australia is remarkably HOMOgenous. 
[emphasis added]. Judges are overwhelmingly male. former members of 
the Bar. appointed in their early fiJiies. and products of the non-government 
education system . in the federal sphere. six of the seven judges of the 
High Coun are male .. Thiny-two of the thin,-three judges of the Federal 
Cow1 are male Similar obsef\ ations may be made of the State-coun 
S)stem. (pp. 91-92) 
The Repon ( J 994. p. 93) notes that there is "a ,·ast disparity between the proponi<>n of 
women in the population and the proponion appointed as Judges " The imbalance is 
even more remarkable given the current demography of the law profession. 
According to recent statistics. fil\) per cent of law graduates are \\omen. v'11ile 
women now make up a quaner of the entire legal profession (pp. 93-94). 
The absence of women from positions of power \\!thin law's institutional hierarchy is 
more than just statistically significant. It exposes not only the inherently subservient 
position from v.h1ch women must make their claims. but it also makes apparent the 
concomitant nature of both the legal and masculine discourses. In nominating the 
characteristics of the abstracted, exnominated legal subject. Naffine ( I 992. p. ,i) 
discerns that law presumes a quite specific and definable person: "(T)he human being 
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of legal thought . he is a man. he is a middk-class man, and he evinces a middle-
class style of masculinity" (µ. xi). Naffine concludes from this that, "(!)aw and the 
man of law arc simpa11co" (p. xii). In other words. the discursive practices of both 
di,wurscs coalesce se:1rnlessly "ithout disjuncture and meld together to present la\\ 
as an institution that is natural. uni,ersal. value-free and above all. gender-neutral. 
rl1e patnarchal underpinnings that support la" and other similar institutions and theJr 
practices. become most apparent \\ith the application of feminist them,. Feminist 
criticism aims to n.:fo1.:us the gaze. "becoming sensiti\·e to \\hat often goes unnoticed. 
becomes naturalised. or is taken for granted \\ithin a sexist society" (Kuhn. 198~. p. 
73 ). Application of Kuhn\ otl~quoted maxim. "making visible the im·is1ble" (p. 73 ). 
is clear!, pertinent \\ ith regard to dra" mg critical attentwn to the fc" (lack of) 
,,omen presertly occup) ing judicial otfo..:c." This situation is commonly explained as 
merely reflecting society's norms m that p,mer and public life 'natural!,' equate \\Ith 
the ma~culinc. 
The example of gender 1mbab.ncc in the judiciary represents an uncompl icatcd case of 
bias against women. and can be addressed and possibly rectified tb·ough affirmati,e 
action policies such as those recommended in the Senate's Report on Gender Bias and 
the Jumciary ( 1994. p. I 05). More intractable and resistant to refonn. both because it 
forms the basis of legal discourse and because it is more difficult to particularise. is 
the patriarchal underpinning that supports law in its institutional fonn. Naffine ( 1992. 
p. I 0) observes that "(!)aw treats as axmmatic the subordination of women to men: it is 
culturally a male institution which serves to ensure that men remai11 the dominant 
sex." 
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4.3 The Possibilities for Reform 
Feminists have proposed various strategies aimed at disrupting the hegemonic control 
and influence which accrues to law as a result of its powerful alliance with patriarchy. 
Suggestions have included calls for: the development of a separate 'feminist 
jurisprudence'; the implementation of affim1ative action in the appointment of more 
women judges; the mandatory introduction of gender studies to law school curricula 
and the re-education of the judiciary in issues of gender awareness. (Senate Report on 
Gender Bias and the Judiciary, 1994, Chapter 5). All of these proposals posit reform 
as being possible from within the legal system. 
How , iable is such a project though. bearing in mind law's historical propensity to 
accommodate and incorporate the 'new' into its already established knowledge 
system9 De Laurentis ( 1988. p 8) refers to this tendency as "institutional 
recuperation". while Smart (1991. pp. 16-17) notes 111 respect of law. how its 
"colonisation" of the "psy" disciplinary regimes in the 19th century was seen as 
justification for subsequent legal intrusion and control of a whole range of new areas. 
From this perspective then, any appeal to law to redress the balance would seem likely 
to be counterproductive. It would merely replicate and reinforce the status quo 
without any challenge to the institution itself. Certainly this is Smart's (1991. p. 89) 
view: "Law reform per se preserves law's place in the hierarchy of discourses which 
maintain that law has access to truth and justice." Naffine (1992, p. 8) likewise is 
sceptical about reform from within the system: "There is little point in seeking to 
improve women's position within this masculine legal framework: it has no room for 
women. What is needed is social revolution, not reform." 
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However, by placing gender on the legal agenda and instigating reform through 
legislative channels, some important changes have been achieved by feminists. Most 
of these changes have been effected by an appeal to either the ~ or difference 
position. Inherently though, the debate is reactionary because both positions are 
advanced as being mutually exclusive, which means that advocating one means 
denying the other. So although some measure of reform is achieved it is often at 
substantial cost in another sphere. These problems become apparent when the 
positions are examined more closely. 
4.4 Examining the Equal/Difference Debate 
The equality argument raises problems because it is predicated on using the male as 
the comparative standard. Advocating this position inevitably invests the 'he' with the 
status of the norm while disregardi,ig the structural inequality from which "omen 
make their claim. This 'sex neutral' position forms the basis for anti-discrimination 
legislation and has clearly been important in specific areas. Frug ( 1992, p. 32) points 
to its success in precipitating the "break down [ of) economic, employment, and 
educational barriers that explicitly prevent either sex from acquiring the benefits 
available to the other in society." 
Unfortunately because the position is premised on a 'gender blindness', its impact. 
besides supporting "the power imbalance of the status quo" (p. 33), also countenances 
and indeed has facilitated anti-discrimination cases by men against women. Frug 
(1992); Graycar (1990) and Smart (1991) all comment on the 'backlash' phenomenon 
where the "'ideology of equality' has been appropriated .... [ and] harnessed as a 
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weapon in the battle for the maintenance of male domination" (Graycar, 1990, p. 58). 
Empirical evidence cited by MacKinnon (1984, p. 83) supporti, this assertion: 
"Almost every sex discrimination case that has been won at the [US] Supreme Court 
level has been brought by a man." 
In requesting equal treatment women are in effect, asking to be judged and treated like 
a man. While this procedure accords perfectly with the law's preferred methodology, 
"of reasoning by analogy" (Naffine, 1992, p. 50), applying the legal principle 'of 
treating like cases alike' destines women to be disadvantaged because the principle 
must disregard inherent structural inequities. 
The difference position offers an antithetical spin on women's difference, presenting it 
as a claim based on unique and positive features which centre around biological 
characteristics. This strategy immediately raises the problem of essential ism in its all-
encompassing assertion that it is women's biological functioning that sets them apart 
from men. While certain gains for women have resulted from using 'difference' 
criteria legislation, (for example maternity leave entitlements). the necessity to 
categorise women as a uniform. albeit 'different' group. remains fundamentally 
problematic. As Frug ( 1992. p. 33) states, "the dilemma of difference" lies in the fact 
"that deploying commonalities among women unavoidably embeds such traits within 
[all] women" (p.36). In the longterm the problem that ensues is that all women will 
not fit a designated category, whereas JUStice', (the law), depends on women as a 
group being able to be matched and fitted to a pre-determined set of criteria. 
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4.4.l General Problems with the Difference Position 
The situation is most clearly demonstrated in the 'special' treatment women receive in 
respect of certain medical conditions which are predicated on biological difference. 
Smart ( 1991) notes how both science. and by association law, work from a traditional 
premise that problematises women's bodies in order to control and regulate them. The 
medicalisation of a situation or conditirn based on biological difference means, for 
example. that a condition defined as 'post-natal depression' becomes a legitimate legal 
rationale when re-inscribed as 'infanticide'. This nomenclature change in tum 
reclassifies this particular type of'murder' as specifically a women's phenomenon. 
Smart (1991, p. 95) cites infanticide as just one example where "the law has readily 
abandoned judicial criteria for judging guilt in preference for the medical discourse on 
insanity." The Chamberlain case is one instance, where. in theory. infanticide might 
have been considered a 'reasonable' defence for Lindy Chamberlain. According to 
Young (I 989, p. 158). one of Lindy's supporters. a Senator Mason. "thought it was 
ironic that Lindy continued her incarceration because she refused to plead guilty to 
infanticide", implying that if she had utilised what the legal system offered, the law 
would have worked and justice would have been seen to have been done. 
An overriding criticism of the approach based on difference is that it perpetuates the 
notion of woman as victim, particularly as a victim of her hormones. For example, 
when the ill-defined and ill-understood condition Premenstrual Tension (PMT) or 
Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS) is used as a defence or in mitigation, it tends to 
reactivate stereotypical images of women. These images, which have a long historical 
record, are of mercurial, often violent women held captive by their hormones. (Eastel, 
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1991). The concern is that utilising these stereotypes reinforces a tendency to 
categorise women according to their sexuality. 
In furthering this argument MacKinnon ( 1984, p. 86) cites the law's "special 
protection rules" for women as concrete evidence of systemic domination by an all-
powerful patriarchy.6 From the perspective of MacKinnon's "dominance model" 
(Frug. 1992. p. xv) a defence proposal based on difference is doubly problematic for 
the already oppressed and less powerful gender, for it works to further e,1trench the 
power imbalance: "(F)or women to affirn1 difference, when difference means 
dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirn1 the qualities and characteristics of 
pov.erless,w : ' ' 1cKinnon, p. 86). 
MacKinnon regards u" ii system as the institution principally responsible for 
maintaining patriarchy's oppressive rule. Smart (I 991, p. 77) argues that this is a 
limiting position which underestimates other cultural factors and inevitably leads to 
problems with "essentialism" and "detern1inism." Frug (1992) likev.ise admits that 
although the theory has merits in advancing a view from below. a so-called Woman's 
perspective, its claim to represent ;ill women is clearly at odds with postmodernist 
notions of multiple viewpoints. Naffine (I 992. p. xii) also makes the point that the 
law has a bias toward a certain kind of maleness which causes it to discriminate 
against other (non-conforn1ing) males: "Because feminists have often perceived men. 
uniforn1ly, as the oppressors of women, the problem of legal sexism which has men as 
its objects has remained largely unaddressed." 
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Despite the considerable reservations expressed with MacKinnon's dominance theory 
many feminists still share her concern, that a legal defence based on the "stigma of 
difference" (MacKinnon, 1984, p. 85) inevitably revives damaging deterministic, 
biological theories about women. 
4.4.2 Specific Problems with the Difference Position 
One problem that could be viewed in this light is the recently utilised defence known 
as the 'battered wife syndrome' where a woman accused of murdering her partner uses 
in her defence, the history of violence and abuse perpetrated on her by the deceased 
person. The syndrome is characterised by certain features which require verification, 
or 'diagnosis', by a medical expert who is usually a psychologist or psychiatrist.' 
While a self-defence plea incorporating the syndrome has been instrumental in 
gaining acquittals for women who were the victims of domestic violence. its use 
raises a number of issues. Firstly. the discourse it activates and serves to authenticate 
is a stereotypical one of woman as passive victim: 
(E)ven when a battered woman wins . she may lose if she experiences 
this defense [sic) as a humiliation, thereby increasing her sense of 
powerlessness and reinforcing her submission to a system weighed against 
her. (Bartlett & Kennedy. 1991, p. 3) 
The discursive strategies surrounding this discourse posit that the violence of the 
response, the killing, is uncharacteristic but is made comprehensible, or 'legitimised' 
in legal terms, by framing it within a medical context. The medical categorisation 
itself serves to further reinforce the impression of woman as victim, along with 
notions of difficult, problematic and unknowable, as the syndrome falls within a 
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broad classification of conditions tenned 'psychosomatic'. Barrett and Roberts (1978) 
in a study on the social control exerted by doctors' on women patients suggest that the 
tenn 'psychosomatic' can be understood in two distinct ways: 
As well as the tenn's neutral meaning of a physical illness with a 
hypothesised mental origin, the label 'psychosomatic' frequently carries the 
connotation of the patient's supposed failure to withstand the strains of 
everyday life in modem society. (p. 41) 
This latter description clearly fits the profile of the victim/woman whose symptoms, 
according to the medical model, are the result of "individual inadequacy" (p. 41) 
rather than due to any structural or cultural factors. Here again the discourse activated 
by the tenn 'psychosomatic' tends to perpetuate notions of women as subordinate and 
dependent. From Barrett and Robert's (1978) research there is clear evidence that 
medicine is an institutl(ln which exerts a high degree of social control over women. 
As part of exercising this control the institution grants power or empowers designated 
people to speak as experts. 'The expert' is credentialled, or deemed to have the 
necessary expertise by qualifications and/or experience, to divine the presence or 
'diagnose' the syndrome from a range of symptoms offered by the accused. In order to 
fit the pre-detennined category certain criteria must be met. This process of slotting 
persons into categories is viewed as problematic by feminists. The law's attempts at 
standardisation are ideological and fonn part of various discursive strategies which 
work to shore up the dominant discourse. Ignored and discounted are a range of 
oppositional views which emanate from individual women's experience. 
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Graycar (1994) and Smart ( 1991) both acknowledge the positive aspects of using 
expert witnesses in circumstances where such witnesses can present alternative 
accounts of 'reality'. In such cases experts can offer a challenge to what are accepted 
masculine "commonsense assumptions" and ordinary "understandings of the world" 
(Graycar, 1994, p. 16). Graycar (l 994) quotes Justice Bertha Wilson of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, who strongly supports the addition of these alternative accounts of 
'reality' to the system: 
If it strains credulity to imagine what an ordinary man would do in the 
position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically 
find themselves in that situation .... The definition of what is reasonable 
must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign lo the 
world inhabited by the hypothetical "reasonable man". (p. 16) 
However for both Graycar and Smart the issue preventing unreserved acceptance of 
the 'special provision' categories for "omen. revolves around the expert's role 'of 
speaking for' or 'on behalf of women. As Smart (l 991, p. 47) contends there is no 
advantage to women being "saved from the law, only to be surrendered to the 'psy' 
complex." Such a procedure is ultimately disempowering for women because it "does 
not 're-qualify' women's accounts, it simply empowers the 'psy' professionals to speak 
for women" (p.47). Graycar (1994. p. 18) also expresses reservations about the 
practice of "delegating the construction of women ... to a group of 'experts' ... with 
authority to determine who is, and who is not, an appropriate 'battered woman' with a 
veritable syndrome." 
4.5 The Possibilities for Reform within the System 
Both Graycar and Smart suggest that law needs to take account of, and make 
provision for, the many alternative realities which are women's lives. Rather than 
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asking someone else. 'the expert', to "filter the women's experience", Graycar ( 1994, 
p. 18) calls for structural changes tn the system whicn include redefining what is 
accepted as evidence. In the first instance Graycar suggests more flexibility in the 
system so that "people out there [can] ... come in here and tell us themselves what it 
is like out there" (p. 18). Or more radically still: "(W)e could bring people with 
experiences of'out there' into here, that is, into judging" (p. 18). 
In respect of broadening the Judicial base, the Report on Gender Bias and the 
Judiciary ( 1994, p. I 05) sees merit in encouraging judicial diversity, but virtually rules 
out any changes by recommending a continuation of the same selection procedures. 
So while the system acknowledges the need for change, and indicates some capacity 
to change, some of the modifications presently proposed, especially in the area of 
rules of evidence, may not deliver the reforms desired by feminists. 
Recent amendments to expert-evidence law by the United States Supreme Court in 
Daubert ( 1993) now demand that a strict test of scientific validity be applied to all 
s•Jbmitted expert evidence. The previous test of admissibility accepted by the courts, 
the Erv~ test, operated on the principle of 'general acceptance' by members of the 
relevant scientific community (Richardson. 1994). The Daubert decision, on the 
other hand, requires compliance with strict scientific criteria which include "a 
determination of the 'falsifiability' of the scientific theory, its 'known or potential error 
rate' and whether the theory has been subject to peer review" (Richardson, 1994). 
The effect of the change according to commentators such as Professor Richardson, 
will be most dramatically felt in the Freudian based 'psy' disciplines where the 
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evidence being offered is not able to be falsified: "In fact many 'syndromes' ... such as 
the battered woman, battered child and rape trauma syndrome, may become 
problematic under Daubert" (Richardson, 1994). It is too early to predict the impact 
of Daubert on the Australian legal system but its acceptance would seem likely to 
restrict the 'special provision' defence currently utilised by some women. 
4.6 The Possibilities for Reform outside the System 
As has been demonstrated a feminist critique of law exposes that institution's inherent 
maleness and suggests some reform initiatives within the system. These though. are 
neither totally effective nor problem free. Bartlett and Kennedy (I 991, p. 4) argue 
that law's "power" gives it significant potential as a vehicle for reform. but other 
measures outside the system also need to be utilised: "Stated simply, the depth and 
scope of transformation needed to end women's oppression cannot be achieved 
through law alone" (Bartlett & Kennedy, p. 4 ). 
One area that I tight legitimately be considered a possible avenue for refona is the 
popular cultural phenomenon and mass art form of television (White. 1992). For a 
significant proportion of the population. television remains their most popular source 
of entertainment and information. A recent nationwide survey supports this 
conclusion, rating "television watching" as "Australia's number one cultural activity" 
( 1994, July 7).The West Australian, p. 5. 
It is also reported that law and legal professionals as a group are "over-represented" as 
narrative subjects on television (Hartley & Fiske cited in Chase, l 986, p. 551 ). This 
phenomenon is also commented on by Karpin (1995) who agrees that: 
Television seems to have a special relation to law. TV is littered with 
shows about the law. From cop shows to "Cops", from shows about 
lawyers, to shows about law cases, television in the States and to a lesser 
extent in Australia, is always doing law. (pp. 4-5) 
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Indeed the ubiquitous court room scene as narrative denouement is, in filmic terms, a 
classic signifier of textual closure and has come to represent something of a 
cinematographic cliche. In more recent times the popularity of the soap opera genre 
which habitually features "an array of professionals (especially doctors and lawyers)" 
(Chase, 1986, p. 558), signals an even greater proliferation on television of legal 
narratives and images. Within the genre of the soap opera the court room scene 
performs another function as well. It is a "locale where characters can deal with right 
and wrong, guilt and innocence" (Kaminsky & Mahan. 1988, p. 94). 
4. 7 The Role of Popular Culture 
Legal commentators such as Chase (1986) and Fraser (1990) enthusiastically endorse 
the myriad manifestations of law which are available within popular culture. For 
Chase (I 986, p. 527) diverse images of the profession are important because they 
"help legal academics gain a sense of perspective on the law from outside the confines 
of their own narrow discourse." Fraser (1990) extends this to include those outside the 
profession as well, insisting that the images television creates of the law, and lawyers. 
are rich sources of socially relevant material: 
The "image" of the lawyer in popular culture is, to oversimplify, at least a 
bi-level one. There is the "mass" image of lawyers, i.e. what real people 
who are not lawyers think and imagine lawyers to be, and there is an 
"internal" image of lawyers, in popular culture, i.e. what lawyers see 
themselves to be, how they present themselves to others, and what they 
want to be, all, in part at least, as a result of what they and their 
clients/friends, etc. see on television. And that is why I watch a lot of 
television. (p. 8) 
103 
Fraser (1990) does acknowledge though, that the interest and regard he has for 
television, sets him apart from his legal and academic colleagues. Watching 
television, after all, is an activity that falls within the province of the 'private'. From 
this perspective alone then, irrespective of the content or value of the progran1me, 1t is 
relegated to the trivial and irrelevant and remains incidental to the conduct of 
important 'public' matters, such as law. 
This perception is not shared by cultural theorists who regard television as an 
important indicator and circulator of cultural ideas, social values and mores. 
Televisual texts from this perspective, represent significant markers or indicators of 
shifts in cultural values, and offer a logical area for study. White's (1992) view is 
representative of the approach favoured by cultural theorists': 
A mass art form like television provides a crucial arena for ideological 
analysis precisely because it represents the intersection of economic-
industrial interests. an elaborate textual system. and a leisure-entertainment 
activity. (p. 170) 
Examining and assessing law's representations on television will necessitate an 
investigation of what White (p. 170) calls the "elaborate textual system." As a 
feminist perspective has already been employed to explore law's institutional aspects, 
a similar analytic technique and perspective will be adopted in examining the selected 
texts. The two texts under review. have been included specifically because their 
narrative subject matter relates to issues of gender, and in these circumstances a 
feminist approach is considered to be particularly appropriate. 
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CHAPTERS 
5. MEDIA DECONSTRUCTIONS: TEXTUAL ANALYSES 
5.1 Law's Hidden (A)Gender in Popular Culture: A Feminist Perspective 
In this analysis of texts from popular culture I will be considering aspects of law 
which have already been identified as being of particular concern or interest to 
women. It is apparent that media disc0urse, through its provision of "gender-specific 
narrative forms" (Fiske, 1987, p. 179), already acknowledges the necessity to 
accommodate feminine meanings. The expanding soap and cross-soap genre forms 
testify to these efforts at inclusivity.' There is an expectation then. that 'women's 
issues'. including those of particular concern to feminists. will be recognised through 
their representation in fictional texts. The contention of this thesis remains however. 
that the 'ideal of law', manifest as law the institution. v.ill be as unchall~nged in the 
texts as in the larger social context. 
The two focal points for feminists engaged in legal reform have centred around 
appeals to either the ffilli!! or difference position. The textual representation and 
treatment of each, will be reviewed through selected episodes of LA LAW and Picket 
5.2. Case I: The Equal Debate: The Representation of Sexual Discrimination in an 
episode of "LA LAW" 
In the episode of LA LAW screened on 30/6/94, the issue of sexual discrimination 
was presented as the principal storyline and provides a good example of the equal 
debate. The main narrative involved Ann Kelsey from Kenzie, Brackman, and her 
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representation of Judith Kincaid, a lawyer-colleague who sought to sue her own law 
firm employer, Owen, Pierce, Mcintyre and Reynolds, for "sexual discrimination 
under title 7, for their failure to make her a partner." 
Example of the Equal Debate 
In what is for LA LAW, a traditional opening scene at the partners' meeting, Kelsey 
backrrounds the case for the viewers' benefit, making the point with heavy irony, that 
Kincaid's firm has no female partners "not even one like there is here." At the outset 
of this particular episode the viewer is made aware of Kelsey's feminist inclinat10ns. 
Her overt support for her client suggests gender solidarity and a firm commitment to a 
cause, and this position is given extra narrative v.eight by a remark from Becker. a 
male colleague. Becker's announcement that he intends to purchase a Bentley 
"because it will make me happy," signals an ideological dichotomy between the male 
and female points of view. Becker's motivations are clearly flagged as the base ones 
of materialism and individualism. His sexism is also signified in his rhetorical 
suggestion to Ann that she, "try not to f;et [the firm] c; reputation as a repository.for 
litixious. emhitlered female.1, shall we Anne?" The stereotype of the 'bitter/feminist' 
appealed to in the gratuitous insult has no narrative motivation at this juncture, so the 
viewer is positioned to regard it and the speaker negatively. This is just one of several 
instances where Becker's legitimacy to speak on 'women's issues' is undermined while 
Ann Kelsey's is incrementally enhanced. 
In another example, Becker is shown to have dishonourable intentions toward a 
prospective staff member, Jane Halliday. She is cast as an attractive, virginal, 
fundamentalist Christian who Becker favours, out of self-interest, to join the firm. 
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Ann on the other hand, as a feminist, opposes the appointment because of what she 
believes are standard 'right wing' fundamentalists' views on civil rights issues, such as 
abortion and humosexuality. To this point in the narrative, the framing of the issue is 
clearly pro-feminist. 
11,mever Ann's ready acceptance of the negative stereotype of the fundamentalist. as 
automatically inclusive of Jane Halliday, is obliquely queried by a secondary narrative 
which raises questions about religious discrimination. Anne's claims to the high 
moral ground are gradually undermined. as the minor storyline via dominant 
specularity. positions the viewer to observe that the fundamentalist Christian. Jane 
l lalliday. is in fact both highly ethical and principled. 
The extra textual knowledge supplied by the minor narrative. pr0mpts interrogation of 
Ann's judgement, suggesting perhaps that it is based on a 'knee-jerk' response which 
relates to her 'hardline feminist' orientation. The inconsistency that arises from these 
parallel narratives remains unresolved within this episode. This very lack of dosure 
leaves the way open for a critical reading to be made of Anne Kelsey's reaction which 
may generalise to criticism offeminism as a methodology. 
The structural device that sets up this narrative tension is characteristic of the 
drama/soap genre. Customarily several narratives operate simultaneously, with one or 
more of the lesser storylines used to comment obliquely on the main narrative. The 
two minor plotlines introduced in this episode include the one already discussed, the 
selection of the new junior lawyer, and another which deals with mental competency 
and the possibility of murder charges. Within these minor narratives two new cast 
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members, Eli Levinson and Jane Halliday are introduced. They function, to some 
extent, as individual representatives of specific minority groups: Eli is Jewish and Ms 
Halliday is a fundamentalist Christian. Their appearance in the drama foregrounds a 
parallel area of discrimination, namely religious discrimination. strategically included 
to mirror the main storyline which concerns sexual discrimination. 
This distinctive narrative form which Mayne (1988, p. 37) refers to as the, "themr,tic 
overlap between the storylines or the 'echo' effect where storylines reflect off each 
other", is characteristic of the LA LAW series, and of soap opera generally. The fact 
that neither storyline acknowledges the other, is particularly significant in ideological 
terms. In Mayne's (p. 37) view such a strategy accounts for the series, "much-
acc,aimed quality of open-endedness." The open-ended narrative form is 
characteristic of the soap opera genre which typically avoids narrative closure. 
relinquishing in the process the opportunity to assert a strong ideological message 
(Fiske, 1987, p. 180). While this attribute of'soaps' is positively regarded because it 
acknowledges "the viewer's power to make meanings" (Fiske. p. 179), such a position 
does not deny that texts do try to assert control over meaning and that texts p ,r 
certain meanings over others. 
In the case of cross-genre texts suer. as LA LAW, which have a strong soap 
component, there is a tendency to progressiveness within the storylines and in the 
formal structure. This however, is counteracted or muted to some extent by the 
expectations of the competing law series genre which demands closure of the main 
narrative within each episode. The result is that initial progressive positions are quite 
often compromised or deliberately counteracted. This situation has already been 
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noted in this episode where the initial pro-feminist stance is systematically 
undermined. Rowe's ( 1988, p. 3 7) assessment of LA LAW draws attention to this 
dilemma: "(C)ompared to most prime time shows, it has a high degree of ambiguity 
and complexity. But essentially things work out for the best. Our heroes may be 
flawed, but the la" is not." [emphasis added] 
Many of the issues dealt with in LA LAW involve social systems, patriarchy for 
example is the basis for sex discrimination, and the series has been highly 
commended for its topicality and treatment of sensitive issues. Nevertheless, the 
solutions most favoured are individualised ones which implicitly support the status 
quo. Within this context, law is usually presented as the proper, appropriate and sole 
arbiter. In analysing this episode, which ostensively deals with the feminist issue of 
sexual discrimination in the workplace, some of these reactionary positions become 
apparent. 
There is no doubt that the issue of sexual discrimination is presented, in the narrative 
structure as well as the content, as a serious and legitimate area of concern. This 
accords with Mayne's ( 1988, p. 31) view that, "LA LAW represents feminism not 
only as a thematic issue, but also as a narrative one." However there are unresolved 
ambiguities which accompany the proffered narrative solutions, and these inevitably 
raise doubts about what purports to be a feminist approach to resolving problems. For 
instance one question that is implicitly raised is: How legitimate is it to sacrifice one 
woman, who was not conscious of being discriminated against, to prove another 
woman's discrimination? A successful outcome for one woman, predicated on the 
sacrifice of another, is open to be read as a hollow victory in terms of broader feminist 
109 
issues, such dS women's solidarity and the greater good of all. Such a reading quite 
clearly invites criticism of feminism as the appropriate and legitimate strategy in these 
circumstances. 
The outcome of the case which sees Ann Kelsey victorious, with a partnership and 
compensation being offered to her client, is concrete evidence that discrimination has 
occurred. However Judith Kincaid's acceptance of a settlement, in lieu of the 
partnership, suggests self-interest and even more damagingly, for a feminist reading, it 
allows the fir.n's employment practices to continue un-reformed in patriarchal control. 
There is real ambiguity too, in the figure of the other lawyer/colleague, Sylvia Reiner, 
whose humiliating employment situation at Owen & Pierce, is publicly exposed by 
Ann Kelsey to demonstrate ongoing discrimination by that firm. Sylvia. who, in 
Judith Kincaid's opinion is being used by the firm as "window-dressing", stoically 
maintains on the stand that she has no complaints about her treatment by the firm. 
She is then demcaningly described in the firm's report, read out in court by Ann 
Kelsey, as being, "as loyal as a St Bernard, keep her chained to the doghouse, feed 
her once a day and she'll follow us anywhere." As this treatment continues, Sylvia is 
increasingly constructed as the narrative's innocent victim by both visual and verbal 
codes operating in unison. For example, during part of the court sequence, the camera 
moves in on Sylvia's face recording her mounting discomfiture and shame. Even 
more significantly, in an extended scene at the conclusion of the episode, the camera 
moves away from the successful duo, Kelsey and Kincaid, to focus on Sylvia's 
departing figure. Shot with slumped shoulders, cowered and defeated, Sylvia turns to 
follow on command, "Come on Sy/, let's go" as one of the two male lawyers walks 
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ahead. As Rowe (I 988, p. 3 7 ) aptly observes in relation to this series: "Our heroes 
may be flawed, but the law is not." For quite plainly, the law has delivered justice, 
( after all sexual discrimination has been condemned), but the victim, punished by 
both sides is the innocent bystander. The question left begging is: Who is to blame? 
The preferred reading seems strongly to suggest feminism and feminists. 
While no criticism of the legal system is signified nor implied in the narrative, some 
of the loose narrative threads are similarly suggestive ofan anti-feminist rhetoric. The 
overt victimisation by the male hierarchy, represented by the law firm and the male 
lawyer, for instance, is flagged as an obvious iniquity at the outset. The subsequent 
victimisation which results from the actions of the women, who professionally 
speaking are Sylvia Reiner's 'sisters-in-the-law', strongly points to a reading, critical of 
feminist practice in action. 
Categorising Women in "LA LAW" 
The women in this narrative divide conveniently into those who are active, assertive, 
career-orientated women such as Ann Kelsey and her client Judith Kincaid or, meek 
'lapdogs' like Sylvia Reiner. The dog metaphor is an appropriate one, as allusions to it 
recur throughout the episode. Sylvia remarks to Ann Kelsey prior to being called as a 
witness, that she does not want to be portrayed as, "a poor pathetic creature who 
worked her entire adult life for whatever scraps these men have thrown from the 
table. " Despite being both sympathetic and apologetic Ann Kelsey must, because the 
law demands it, expose Sylvia's vulnerability and stagnant career to advance her own 
client's case. 
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This foregrounds Rowe's ( 1988, p. 36) observation that one of the familiar questions 
posed in LA LAW is to what extent the professional women of the series, "must 
become like men to be accepted by the male establishment?" The answer to the 
question, based on this episode, is that the law rewards those, who best approximate 
its ideal litigant. "the man of law" (Naffine, I 992, p. 22). In this respect both Ann 
Kelsey and her client are seen to be the equal of the opposing law firm's arrogant, 
male partner, who, under Ann's careful cross-examination, is provoked into a vitriolic 
tirade against all women. He is unsympathetically characterised by close-up shots 
from below and this negativity is further reinforced by dialogue which marks him as 
patronising and sexist: "Everytime you don't get what you want it's because you're a 
woman right. It's the glass ceiling, whatever that is Well you know what, I'm a little 
sick of all your whining " The viewer is positioned with Ann Kelsey to regard this 
intemperate outburst as blatantly sexist and self-serving. Kelsey is seen to resist the 
opportunity to take personal offence, and uses the remark instead to advantage her 
client. Her objectivity, as opposed to her adopting a more subjective, emotional 
approach, which might typically be characterised as a feminine response, is validated 
cinematically by closeup shots of his extreme discomfiture at being caught out, and 
her triumph at having trapped him. 
In its examination of sexual discrin1ination the text reveals discursive and rhetorical 
strategies surrounding gender. The two main discourses, a masculine and a feminist 
discourse, take shape during the court appearances. In the final addresses to the jury 
the different positions are most clearly defined. During the opening scenes, the 
construction of the complainant Judith Kincaid, is of an aggressively competent, 
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career woman, similarly attired, but in the character casting and costume not nearly as 
attractive as Ann Kelsey. This unsympathetic casting, which forms part of the 
construction of character (Fiske, 1987, p. 9), sets up a narrative tension by explicitly 
offering an ambiguous reading position for viewers. Also, as part of the defence case 
the male senior partner describes her as, "rather severe. cold, tending to be abrasive, 
bossy, ill-tempered and not a lot offun to be around " This assessment is offered as 
an analytical, well reasoned report, devoid of subjectivity, and the actor's portrayal of 
Judith Kincaid's demeanour, particularly during her terse testimony in court, 
reinforces the male description of her as difficult and hard-edged. 
The process of recuperation only begins when Ann Kelsey exposes the senior 
partner's ingrained sexism and reveals the degree of hidden subjectivity contained 
within the gender stereotype he offers with such seeming objectivity. Following this 
narrative development. the verbal and visual codes begin to recode Judith Kincaid as 
someone more positive, as she smiles and becomes more humane in expressing 
concern for others. In tum, Kelsey is able to re-activate this notion of gender 
stereotype, utilising the feminist strategy of 'looking again' and succeeds in re-
inscribing it positively to support her case of sexual discrimination. 
The Equal Debate 
In the final address to the jury, Ann Kelsey, arguing from the gender neutral position, 
asserts that her client wants equal treatment not "special treatment." Her complaint is 
that Judith Kincaid has alread> received special treatment because her employers 
chose to judge her as a woman-lawyer rather than just as a lawyer. The core of her 
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argwnent is a feminist one that centres on the notion that the cultural construction of 
woman requires conformity to a norm that is a gender stereotype. 
Kelsey makes the point that attitudes and behaviour validated in males, such as bei11g 
assertive. aggressive. singleminded and self-reliant, are re-inscribed negatively in 
women as "abrasive. bossy, cold and calculating." Judith Kincaid does not conform 
to the so-called 'normal' gender stereotype, and Kelsey admits that this makes "the 
men ol Owen. Pierce. Mcintyre and Reynolds uncomfortable because naturally they 
would prefer men around them like themselves." At this point the camera focuses 
momentarily on an Asian juryman whose glance shifts suddenly across to the men of 
law. His flash of recognition signals to the viewer a realisation, and an understanding 
shared by them, that 'natural' institutional exclusivity is at base 'discrimination' and it 
applies not only to gender but to race as well. 
In putting the contrary view, the defence also attempts to utilise a notion of equal 
treatment but blatantly places the male as the universal standard for comparison. 
There is no recognition or acknowledgment of any structural or cultural impediments 
that women as a group face in a patriarchal society. To compound this omission, the 
analogies that are used in this sequence are uniformly masculine. One of the most 
telling analogies used by the defence involves an extended reference to boxing. 
Lessons, supposedly learned from this bastion of masculinity, include the ability to 
"get back into the ring after being knocked down." The inappropriate use of 
metaphors, that are normally associated with a masculine paradigm, provoke a degree 
of disjuncture. The misfit between language and subject is picked up in visual cues as 
well. In a sequence when the defence counsel stresses that women should be judged 
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the same as men, the camera turns significantly to a close-up of the tragic face of 
Sylvia Reiner. There is a suggestion in the framing of the victi,n, that those who are 
judged(women), are not the same as those who do the judging(men). On this 
evidence there is no formula or principle that guarantees that the deserving, the loyal 
or even the talented. get their just rewards. But then this narrative suggests that 
rightini; \\Tongs and seeing that justice is done, is the role of law. 
Although the end result, an anti-discrimination judgement favouring Judith Kincaid. 
seems strongly to assert a woman's right to equal treatment, an analysis of the text 
suggests significant degrees of incorporation. In playing the game, using their rules 
and winning, Judith Kincaid shows herself to be 'one of the boys'. The masculine 
qualities required to win. are those that are synonymous with business and 
institutional life but these are also shown to be. oppressive, exploitative and uncaring. 
Her victory validates in no small way, her alliance with the masculine culture. There 
is no certainty that another woman/mother/lawyer. such as Sylvia Reiner, who 
represents another type of woman and one less able to assert herself, would be 
guaranteed such a successful outcome. As MacKinnon cited in Barren and Kennedy 
(1991) asserts: 
The women that gender neutrality benefits .... are mostly women who have 
been able to construct a biography that somewhere approximates the male 
norm, at least on paper. They are the qualified, the least of sex 
discrimination's victims. (p. 85) 
Her observation reaffirms points made earlier that the law, because it is based on a 
male premise, works best for those who most approximate its ideal, Naffine's (I 992, 
p. 22) so called "man of law." 
115 
This masculine point of view is discernible in another sequence in this episode, when 
a comic perspec,ive is offered on another area of di~crimination. The sequence forms 
part of a series of short scenes highlighting the selection process of a junior lawyer to 
join the firm McKenzie, Brackman. All of the applicants are portrayed as extremists 
of one kind or another ranging from a self-promoting high flyer to a 'wacky' 
environmentalist. One of the applicants is shown as heavily pregnant and as she sits 
uncomfortably in a chair before the jaded all-male interview panel she remarks "/ 
xuess I'd like to start by askinx about maternity leave." From a feminist perspective 
this enquiry is perfectly legitimate and serious. and given the applicant's condition is 
certainly appropriate. 
However the contextualisation of this scene, as one in the series of oddball applicants. 
combined with the male panellists' expressions of disbelief, renders the remark 
ridiculous and positions the viewer to regard it as a wholly preposterous request. The 
discriminatory nature of the scene is totally negated by farcical humour. Rowe notes 
this comic tendency in LA LAW and suggests it contributes in no small way to 
meaning confusion. Indeed Rowe's ( l 988) assessment of the series as a whole, is 
explicative of this particular episode: 
LA LAW gives us some 'positive images' of women and minorities and 
tries to expose contradictions within the institutions and practice of law. 
But it blunts those contradictions. In effect, its tone and vision are comic 
.... The tone of the program, which is essential in determining how viewers 
are meant to perceive types (or situations) like these,just isn't that clear. (p. 
38) 
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In this episode the topical issue of sex discrimination in the workplace is aired and, 
with the case decided in favour of the woman who brought the action, the text might 
be considered pro-feminist. However as has been illustrated, the feminist discourse is 
substantially compromised on several fronts. The most important of these is the 
implied criticism of'feminist practice' or feminism in action. Feminism is constructed 
in the text. as an uncompromising and humourless system which sees no contradiction 
in the sacrificing of one weak woman for the advancement of another stronger one. 
Predicably because this is obviously 'bad' nractice, rewards are few v.ith the only 
winner in the charade being the law. The law wins because its flawless method 
enables it to discern the 'truth' despite the imperfections of the individuals involved. 
Questions about the method and practice of law which might \\Cll have been asked 
but were not, include whether there is something fundan1entally v.r0ni; with a legal 
system which, because it favours reasoning from analogy (Naffine. 1992, p. SO), finds 
one person's claim to truth established and proven, by the victimisation of another' 
Gillers (1989), a law professor, proposes that just such a question, if it had been 
raised, is proof of LA LA W's ability to air recurring, ethical legal problems: 
Lawyers are often required to behave in ways we would condemn if the 
same people were not acting as lawyers. Often, loyalty to clients requires 
lawyers to tolerate injustice to others, even to perpetrate it. How do 
lawyers handle that dissonance? How can it be proper - even laudable - to 
do for others what it would be wrong to do for yourself or a friend? (p. 
1615) 
The answer of course, within the context of this text, is by individualising the problem 
and vesting the solution in the moral integrity of the characters in the drama. Any 
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opportunity to interrogate law's methodology and practice is conveniently ignored.At 
the same time the text superficially suggests, in its choice of narrative subject, a 
possible challenge to law. In allowing space for oppositional discourses, like those 
rel 1ting to gender stereotyping, the text indicates some progressive potential. 
From a feminist perspective. however, the text reveals significant textual closure, a 
high degree of incorporation and a narrative framing which under.nines the possibility 
of validating any feminist agenda. Law, in this episode, is positioned as an 
ideological icon which is impervious to assault and secure in its regulatory role. This 
text offers no challenge to law either institutionally or through a feminist 
interpellation. 
5.3 Case 2: The Difference Debate: The Representation of a Medico-Legal Issue in 
an episode of "Picket Fences" 
In law the difference concept revolves around the notion of women possessing unique 
characteristics which are routinely defined and determined on biological grounds. 
The law relies on science, particularly medical science, to validate its regulatory role 
in this area but many of the organising strategies or 'syndromes' derived from this 
classification tend to present women as victims. An episode of Picket Fences 
screened on 2/9/93 used as its narrative subject, an insanity defence for murder based 
on the menopause as a medical condition. Although the storyline concentrated 
particularly on aspects of the menopause, different areas of sexuality were introduced 
via minor plotlines and these were used either directly or indirectly to comment on the 
main topic. 
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An Example of the Difference Debate 
Like LA LAW Picket Fences employs the court room scene as a dramatic device to 
present opposing positions but it tends toward blending the serious content with a 
lighter touch. The contrast between the two series is signalled in their opening 
sequences. LA LAW advertises itself as sophisticated fare from its opening shot of 
the "California license plate" to its "towering glass skyscrapers" (Rowe, 1988, p. 31 ). 
By contrast Picket Fences. despite its title which suggests all-American values of 
home. family and country, actually offers a visual representation which is much less 
straightforward. Its opening visual signifier is a stylised. white, picket fence set at a 
crazy angle and topped by an impossibly blue sky and white clouds. The scene is 
obviously a mock-up, a fake. an ironic comment on the "ordinariness' of the home, the 
family and the small town. For indeed there is nothing ordinary about events that 
occur in the Rome, Wisconsin setting of Picket Fences. 
The homage here in visml style with the white picket fence, and in content, points to 
the work of director David Lynch, whose film Blue Velvet and television series Twin 
Peaks, both explored the dark underside of small town America. The theme tune of 
Picket Fences rejects exact comparison however. as it suggests pure "soap', gentle and 
absolutely non-threatening. The clouds are the one discordant note which act as 
significrs to narrative seriousness. Their appearance in either white or dark grey at 
commercial breaks, act as a visual barometer on the unfolding drama. 
Viewers are often alerted in the opening sequence to disruptions to the discursive 
conventions of realism. Here the narrative line and casting, actively promote 
interrogation of the 'real' by introducing bizarre plots and characters. This mix of the 
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surreal and the ordinary allows for the extraordinary to appear quite normal. In other 
words quite radical readings are offered within the text. By comparison LA LAW is 
steeped in realism which as a form tends to inhibit and resist radical discourses. "The 
camera. the artifice of the program. become invisible on LA LAW, thereby making its 
representation seem all the more true to life" (Rowe. 1988. p 31 ). 
Within Rome. the action vacillates betv.een the sherifrs office. staffed by the moral 
centrepiece of the drama Jimmy Brock. and his home. where the other central 
character his wife. Dr Jill Brock. resides v.ith the chil<lren. There is little demarcation 
between work and home. The public and private realms frequently spill over into 
each other. which differentiates 1t again from LA LAW where the action is 
concentrated around workplace relationships 
In the ~pisode dealing with 'menopausal madness' a (.,cal \\oman. Alice Freeman. is 
charged with murdering her husband in a bizarre set of circumstances which include 
running him over with a steamroller. Although the crime is viewed as somewhat 
unusual, even by Rome's standards. the sheer weirdness of the event oddly enough. 
lends support to a theory favouring mental instability as the cause. As an ev;,ert 
medical witness. Dr Jill Brock actually employs this logic in defence of her patient 
Alice Freeman. "She/7at1ened her husband wilh a steamroller. What is that if it's not 
insane?" The prosecutor is quick to point out, the 'twisted' logic of this circular 
argument, but as a commonsense notion it is hard to resist. As textual subjects we are 
constructed (Fiske, 1987, p. 62) and drawn into accepting this 'commonsense' 
explanation as being not only possible, but even highly probable. 
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The problems associated with different types of 'knowing', are explored in this 
episode, with logic and facts being ranged against feelings and intuition. Offered for 
scrutiny are questions about the value that can, or should, be placed on judgements 
based on feelings. (the 'commonsense' feminine judgements). versus judgements 
based on facts (masculine judgments). Neither of these positions is seen to be gender 
specific and neither is;,offered as being wholly correct or infallible. In other words 
these oppositional discourses, are offered as competing forms of 'truth' which strive 
for acceptance. 
Both Carter Pike. the forensic pathologist. and Douglas Wambaugh. the lawyer, fall 
prey to the 'feminine' logic of 'knowing' something to be true despite 'factual' evidence 
to the contrary. Their rationale for adopting their respective positions. differs 
however. Carter. as a hopeful suitor. projects an idealised image of Alice Freeman 
which impairs his vision/judgement. Wambaugh's interest is in winning a difficult 
legal case even though this can only be effected by overwhelming the rational and 
logical with linguistic sophistry. Wambaugh achieves this end by forcing the medical 
specialist to admit that tempo,·ary menopausal insanity. though not probable is 
"possible", and because that which is pc,ssible cannot be ruled out. the jury have the 
option of acquittal through 'reasonable doubt'. 
Jill Brock is also drawn into supporting Alice Freeman's position but her judgements 
are seen to be affected by both professional and personal invoh·ement. 
Professionally, her failure to diagnose Alice's menopausal symptoms makes guilt a 
factor which influences her views and decisions. On a personal level, Jill's empathy 
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with the accused's situation becomes so totally subjective, she projects the onset of 
menopause on herself. "This could be happening to me. She's forty, I'm forty It 
could happen at.forty." 
The contrasting 'objective', masculine viewpoint is presented by Police Chief Jimmy 
Brock, who accepts at face value the truth of the facts as they appear. He sees the 
murder as the culmination of a carefully planned series of events which have been 
deliberately staged to focus attention on Alice Freeman's mental state. After 
explaining this scenario to her, he states, "J'/1 tell you what I know Alice. Menopause 
is a misunderstood condition. Doctors are confused. It lends itself perfectly to 
reasonable doubt. It's also .i temporary condition, you don't get institutionalised. As 
insanity de.fence's go, it's a good one. You can win and walk awey completely free." 
The logic of this argument is undeniable. Yet because it is given little narrative 
weight. the final scene, with its deliberately constructed twist-in-the-tale which 
exposes Alice Freeman's duplicity, is quite unexpected. Here the viewer is positioned 
with the transfixed Carter Pike, outside the window looking in, watching as the 
triumphant Alice Freeman toasts the success of her deliberately contrived, devious 
scheme. Like the participants within this drama, the textual subject is invited to be 
'duped' by the televisual discourse. 
The fact that this shocking revelation is shared, but limited to the viewer and Carter 
Pike, has several implications. The authorial intention is certainly not to suggest in 
this instance, that good will somehow triumph; that the evil-doers will be punished, 
and that those who were duped will come to understand and correct their mistakes. 
Just the opposite in fact. Although superficially, the narrative might seem to be 
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pointing to a failure of the legal system and to a vindication of the 'objective' 
viewpoint, this effect is muted and not strongly enforced or preferred as a reading 
position. Instead, the moral ambiguity implicit in the resolution offers great 
polysemic potential, and overall there is little attempt made to constrain meaning. 
Indeed the brevity of the final scene and its limited dissemination tends to inhibit its 
overall narrative power. In other words the discourses offered throughout the 
narrative. many of which are concerned with the problems of adolescent and 
menopausal sexuality, remain valid as important explorations of little understood and 
little discussed topics. Jill Brock's concerns about the menopause, as an unknown, 
frightening event which may change her physically and mentally, are replicated and 
validated through the comments of several other characters. For instance after a 
heated exchange about menopausal symptoms between Maxine, the police officer, 
and Ginny, the dwarf receptionist, Jill is allowed to summarise the situation: "This is 
the kind of shame and denial associa1ed wilh menopause which is /he reason in our 
201h century wifh modern medicine. 1ha1 we know almost nolhing abou/ ii." 
In another scene involving Wambaugh and his wife, Miriam, he asks her to explain 
how 'the change' affected her. "Did this menopause thing make you crazy?" Miriam is 
the only one with experiential authority to speak on the subject and even she finds it 
impossible to describe. "All I can explain Douglas is that you, the judge, Sher/ff 
Brock, Dr Marino, you'll never understand it and even Jill Brock she doesn't have a 
clue either. Until you've lived through it you can't understand it. " 
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The idea that change itself is the vehicle through which learning occurs, that process 
rather than resolution is the important thing, is both explicitly stated and implicitly 
structured within the text. The narrative in emphasising process, rather than the 
"goal-oriented .... clearly prioritized plot structure of masculine narratives" (Fiske, 
1987. p. 213 ). permits the interplay of discourses without clear prioritization. For 
example in Jill's frantic sexual activity, described by Jimmy as a "sex marathon", the 
viewer sees Jill arrive at an understanding of how her own fears of the menopause 
cause her to behave irrationally. Again. as Jill's close identification with Alice 
Freeman may cause her to misjudge, we viewers are similarly invited, both visually 
and verbally. to view Alice Freeman non-prejudicially. Jimmy too, is allowed to 
vacillate from his position. indicating that the certainty he initially espoused as 
'objective' knowledge. is not secure. He had simply ignored the possibility of other 
points of view. "Maybe ll"e are ll"rong The trwh seems to he that menopause is 
something we don't understand Don't l!,et me ll"rong I think she's guilty. hut I hal"e to 
admit I never even considered she could have heen innocent." 
The lack of equilibrium which follows the airing of this multi-layered and unresolved 
discourse on sexuality. offers great polysemic potential. Neither the narrative twist-
in-the-tale nor the serious character misjudgments are sufficiently powerful in 
themselves. to override or curb the progressive potential of the text on this issue. 
Textual Implications 
The implications that arise for Jaw are profound. Someone, and it is no accident that 
it is a woman, has deliberately set out to subvert the legal system and succeeded. It is 
exactly because Alice FREEMAN is a women, and her surname offers an interesting 
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irony, that she is able to activate a defence predicated on 'difference'. The difference 
in this case is that the biological entity known as the menopause is a condition, or set 
of symptoms, unique to women. This makes the defence a gender specific one. What 
is proposed in this text, through a variety of competing discourses on sexuality, is that 
the meaning of 'the menopause' is far too complex, not well enough understood and 
altogether too difficult a concept, to be easily categorised or contained within its 
medical definition. It is certainly too heterogenous to be fitted into any pre-
determined legal category. 
An example of the polysemic potential is apparent in the characterisation of the 
victim/victor Alice Freeman. For the greater part of the narrative, Alice is constructed 
as a powerless 'victim': firstly. in the face of her hormones which control her; and 
secondly. before the institutions of medicine and law. which have the power not only 
to speak for and on behalf of her, but also to judge her. The fact that she is able to 
fool them both. by 'acting the victim'. is less important in narrative terms than the 
discourses which surround the institutions' endeavours. As Fiske (1987, p. 91) 
observes. "excess allows for a subversive. or at least parodic, subtext". and Alice 
represents this 'in spades'. A possible reading position, consistent with the discourse 
of woman as being by nature mendacious and duplicitous. is available through Alice's 
deliberate and successful transgression against society's controlling institutional 
systems. This discourse has an clear referent in law where, in rape cases for example. 
women's evidence inevitably required corroboration. As Graycar and Morgan ( J 990, 
p. 339) report "there seems little doubt that these rules [of evidence) developed 
because of a widespread belief that women lie .... Such beliefs have by no means 
disappeared." 
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But an alternative reading, one consistent with Fiske's (!987, p. 191) "soap opera 
villainess" is also available and has obvious appeal for a feminist readership. From 
this subjectivity, Alice's success in the face of patriarchal control, including her ability 
to subvert institutional practices to her own advantage using her sexuality, can be read 
as a positive sign of female power in action. This position does involve the reader in 
moral ambiguity since Alice, after all, has murdered her husband and she quite 
blatantly deceives and uses people. Nevertheless similar inconsistencies and 
contradictions typically circulate within the soap's open text and are readily accepted 
within this context (Fiske, 1987, p. 191). Indeed, according to Fiske, such situations 
merely replicate inherent contradictions in society which are already well understood 
by women (p. 191). 
The unexpected resolution of the storyline. which shows Alice Freeman triumphant. 
also represents something of a narrative 'joke' which works to prevent textual closure 
(Fiske, p. 87). It catches the viewer unprepared and the sheer audacity of its 
implications, provoke a resolution that Fiske describes as a. "collision of discourses ... 
[which] produce(s) an explosion of meaning" (p. 87). There is subversive pleasure 
available in the narrative line that allows the subordinate, the encoded 'powerless 
victim', to take on the system and win out against authority. If, as Chase (I 986, pp. 
561-562) observes in relation to popular music and the law, a song such as I Fought 
the Law, and the Law Won, offers both subservience and resistance to authority 
depending on the performer, how much more empowering is the amended version She 
Fought the Law and She Won!? 
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The text is also subversive in its treatment of, and regard for, institutions, their 
practitioners and the experts who support them. Throughout the narrative there is a 
systematic dethroning of authority figures, who are variously shown as fallible, 
gullible, illogical and plainly dishonest. For example, the medical "OBGY expert" 
whose specialist advice on the menopause is used by the prosecution, is shown to 
have colluded with Alice to construct her menopausal syndrome. He is quite plainly 
dishonest. The gross perversion and misuse of 'knowledge' which his action signifies, 
gives rise to legitimate questioning and an undermining of the status of the expert and 
authority figure. 
In a less obvious and certainly less culpable way, Dr Jill Brock's personal failings, her 
gullibility and vulnerability in respect of Alice Freeman, inevitably lead to queries 
about professional fallibility. The situation applies too, with the lawyer Douglas 
Wambaugh who, in a similar way, is guilty of misjudging his client. The critique of 
both Jill Brock and Douglas Wambaugh, is defused to some extent by narrative 
motivation which provides a rationale for their actions. However W ambaugh's legal 
victory, which is really a moral defeat, allows questions to be asked about the 
legitimacy of law and the rights it assumes to regulate and dispense justice. 
At the base of the text lies an implied criticism of both the medical and legal 
institutions. Neither it seems, is able to discern fact from fabrication, truth from 
fiction or symptoms from simulation. The text presents the menopause as a area of 
'excess', whose meaning escapes beyond the confines of the text. The competing 
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discourses which constitute this meaning are certainly not able to be contained within 
the institutional boundaries oflaw or medicine. 
The overall critique is not directed at the 'difference' category per se, which some 
feminists regard as problematic anyway because of essentialism, but at the 
overarching problem of defining, classifying and finally delimiting what is known and 
can said about sexuality in our society. For this reason the text is less concerned with 
the 'guilty' individual who, in this case makes both the law and medicine work to her 
advantage, and more intent on revealing the processes by which competing discourses 
struggle to have their truths accepted as the 'truth'. Derry's (1988) comments on the 
genre, reinforce some of these points: 
Guilt in soap operas is complex .... Significantly, the use of the courtroom 
does not reflect the genre's faith in social justice or the American political 
system. On the contrary, the soap opera suggests that justice cannot be 
organised by a social agency, but only, on occasion, by a capricious fate. 
(p. 94) 
Although this text's plotline is ostensibly about the issue of a devious woman using a 
legal loophole to escape justice, its focus is n0• directed toward the legal ramifications 
of this action. For example, the use of 'difference' as a form of legal defence only 
available to women, is not critiqued to any significant degree. So, although the law's 
decision in this case proves to be erroneous, there is no suggestion that this defence 
position is inevitably wrong, unreasonable or improper. What is offered instead is the 
proposition that all forms of sexuality are naturally multifaceted and involve the 
'unknown'. This obviously positions them as discourses, in opposition to institutions, 
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such as law and medicine, whose discursive strategies construct discourses of 
certainty. 
The critique is thus directed more toward institutional forms, whose structures, 
personnel and language require conformity to established 'norms' within arbitrary 
categories. The fact that someone can assume the criteria of a category and then 
bypass both science and law's 'truth finding' processes, suggests fallibility on the part 
of these institutions. The lack of retribution apportioned to the perpetrator, signifies 
that the text's intent is to fix the 'blame' or source of the problem away from the 
individual. To this extent opportunities are offered to interrogate both the institutions 
oflaw and medicine. 
The intersection of law and science in this text presents a radical departure from what 
is standard practice in this field of representation. Medical experts are presented 
offering contrary opinions and in the final analysis, none is correct. Science is again 
cast in the role of aiding law in its judicial function, but contrary to expectations, the 
medical experts actually assist law in bringing about a miscarriage of justice. While, 
as the previous chapter illustrated, such events happen in practice, they are rarely 
represented in this light. This institutional association appears as one of double 
jeopardy with errors compounded and reinforced by each institution, one on the other. 
In conclusion this text can be seen as contravening the contention of this thesis that 
institutions are seldom critiqued. The polysemic potential of the text allows for other 
readings while the space and weight allocated to oppositional discourses mark it as a 
progressive text which challenges law's 'divine right' to control and regulate. 
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CHAPTER6 
6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to establish whether law's 'crisis of confidence' (Sackville Report, 
1994. p.3) is reflected in popular cultur:i! representations of law. The enquiry was 
premised on a perception that law is under challenge, which Cassidy (I 993, pp. 12-
13) identifies as occurring within the print media. It was proposed that as television 
texts represent significant sites for articulating the possibility for social change (Fiske, 
1 987; White 1992). these would provide the study's main investigative sites. 
This thesis devised three investigative categories to test whether challenges to law 
were visible in the audio-visual area of popular culture. These investigative 
categories- institutional theory. feminism and the law/science nexus- provided an 
analytic framework to examine how changes were impacting on law. The task was to 
determine to what extent any of the apparent impulses for change within the areas 
examined, found expression in mainstream culture; in other words. were visible as 
oppositional or alternative discourses within the popular texts selected. 
At the outset law's institutional position within western society was observed to be 
firmly established: its primary role being to dispense Justice' based on notions of 
order and control. This understanding of law, that its position and role were unique, 
and that its goal of Justice' epitomised what a proper society would want for its 
citizens. is a commonsense, assumed position. Critiquing this proposition by way of 
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institutional theory, this thesis suggested that institutions are not unique, but are at 
base, remarkably similar social constructions. Their tendency to accentuate their 
differences derives from their need to define their power and delineate the extent of 
their spheres of influence. Indeed institutions are characterised by marked 
similarities, including an hierarchical structure and a common mode of operation 
which includes an exclusive membership and a unique and defining language. An 
examination of law from this institutional perspective, as was undertaken in chapter 
one, confirmed law's close affinity with the 'model' institution. 
The relevance of this correlation was particularly significant in the light of its 
ideological implications. For. while law's regulatory power presented, and was 
accepted. as the 'norm' and 'natural', its discourse was able to discount and counteract 
any alternative accounts of reality. Thus its regulatory control derived from its power 
to define what is lawful, or conversely. unlawful. Indeed law's 'legal method' acts as a 
paradigm, offering the 'perfect' example of a set of pre-conceived criteria used to 
legitimise the disqualification of other viewpoints. It is used most effectively when 
employed to silence non-legally-sanctioned voices, such as those of minority groups 
like women, children, Aboriginals and others from non English speaking backgounds. 
The force and pervasiveness of law's discourse was observed most markedly in its 
strategies of incorporation. Feminists particularly noted the extent of law's 
encroachment and the expansion of its sphere of influence into the new and 
previously 'unregulated' areas of women's reproduction rights (Karpin, 1995; Smart, 
1994). The transient nature of law's hegemony becomes apparent in such encow1tc1s. 
Rather than some static or fixed entity, law's hegemony more closely approximated 
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the notion of a stable core, with a periphery that reacted and re-formed according to 
specific societal pressures and cultural demands. This thesis viewed this process of 
incorporation as intrinsically destabilising and surmised that instances of institutional 
challenge could well result from such expansionary forays. These were the theoretical 
understandings which formed the interrogative base, from which law's institutional 
traits were subsequently examined within texts. 
There was an expectation, based on law's sheer over-representation in popular culture, 
that some degree of narrative disruption would be detected in the texts, pointing to 
polysemic possibilities. At a superficial level this assumption found support in some 
law representations which did appear less constrained. especially when compared 
with those of science. However, textual analysis revealed that, although the storylines 
exhibited high levels of narrative disruption there was a marked uniformity in the type 
of disequilibrium favoured. It was one heavily reliant on character which pointed 
toward a reinforcing of the dominant discourse of individualism. 
Perhaps though, in the mere representational linking of law with the 'flawed' 
(individual) practitioner, an opportunity for challenging law, the institution, is 
offered? According to Cassidy's (1993) and Rowe's (1988) research, this type of 
generalising effect seldom occurs. Both report that individualised depictions of 
wrongdoing in such situations, rarely extend to reflect adversely on the institution 
itself. Textual analyses of Law of the Land and LA LAW, undertaken as part of this 
thesis, confirmed these findings. 
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Both of the texts, Law of the Land and LA LAW, tended to individualise agency as a 
way of deflecting scrutiny away from social structures as major determinants of 
action. In every case fallibility remained firmly attached to the individual protagonists 
with little or no critique of law being offered. Indeed, in Law of the Land, law was 
deliberately positioned as the narrative centrepiece with narrative resolutions being 
the province and jurisdiction of that institution. This was maintained even though, as 
the text revealed. human intervention was required to obtain law's Just outcome'. 
Such 'compensatory' acts were not constructed to reflect adversely on law, nor offered 
as evidence of any inadequacies in that institution's praxis. 
In LA LAW, the law was similarly shown as being able to arrive at the 'correct' 
decision, (eg. sexual discrimination was proven). despite the imperfections of the 
individuals involved. The subject matter of the storyline and its narrative outcome 
both had progressive aspects. as was eluded to in chapter five. However, the text 
actually set up for interrogation a range of 'feminist discourses', which were negatively 
presented as oppositional to, and therefore disruptive of. the status quo. Law. because 
of its role and position in the current social order, (the status quo), remained 
exnominated within the text. As a consequence, there was no necessity, in terms of 
narrative logic or meaning making, to critique law as an institution. Nor did the series 
find it necessary to investigate law's underpinning, its 'legal method' which, in 
demanding that 'truth' be proven by analogy required that one woman be victimised to 
gain justice for another. In texts such as these, where legal institutional features, such 
as being value-free, objective and gender neutral, function within the narrative as 
synonyms for certainty and moral rectitude, there can be little expectation that law 
itself will be critiqued. 
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By contrast a range of institutional challenges were observed occurring within the 
legal drama/action/soap Picket Fences. This fictionalised representation of small 
town life. characterised social 'norms' as in a constant state of flux. Discourses which 
"ould commonly represent and reinforce the normal or 'common sense' view of 
society. functioned in this series as narrative variables. In the particular episode 
examined. there was a deliberate strategy to dethrone institutional knowledges by re-
prioritising the hierarchy of their discourses. This technique opened up for scrutiny. 
and made vulnerable to critique. law and medicine, the two key institutions involved 
in the narrative. The fallibility of both institutions. made manifest in the acquittal of 
the 'guilty' woman. challenged law's discourse of certainty. Furthermore. the text's 
deliberately open ended and unresolved plotline. which blatantly disregarded standard 
ethical and moral issues, such as the need to punish the 'law breaker'. pointed to the 
text's validation of discourses opposed to dominant cultural values in respect to law 
and morality. 
The lack of retribution accorded the guilty party in Picket Fences contrasted "ith La" 
of the Land and LA LAW, and this outcome was significant because it worked to 
positively direct 'blame' away from the individual. In offering such a reading Picket 
Fences demonstrated how texts really do have the potential to "shift the responsibility 
for the crime away from the (evil) individual and place it firmly onto the social 
system" (Fiske, 1987, p. 86). In other words. deep seated social structures and 
organisations that operate as concealed sites of power, can be opened up textually as 
potential investigative sites. Picket Fences is the one text examined which 
significantly contradicted the contention of this thesis that law, the institution, is rarely 
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critiqued. The range, textual space and narrative weight afforded oppositional 
discourses within this particular text, indicated that critiques of law can, in certain 
circumstances. coincide with preferred reading positions. 
This thesis also contended that while institutions are naturally structured to resist 
scrutiny. some are especially privileged in this regard. It argued that these institutions 
claim hierarchical superiority, and an associated resistance to interrogation, because of 
their at1iliation with science. Claims to be ·something like science', were seem to 
confer a pe .1icular resistance. Law proved to be just such an institution with media 
representations that worked discursively to reinforce the ideology. 
As \\as observed in chapter two. science's claims to infallibility tended to generate 
representations that were commensurate and compatible with that ideological position 
(Gardner & Young. 1981 ). This contrasts with law. "hich does not claim infallibility 
and so encourages its discursive representational strategies to be less rigidly enforced 
or controlled. However. representational overlaps do occur and these were observed 
most notably at the junction between science and law. This thesis argued that. in such 
encounters. science's discourse supported Im, 's claims to 'truth' through the hierarchy 
of discourses which grants 'natural' precedence to science. Science's discourse also 
had a further discursive power to invest judicial outcomes with a certainty and 
'rightness' that made them dit1icult to counter or reject. Forensic science was selected 
as the site to examine this junction between science and law; firstly, because it was a 
problematic site in many miscarriage of justice cases. (Wilson. 1991) and secondly. 
because it remains a favoured representational site within popular cultural texts. 
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ln its representation of the law/science nexus, Phoenix typified a whole range of 
similarly framed texts, which have narratives motivated by the strong investigative 
elements of the cop/mystery genre. In these texts narrative tensions typically revolve 
around 'solving the case' and any problems that obstruct the desired outcome, 'the 
solution', are inevitably resolved by the intervention of science. Accordingly science 
is positioned in the role of plot 'problem solver'. This narrative tendency supports 
textual closures which are predicated on science providing the one (and only possible) 
answer. Such a narrative structure provokes a predictable ideological outcome as. 
armed with science's incontrovertible 'truth', the judicial outcome appears obvious. 
and therefore. uncontestable. 
Phoenix, for example, used science as its guarantee of narrative 'truth' while also 
attempting to appropriate science as its paradigmatic model. It utilised the 
representational strategies of the conventional TV science format by employing 
discursive practices designed to curtail meaning making and reduce reader 
empowerment. These strategies included: valorising the 'value-free' scientist; 
authenticating science's uniqueness through its own scientific language; merging 
verbal and visual elements to inscribe the viewer into the screen space; and employing 
the contrived visual style of 'naturalism' to authenticate the 'reality' of the fictional 
world. The technical device of heavy realism was a common feature of both Phoenix 
and Law of the Land and their adherence to it, and reliance on its visual form. hinted 
at its central role in determining textual meaning. Analyses of these texts 
demonstrated that, when reproducing the 'real' is a central tenet and a defining 
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characteristic of the text, dominant discourses tend to be advantaged in terms of 
preferred readings. 
Texts such as Phoenix, which promulgate an arcane view of science as inevitably 
reifying law, actually replicate science's own discursive strategy of positioning readers 
regressively. Furthermore, by positioning science as an infallible adjunct to law, 
Phoenix lent support to a deterministic and regressive stance which preserved and 
promoted a problematic status quo, already identified as occurring within law. This 
gives rise to a contradiction, in that texts such as Phoenix, which traditionally assert 
'absolute certainty' in outcome, and employ naturalism as a standard form of 
verification, are at variance with actuality (Bourke. 1993; Wilson, 1991). The 
profession's failure to acknowledge the extent of the challenge within. represented by 
forensic science. is paralleled without, in the area of media representation. 
By contrast, in the different geme of 'faction· or the 'fictionalised fact' film. Evil 
Angels presented science as a contested discourse whose claims to certainty were 
precariously based on various cultural and rhetorical practices. In framing science as 
just one discourse among many, and thereby rejecting its assumed position on top of 
the hierarchy of discourses, the text positioned and empowered the reader to 
interrogate science's claims to speak the 'truth'. By dismantling and discounting 
science's 'validating' strategies, Evil Angels encouraged a scrutiny of law. Exposing 
science's fallibility led progressively to law's credibility being undermined. In 
acknowledging the contentious nature of the science/law nexus, as it occurred in an 
actual case, Evil Angels opened up textual spaces for alternative interpretive accounts 
or oppositional discourses to form and circulate. The presence of oppositional 
I 
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discourses offered the possibility for change to occur. This text clearly posed some 
challenge to law through its interrogation of science, but in this regard it is a very rare 
text indeed. 
This thesis also dealt with expectations, expressed in chapter four, that feminist 
concerns would be offered textual space within the framework of at least some legal 
narratives. This assumption arose from feminist critiques of law which in exposing 
law's patriarchal praxis had resulted in some reform of law. In examining these 
expectations, the thesis analysed how discourses. ostensibly promoted as 'women's 
issues', were positioned within the textual hierarchy of discourses. It hypothesised 
that law's institutional discourse would prevail in such encounters and this proved to 
be the case. except for the one notable exception. Picket Fences. 
At best the thesis identified a degree of recognition by media texts. of the necessit) to 
appeal to a female subjectivity as a integral part of society's audience mix. This was 
most visible in the selection of genre form. the soap opera: in the choice of narrati,e 
subject matter: and also in gender characterbations. Superficially each 0f the texts. 
LA LAW. Phoenix. Law of the Land and Picket Fences. demonstrated evidence of 
feminism as a fur.national influence. Indeed. critiqued from a perspective other than 
law. each of these texts could be considered progressive in some aspects. For 
example. all the women in these texts were presented as occupying roles within the 
public sphere. and within the work environment they were depicted as naturally 
skilled and competent professionals. Significantly also. because it is rarely included 
in masculine narratives, aspects of their private life were seen impacting on their 
public personnaes. The subject matter of some of the narratives atso appeared to 
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address issues of specific concern to women. The selection of these as issues, actually 
signified the extent to which they have become, or are in the process of becoming, 
mainstream societal concerns. 
Despite these positive features, textual analysis revealed that the mere raising or airing 
of an issue, like for example the case of sexual discrimination in LA LAW, did not 
guarantee support for a feminist viewpoint or imply textual progressiveness. A 
feminist reading of this text revealed substantial degrees of institutional incorporation 
within a narrative fran1ed to undermine and discount legitimate feminist aspirations in 
the area of sexual discrimination. Law was positioned as the discourse of certainty 
discursi,ely empowered to repress contradictions. represented in the text as women's 
'illogical' aspirations. so as to arri, eat ideological closure. 
Picket Fences, b> contrast. foregrounded contradictions in its narrative and characters. 
and these worked discursi,cly to undern1ine the power of the two institutions. law and 
medicine. The obvious fallibility of these institutions was directly apprehended 
through the narrative incursion of a feminist discourse on sexuality: mature sexuality 
at that. which is in itself a departure from the 'norm' in tern1s of what and who is 
commonly represented. Picket Fences in presenting a disruption between the 
accepted nexus of knowledge/power and 'truth'. otlered reading positions which 
challenged the discourses of dominant ideology in this area. Its representational 
strategics and rhetorical devices encouraged a critical examination of 'accepted' 
institutional practices and these marked it as a text, distinct from the rest. These 
principal features of difference related directly to its genre. 
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The role of genre. 
In textual terms gender concerns emerged most strongly through genre selection. The 
thesis' hypothesis that genre would be an important determining factor in meaning 
making, found confirmation in the texts examined. While the findings indicated that 
non~ of the texts was specifically engaged in a critique of law per se, there was 
evidence that some oppositional discourses were indirectly challenging law's 
hegemony. A common feature of their textual discourses was the obvious correlation 
between the range of alternative reading positions offered. in other words the 
polysemy of the text, and the genre type. Typically heteroglossia and the open ended 
narrative form were characteristic of the cross genre soap/drama text. 
The current form of this text which is available, and of which Picket Fence is 
representative, is noteworthy because of its high quality production values and 
popularity with viewers. These texts utilise narratives based on serious social issues 
and link these with representational strategies which offer audiences a sophisticated 
blend of pleasure and challenge. Currently there are several highly rating examples of 
this 'progressive' genre mix. available on television.9 
Genre's "contract" (Fiske, 1987, p. 114), which relates to audiences' expectations of 
texts, limits meaning by imposing parameters on textual form and content. On a 
continuum, tightly controlled, formulaic texts appear as regressive whereas the 
previously cited, cross genre soap forms, are at the progressive end of the scale. In 
this research project, the most obvious example of the regressive text was Phoenix, 
which appropriated science as its paradigmatic model. Reproducing the old style TV 
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cop show with a reliance on a naturalistic documentary style, Phoenix appeared as 
distinctly arcane and outmoded, especially when compared with its US counterpart 
NPYD Blue. In this new look, US cop/drama, the emphasis is on a soft-focus visual 
style with extra narrative weight accorded the feminine-inclusive, soap elements of 
the drama. 
The boundary stretching features of the new cross genre texts demonstrate cognisance 
of the multiple subjectivities of audiences. In actively promoting a range of discursive 
reading positions these texts, with their adroit mix of fact and fiction, and serious 
content with parodic and self reflexive forms, presume a 'sophisticated' social 
subjectivity on the part of television audiences. Their textual complexity assume, an 
active, engaged and 'knowing' readership familiar with other televisiom texts and genre 
types. This presumption contrasts markedly with the 'imagined audience' of Phoenix, 
and the TV science programme as described by Gardner and Young ( 1981 ). Within 
the science community it is interesting to observe a recent shift in attitude toward the 
genre of the soap opera. The popularity of the 'soap' commends itself as a resource for 
science to exploit, as a way of improving science's own public profile. While such 
initiatives might prove advantageous to science in the short term, this genre's 
notorious polysemic potential (Fiske, 1987, p. 194) could actually compromise 
science's current position of cultural dominance. 10 
It was proposed at the outset of this thesis, that television texts represent significant 
sites where the possibility for social change may be observable. Certainly with Picket 
Fences, Evil Angels and Making Babies, although their narrative forms and 
representational strategies were radically different from each other, each text acted as 
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a "frame within which ... oppositional discourses [could) be heard" (Fiske, 1987, p. 
47). The text Making Babies in critiquing the science of reproductive technology, 
adopted an overtly feminist interpellation within a factual framework. Using a 
feminist perspective the text sought, by juxtaposing various negative and conflicting 
representational and rhetorical strategies, to position viewers oppositionally to this 
particular area of science. Its didactic interpellation however, inclined it toward being 
highly prejudicial to some readers and invited resistant oppositional responses. Fiske 
( 1987, p. 46) observes that radical texts which eschew anticipated cultural demands 
for entertainment and pleasure, run the risk of alienating viewers. Instigating social 
change requires that a balance be struck, between textual pleasure or engagement, and 
challenge in the form of meaning making. 
This necessary balance seems to have been achieved, in the cross genre forms 
currently being produced in the Unite; States. Their accessibility and popular appeal. 
masks a range of subversive and genuinely radical discourses which operate within 
the conventional dominant form. Picket Fences is just one of several boundary 
extending soap/dramas which work at two levels, as both a genre and a gender mix 
(Fiske, 1987, p. 113). Those who desire to instigate and promote institutional change 
need to become involved in the formational agendas of texts such as these. In other 
words, feminist who seek law reform, should consider the possibility of contributing, 
as has happened in feminist legal fictions, to feminine genre forms (soap/dramas) 
which interpellate to a gender mix, rather than those like Phoenix and its successor 
Janus which replicate an old masculine genre form of closed text, interpellating 
principally to a male readership. 11 
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This thesis' research demonstrates that a receptive vehicle exists, in terms of genre, 
for addressing institutional hegemony. In terms of readership too, there is a receptive 
cultural climate familiar with the contradictory demands of the cross genre form. The 
task is now, to produce texts which are inventive enough to challenge yet pleasurable 
enough to make the meaning making worth the effort. 
As was evidenced in this thesis, calls by feminists for reforms to law have resulted in 
anomalous outcomes; either reforms have succeeded in reinforcing law's hegemony 
or they have produced undesirable or unpredictable results (Smart, 1991; Naffine, 
1992). The work of this study suggests that law, the institution, might be susceptible 
to reform initiatives generated from outside that institution. These initiatives could 
well form the basis of narrative material. from which a range of legal stories for 
popular culture could be constructed. In recommending such a strategy this study 
recognises the insightfulness of Graycar's (1994, p. 20) assessment of law, that "there 
are enormous obstacles to women's stories occupying the same space and ... the same 
authority as the stock stories which underpin the commonsense of deeply gendered 
legal discourses." This thesis proposes that these stories can, and indeed should, be 
told and that popular culture offers both the avenue and the vehicle. The narratives 
though, should be women's own stories. 
Implications 
The purpose of the study was to examine whether challenges to law, the institution, 
were observable within popular culture's audio visual field, particularly television. It 
was proposed that law's position and status as an institution, and its powerful 
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discourse of control and regulation, would act as a major impediment to oppositional 
or alternative positions being granted textual S!'s!Ce. This proved to be the case in 
most of the texts examined. However, an important finding of this study was the 
identification of a medium, in the new cross genre texts, which accommodates 
genuinely, in both form and content, a range of oppositional discourses. 
In assessing the progressive impact of these texts on potential audiences, this thesis 
acknowledges a limitation in the lack of audience studies research to support 
predicted outcomes. While such research is recognised as being an important adjunct 
to this study, it was beyond the scope of the present project. In recommending these 
texts as useful vehicles for addressing institutional hegemony, this thesis further 
recommends appropriate research into audience studies. 
Nevertheless the findings of this research project demonstrate that reform possibilities 
exist in popular cultural forms and that certain genre types provide appropriate frames 
for referencing new meanings. These findings have significant practical application 
for reformers, such as Graycar (1990), Naffine (1992) and Smart(l99!), who see a 
real need for change to law but who view law reform as inevitably problematic. In 
contextualising law within the frame of fictionalised entertainment while utilising the 
progressive cross genre form, presents audiences with the challenge of reading 
critically. In practical terms, audiences are offered an opportunity to evaluate 
oppositional positions, to work out solutions and to deal with uncertainty; all of which 
provide an opening for "potential discourse[ s] of resistance" (Fiske, 1987, p. 70) to 
form and circulate. It is in the recognition ofone's own lack of power and in resisting 
that situation, that the first "vital step" (p. 70) toward effecting change is begun. 
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According to the results of this thesis, the new cross genre law texts offer just this 
potential to those who advocate changes to law, the institution. 
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APPENDIX 
I. The relevant sample material was taken from the Melbourne Age, and covered a ten 
year period from the nineteen eighties to the nineteen nineties. Over this period 
Cassidy (1993, p. 8) notes not only a substantial increase in "law-centred matters" 
being covered by the press, but also a change in the way they are being presented. 
2. Something of an analogous situation was reported on the front page of ( 1995, June 
24). The West Australian under the heading "Scandal of black and white twins". !VF 
twins born in Holland of Caucasian parents were shown to be racially different from 
each other. The storyline advised that one twin, Teun is white, brother Koen is black. 
3. Within "regimes of representation" Hartley, (1992, p. 46) contends that news has the 
equivalent status of science. afforded a special position based on a scientific premise 
that fact and objective representation are more real and hence more likely to be true 
than fiction. 
4. Noted examples include the Chamberlain case, Birmingham Six, Splatt case. Rendell 
case, cited by Bourke.( 1993). 
5. The feminist perspective has a more general application too. Its oppositional 
positioning provides it with a particular perspective which can be utilised to critique 
other social spaces beyond gender, such as class and race. "(A) feminist approach is 
able to show the discordance between the legal model of the person and the attributes 
and needs of social groups other than women" (Nafline, 1992, p. xiii). 
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6. MacKinnon's assertion is based on a particular feminist position which holds that 
socially constructed categories and attributes are arbitrarily assigned by gender, with 
all power automatically being attached to the male, irrespective of race or class. 
7. A report of (1993, November 5). The West Australian, p. 5 "Husband Killer Walks 
Free" stated this was believed to be the first case in WA where the 'battered wife 
syndrome' had 1:-een recognised as a legal defence. It has subsequently been used 
elsewhere in Australia. 
8. Examples include NPYD Blue, Northern Exposure, Picket Fences, ER. 
9. C•ment examples of this 'progressive' genre mix include: Chicago Hope and ER, 
which routinely explore issues of medical ethics, law, class and race in a medical 
setting; Northern Exposure, which offers a unique cross cultural mix of issues 
concerned with race, class, gender, ageism and the environment; NPYD Blue, which 
examines issues of law, class, race and gender in an urban police setting; The X-
Files, which explores many facets of science, the environment and institutional power 
from a science fiction perspective. 
10. "Engineers aim to build new image." "We have LA LAW but why isn't there LA 
Engineering to show what they can do and also their personal lives and problems," 
reported quote from Dr Martha Sloan, International President of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers. ( 1993, October 15). The West Australian, p. 35. 
147 
"Chemist backs soapie message." "There should be a television soap opera on 
scientists to make them more human to the general population," reported quote from 
Ben Selinger Professor of Chemistry at ANU. (1993, September 29). The West 
Australian, p. 9. 
"TV series a pull for women vets." "(T)he series [A CoW1try Practice] romanticised 
the profession. giving it a positive public image which encouraged women to consider 
veterinary a worthy career," reported quote from David Fraser, Dean of Veterinary 
Science at the University of Sydney. ( 199~. May 2). The West Australian. p. 31 
11. Despite attempts to 'sell' Janus as a text which would appeal to women. 1994. October 
9-15th. (TV Extra) p. 20. with the heading. Women Rule in the Battle for the Bar. its 
masculine genred form makes it similar in appeal to its predecessor Phoenix. 
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